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No New NATO Proposals Yet at Vienna Talks

LD1409205489 Moscow TASS in English 2023 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Vienna September 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov:

At today's plenary meeting at the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, held in the Vienna Palace Hofburg, NATO countries, contrary to expectations, have not submitted new proposals that were publicised by the press in advance. Local political observers believe this fact bespeaks of considerable differences within the North Atlantic Alliance.

Going by publications in the press, these proposals of measures for stabilisation, arms limitations, information and control were to be submitted at the beginning of the third round which opened on September 7. With a reference to representatives of Western delegations at the talks the news agency APA reports that Greece objected to the discussion of a new NATO document. It does not agree above all with NATO's proposal for the ceilings for troop participation in exercises and declares for a lower ceiling than that envisaged by the allies.

Head of the GDR delegation, Ambassador Claus-Dieter Ernst told reporters here that there is a need for the readiness to compromise and for renunciation of the striving for unilateral advantages so that the Vienna talks on disarmament be a success.

He said the proposals of socialist countries confirm that the Warsaw Treaty organisation is prepared not only for sharp cuts in troops and armaments, but also for thorough-going changes in the structure of the military potentials remaining after reductions.

The GDR diplomat said the partners in the talks agreed to work out a treaty on the reduction of armed forces and armaments possibly as early as in 1990. But one gets at times the impression that some in NATO wish these cuts to apply to the West in a smaller degree and that NATO is not very eager to contribute to disarmament.

Meanwhile there is a need for a clear answer to the question what consequences the final agreement will have for the military potential of the North Atlantic Alliance, Ernst said.

Functions of Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Cited

LD1409174989 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—By TASS Military Writer Vladimir Chernysehv:

The Soviet-American agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centres was signed in Washington two years ago, on September 15, 1987. Without doubt it was one of the results of new political thinking, the evidence of the fact that both sides are aware of the need of practical steps to avert the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of misconstruction of each other's intentions or some accidents, for instance, breakages and faults in weapon systems.

It is also apparent that the practical activity of the centres established as a result of the agreement holds a definite place in the overal process of confidence-building between the USSR and the USA.

Asked how the nuclear risk reduction centre of the USSR is functioning, Colonel Nikolay Shabalin, deputy chief of the centre, said the following: At first the centre's functions were relatively modest, the sides were informing each other of the launchings of intercontinental ballistic missiles beyond the limits of national territories.

Later the USSR and the USA started informing each other of all launchings of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Then a fundamentally new and considerable task was assumed by the centre: To relay information about the state of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to which the INF Treaty applies.

This information includes the data as to which missiles are stationed at specific bases, the coordinates of these bases, the number and types of missiles stationed there, the information on covers and means of transportation at the bases, etc.

The sides inform each other of the slightest changes in these parameters. The centres also relay information about the intentions to carry out inspections, the number of group of inspections, and the time for their arrival. The personnel of the centres is directly involved in the holding of inspections: Its duties include bringing inspectors to the sites, and providing accommodation and work for them.

It follows from Colonel Shabalin's explanations that the functions of the centre are numerous and varied and that the workload of its staffers is quite large. Nevertheless, the functions of the centre and the volume of the tasks it handles will considerably increase in the future.

With the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction, the nuclear risk reduction centres will undoubtedly be involved in its implementation. If the cares of the staffers of the nuclear risk reduction centres increase, as the arms race is stopped, they will only be pleased to make personal contributions to the process of disarmament and confidence building.

Sychev Interviewed on Potential Changes in CEMA

LD1409225389 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—"To go over from interaction between socialist CMEA member-countries at the governmental level to direct external economic contacts between their enterprises is the chief task faced now by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," the council secretary Vyacheslav Sychev told TASS.

He noted that the process is connected with updating the mechanism of multilateral cooperation—from coordinating economic policies and plans to working out fundamentals of legislation on cooperation.

The executive committee of the socialist economic organisation is now working out the general concept of restructuring the CMEA activities. But decisions are made in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance on the basis of consensus, which is not easy to reach as approaches of the countries to individual issues are far from identical.

The issues in question relate, first of all, to problems of pricing, currency, finance and crediting.

The emphasis on reforming the mechanism of cooperation in the CMEA activity, the council's secretary said, does not imply that the council's agencies have discontinued work along other lines. But we tackle problems in a new way.

For example, enterprises and economic organisations of the CMEA member-countries will be considered in coordinating economic development plans for 1991-1995.

The press in the West alleges that the coordination of economic plans is an utterly formal procedure and the multilateral cooperation between CMEA countries is an unrealizable ambition.

Nevertheless, there is no denying CMEA achievements in supplying member countries with fuel, raw materials and other products, which are a result of plan coordination.

It is quite another matter that these achievements can no longer satisfy us. We are dissatisfied with the level of cooperation development, the quality of mutually supplied products and think that the CMEA countries' export structure is not consistent with present requirements.

Speaking about the perspectives of creating a single CMEA market, the possibility of which is called in question in the Western media, Sychev stressed that to join or not to join such a market is the question which each country has to decide independently, while the task of the council is to create economic and legal conditions for direct interaction of economic organisations on the market. Work in this direction is being done now.

"I cannot say where the french newspaper "LE MONDE" and the English magazine "THE LISTENER" obtain facts that enable them to draw categorical conclusions about a split in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of the socialist countries and other sensational conclusions that leave one puzzled," the secretary said.

"If Western reporters are looking for authentic information from the horse's mouth, so to say, they may turn to the CMEA secretariat offices for the purpose".

Shevardnadze Meets Warsaw Pact Deputy Ministers

PM1509085589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Ties Are Developing"]

[Text] On the same day [13 September] E.A. Shevardnadze received the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states.

During the talk, which took place in a warm, friendly atmosphere, there was a discussion of measures aimed at stepping up collabroation between the allied states in the consolidation of peace, disarmament, the creation of a stable and secure Europe, and the fundamental perestroyka of international relations on a new basis. Questions connected with preparation for the next sitting of the foreign ministers committee in Warsaw were also touched on.

The following took part in the meeting: I. Ganev, Bulgarian deputy foreign minister; I. Esi [name as transliterated], Hungarian deputy foreign minister; E. Krabatsch, GDR deputy foreign minister; B. Kulski, Polish deputy foreign minister; C. Oncea, Romanian deputy foreign minister; P. Sadovsky, Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister; and I.P. Aboimov, USSR deputy foreign minister and general secretary of the Political Consultative Committee.

Shevardnadze Has 'New Proposals' for U.S. Visit

AU1509144389 Paris AFP in English 1432 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, Sept 15 (AFP)—Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will offer "new proposals" when he meets next week with President George Bush and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said Friday.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov gave no hint of what the new proposals might be, but said the meeting which Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Bush are due to hold in Washington on Thursday would be a "good start".

Mr. Gerasimov expressed "satisfaction" over a recent White House statement of support for reforms in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Shevardnadze is scheduled to go on from Washington to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for two days of talks with Mr. Baker on bilateral relations, human rights, regional conflicts, disarmament and international, terrorism.

Earlier this week, Mr. Shevardnadze called for new initiatives in disarmament talks, criticizing Washington for being indecisive and holding up progress. [passage omitted]

Gerasimov Holds Foreign Ministry Briefing 15 Sep

Previews Shevardnadze Talks in U.S.

LD1509112189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1102 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow, 15 Sep (TASS)—The forthcoming meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and President George Bush on 21 September in Washington is a "good beginning" for his visit to the United States, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, declared at a briefing here today.

Speaking about the meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, planned for 22-23 September, he noted that the Soviet minister will bring a number of new proposals to it. "We are relying on the U.S. side also to suggest specific, new ideas," the USSR Foreign Ministry representative added.

Notes Rogachev Discussion With Japanese

LD1509124789 Moscow TASS in English 1238 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Soviet and Japanese [deputy] foreign ministers Igor Rogachev and Hisashi Owada confirmed a mutual intention to exert efforts aimed at developing and expanding the political dialogue and strengthening contacts in various spheres between the USSR and Japan, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He said that a working consultative meeting of the two diplomats took place in Moscow on September 13. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze received the Japanese representative who handed over a message to the Soviet minister from Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama.

During the consultations, the sides discussed in detail questions on preparation for a meeting between the Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers at the session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. The sides also exchanged opinions on bilateral relations and some international problems.

Gerasimov pointed out that the sides noted with satisfaction changes for the better in Soviet-Japanese relations, which were initiated by Shevardnadze's visit to Japan in December 1988.

Kozyrev Outlines Expectations for UN Session

LD1409201189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1103 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow, 14 Sep (TASS)—Only a departure from confrontational polemics will make it possible to turn the United Nations into a forum for elaborating mutually acceptable solutions and agreeing on the stands and actions of states in the international arena, Andrey Kozyrev, chief of the International Organizations Directorate at the USSR Foreign Ministry, has stated. "The Soviet Union expects," he said, "that the line aimed at strengthening and expanding the processes of renewal in the authoritative international organization will be continued in the course of the discussions at the 44th session of the UN General Assembly, which begins next Tuesday."

Touching on the USSR's specific priorities at the forthcoming session in a conversation with a TASS diplomatic correspondent, Andrey Kozyrev paid particular attention to strengthening the UN's preventive functions. He noted that in the past 2 years the United Nations, and its secretary general in particular, has made a significant contribution to the settlement process between Iran and Iraq, in the south of Africa, and in Afghanistan. At the same time, a number of serious problems also exist in this sphere. In the main, they amount to convincing all the parties involved in a particular conflict of the need to turn away from counting on force and to adopt political methods of pursuing a settlement. Otherwise, Andrey Kozyrev said, the efforts of the world community, the intermediaries, the military observers, and the UN peacekeeping forces will not lead to the desired results.

Closer cooperation between the USSR and the United States within the framework of the United Nations could have a positive influence on enhancing the organization's role, in his opinion. At the same time, the diplomat stressed that such cooperation does not in any way mean some kind of "deal between the superpowers." It is a matter of joint initiatives put forward in conditions of a discussion, which is absolutely equal with all other parties, to ensure general forward movement.

As an example of such "constructive parallelism," he cited the mutual understanding reached between the USSR and the United States at the bilateral consultations on banning chemical weapons.

Andrey Kozyrev believes that the joint proposals submitted by the superpowers in this field can enrich the multilateral dialogue and accelerate the elaboration of a convention on a comprehensive and total ban on chemical weapons within the framework of the disarmament conference in Geneva.

United States & Canada

Yeltsin Advocates 'Independence' for Republics

LD1409175189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1547 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Excerpt] Washington, 14 Sep (TASS)—Completing his trip around the United States B.N. Yeltsin spoke in Chicago at the Council for International Relations. According to a UPI report, he stated in particular that in the course of the meetings that had taken place with President Bush and Secretary of State Baker a plan for the aid to the Soviet Union had been discussed. One of the points in this plan, according to him, envisions the elimination by the United States of the restrictions on trade with the USSR. Yeltsin said that he would not talk about the other points in this plan in detail "out of respect for President Bush." "We discussed measures that would be mutually advantageous," he said.

In reply to the question of whether anything had changed regarding the issue of granting most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union, the White House press secretary M. Fitzwater elaborated at the briefing, "I did not hear of any changes."

UPI noted that B.N. Yeltsin said he hopes to learn in the United States how his group of deputies can achieve success in the framework of the Soviet political system. "We have decided that it is best to learn from the United States, where democracy has existed for 200 years." He said he supports the concept of a multiparty system, but is not counting on his group becoming the second party, for which "there is no social basis in the Soviet Union."

In an interview with the PBS television, B.N. Yeltsin answered numerous questions, including:

Question: Is it possible for the USSR to implement aims of perestroyka which, as you have said, people want, while it remains a communist state?

Answer: Well, "communist" is a word that, in my view, needs, generally, to be understood simply as a dream or an idea one can constantly cherish, but only cherish—it cannot be used. What is needed is some sort of a new model of socialism that would be constructed taking account not only of the experience of socialist countries, and of our experience, of course, but also of the experience of the United States, for instance, which has more than 200 years experience in bourgeois democracy. From the point of democracy, you have something for others to learn, and this, too, must be made use of when constructing this new model of socialism.

Question: Can you combine communism with democracy in your country?

Answer: Communism, I am saying once again, is something that exists in one's head and in one's dream. Whereas socialism and democracy—socialism that is not a slogan-based and barrack-room type of socialism but is renewed socialism, a socialism renewed in a new model of socialism—this type of socialism can be combined with democracy.

Question: Do you still regard yourself as a communist?

Answer: Yes, I have not been expelled from the party.

Question: But does the idea—I mean the communist idea—still govern your mind?

Answer: It is a sort of dream beyond the clouds, so to speak.

Question: What do you think can be done, looking at the aspirations of the Baltic states for independence?

Answer: They must be given independence, they must be given economic sovereignty and economic independence and rights and financial autonomy. Beyond that, let them decide for themselves whether to secede from the USSR or not.

I believe that the national republic must definitely have independence.

Question: In our country, many view Gorbachev as a hero, a historic personality who has sharply changed the course of the giant ship of state. Is this the way we should react to him? How should Americans react to Mikhail Gorbachev?

Answer: You have a certain euphoria about this issue—of the first 2 years of perestrokya. You simply do not know the real problems now in our country. If you knew, you would lose some of the euphoria. [passage omitted]

U.S. Media Interest in Yeltsin 'Tremendous'

PM1409153789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Correspondent A. Shalnev dispatch: "From the Viewpoint of the U.S. Press"]

[Text] New York—Boris Yeltsin's tour of the United States is arousing—without exaggeration—tremendous interest in the U.S. press. They are writing a great deal and in detail and—to speak of television—showing him frequently.

I believe the interest is understandable, taking into account the fact that certain mass media see Boris Yeltsin as some kind of leader of the opposition in the Soviet parliament. And this is the first time such a person has been to America. It is almost a sensation.

There is heightened attention to what the people's deputy says, what he does, and how he does it: Reporters notice literally everything, even the tiniest gestures. THE NEW YORK TIMES, for example, described in detail how the Soviet parliamentarian reacted when he flew in a helicopter past Manhattan and the small island on which the Statue of Liberty stands. "On seeing the statue Boris N. Yeltsin smiled broadly and started clapping.

and then, in a spontaneous gesture of delight, he raised his finger as if something special was taking shape in the relationship between them—him, the restless prince of the Soviet Communist Party and her, the symbol of American liberty."

Or this observation, also in THE NEW YORK TIMES: "By managing on just 2 hours' sleep Mr Yeltsin demonstrates his adaptability to the way Washington functions.... At the double, abandoning meetings with less influential people in cases where more influential people appear on the horizon. By the end of his stay in Washington just one of the preplanned meetings has taken place—a meeting with eight senators, including Bill Bradley, Democrat from New Jersey, who on the whole is skeptical about the expediency of major U.S. investment in support of changes in the Soviet Union."

The press did not overlook the fact that the White House took a comparatively restrained attitude to the very idea of a meeting between Yeltsin and George Bush and delayed it until the very last minute, that the meeting took place not in the Oval Office but in the office of the president's assistant for national security affairs, where the head of the administration "dropped in for 15 minutes," and that, contrary to tradition, the White House did not disseminate any photographs of that meeting. But a statement was issued, in which White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater emphasized that the administration did not intend to accord Yeltsin "a platform for dissidence." According to Fitzwater, Bush told Yeltsin that the American people share the hopes for perestroyka's success.

"But, for Yeltsin," THE NEW YORK TIMES remarks, "the substance of the meetings with administration figures was less important than the fact that these meetings took place." After another meeting the newspaper continues, "the Siberian returned to his limousine with the smile of a victor on his face."

Another aspect that attracts the local press' attention: the acuteness of the deputy's critical comments on the Soviet Union's situation—an acuteness combined with the enthusiastic tone of his comments on America. THE NEW YORK POST accompanied a series of such comments with the headline: "Your slums strike us as a dream, Yeltsin says." The emigre NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO called that statement "the culmination of Yeltsin's self-destruction." Remarks like this coupled with predictions that there will be "very difficult times" unless there is progress in the Soviet Union over the next 6-12 months—all this gave journalists occasion to ask Yeltsin at one of the news conferences whether he thinks that such criticism undermines the Soviet leadership and complicates Gorbachev's work. He replied: "...This does not complicate Gorbachev's work but creates a definite pluralism of opinions which dynamizes the process."

A personal comment in this regard: I once interviewed former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in Moscow. I asked him a question about the way he viewed Washington's "strategic defense initiative," and I did so in the knowledge that Carter opposed that system. But I wanted to hear it first hand, so to speak. I did not hear it. The former president looked at me and said: I have not come to Moscow to criticize my administration. I will do that in the United States....

Quayle Statements on Perestroyka, Baltics Viewed

PM1409161989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 5

[S. Dardykin article: "Quayle Refuses To Subsidize Perestroyka—Two Statements by the U.S. Vice President"]

[Text] U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle has recently made two statements. One was at a meeting with leaders of the U.S. mass media and the other was during a TV interview. The first was a reply to a question from a participant in the meeting: How can the United States help perestroyka in the USSR? The second concerned the situation in the Baltic.

Since the first and the second consisted of just a few phrases it clearly makes sense to cite them verbatim.

So, in the first instance the Vice President stated: First and foremost, the United States must ensure that "the West gives no financial help and offers no subsidies to the USSR until it is sure of the aims of the reform." "The worst thing we can do," he continued, "is permit the subsidizing of the system existing in the USSR now. I hope that the West will not be too impatient and will not conclude that things are changing there (in the USSR—editor's note) quickly and irrevocably. This system can survive or die only through the implementation of internal reforms. The best thing we can do is make sure that our investments and credits and everything we do in the Soviet Union are aimed exclusively at the implementation of reforms. The United States will not rush into the USSR as long as the present centralized and totalitarian system exists there."

In the TV interview, Dan Quayle said the following: "We hope that the Baltic republics will continue their movement in the direction that they want, that is, toward the attainment of independence. If negative actions are taken toward the Baltic states, it is to be presumed that our reply will also be negative."

Since the time of the U.S. election campaign not so long ago it has been common knowledge that the present vice president likes to make statements whose tone is more "conservative" on certain points—in the U.S. definition—than those of the Bush administration as a whole. The White House or the State Department have even added their own clarifications to some of Quayle's statements: The vice president's words do not reflect the administration's official position, which thus reduces the "second in command's" view to the level of a personal opinion. Some people in Washington tend to explain the fact that Dan Quayle is out of tune with the general choir in terms of his lack of adequate political experience despite his long political career (4 years in the House of Representatives, 8 years in the Senate, and now vice president). Others consider that this is how the current administration demonstrates pluralism of opinions. Indeed, what is this if not pluralism: This week President Bush has again been saying that he supports perestroyka while the vice president says that he isn't sure of its aims.

The aim of Quayle's statements is understandable—it is to reaffirm his reputation as an orthodox conservative. But the logic and the underlying terminology are not. First, I do not understand what Quayle means by subsidies. Does to trade normally mean to subsidize? Is the granting of credits really not a means, and a highly profitable one, of earning money? On condition, of course, that the borrower is capable of repaying? If anyone has accused the Soviet Union of anything so far it surely cannot be of welshing on a debt. Yet further evidence of how seriously we ourselves treat the question of whether to take credits or not is shown by the long—perhaps too long—discussion of the question of whether it is worthwhile or permissible to finance purchases of Western consumer goods in this way.

So what does the U.S. vice president mean by subsidies since the United States is clearly not inundated with credit requests from our side and since there hasn't been normal trade between us and still isn't? For decades, Washington attached different political demands to the development of trade relations and to the devlopment of economic relations in general with the USSR. The list is endless—the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the expansion of Jewish emigration, an end to the jamming of Western radio stations, and so on and so forth. What was the result? The Afghan veterans came home long ago. The radio stations are not only not being jammed but are even represented, at least some of them, by their own permanent correspondents in Moscow. The restrictions on emigration have been lifted to such an extent that the United States is now talking about restricting the entry of Jews from the USSR out of fear for the state of their own budget. We did all this not to earn "subsidies" but from our own idea of the needs of perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost. But there still isn't any trade. If you follow Quayle's logic there won't be—on this occasion, so long as he is unsatisfied about the purposes of our perestroyka. I wonder whether the vice president really doesn't know or merely pretends not to know that its economic aim is to get away from the "centralized system"? As for the "totalitarian system," it seems to me that we have already left it and have no intention of returning to it.

Of course we are interested in trading on equal terms, without discriminatory restrictions or barriers, with everyone, including the United States. We are interested in credits and joint economic projects. We are interested in this more than anyone because we see the expansion of business contacts as one of the paths of economic perestroyka. But we are not so naive as to expect that the West and the United States in particular will subsidize peretsroyka or to believe that someone or something can force American firms, for example, to trade at a loss or to invest money in joint ventures if there are no perceptible advantages in prospect. Even the vice president doesn't have the power to do that. Or perhaps Dan Quayle had in mind a subsidy from the administration? If so, that would be even more ridiculous—it should look into its own budget deficit.

Let us assume, although I don't believe it very much, that in this case the U.S. vice president is simply out of tune with reality, the facts, or with his own capabilities. We can blame it on an excess of ambition and his inadequately informed views on perestroyka and notional U.S. help for it. Ultimately, let us blame it on Washingtonian pluralism. But what is the reason for the direct ultimatums addressed to us? Because if you disregard certain conditional phrases of the "it is to be presumed" type, Quayle's statement on the Baltic sounds like nothing short of an open ultimatum.

Dan Quayle is hardly unaware that as long as the Soviet Union is an integrated whole, to make this kind of prediction about the development of the situation in one or several of its republics is nothing less than interference in its internal affairs. This cannot be interpreted as other than a call for the USSR to be split up. It must be supposed, as he would say himself, that the vice president undoubtedly has enough political experience to understand this

We will not delve deep into international law. Quayles' speeches show something else. On the one hand, he is apparently pro-reform—let us leave aside the inevitable difference of interpretation of perestroyka that exists between ourselves and the vice president. On the other hand, he advocates, directly or indirectly, a development of events which has nothing to do with reforms or perestroyka and would moreover be tantamount to their inevitable end. It is noteworthy that this is appreciated not just by us but by people in Washington, too. On practically the same day as Quayle gave his television interview, THE NEW YORK TIMES quoted the opinion of an administration staffer as follows: "We cannot, but we would like to say to the inhabitants of the Baltic republics: 'Remember that you owe all your achievements today to Gorbachev.' Gorbachev and perestroyka are synonymous to the American way of thinking.

Cheney Speech to Hudson Institute Reported

LD1409165689 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Washington September 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Orekhov:

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney made a speech to the Hudson Institute national policy forum on Wednesday. His speech was devoted to American-Soviet relations and the course of congressional discussion of the draft military budget for the next fiscal year.

"We may—may—today be on the brink of a whole new era in terms of the international arena and our relations with the Soviet Union. But I emphasise 'may'". "All of us have been intrigued with the possibility that the Soviet Union truly focussed upon internal reforms, and that would involve changes in Soviet policy towards the West, towards their neighbours, towards the United States. That would mean that the period immediately ahead would be one in which there would be less tension. It is extremely important that we remember that this is a period of time in which there is enormous uncertainty, because we do not know what, in fact, is likely to transpire in the period immediately ahead," he said.

"This is exactly the wrong time for the United States and our allies to alter the strategy that we've pursued so successfully during the post-war period," Cheney said. "Specifically, I think it's important that we do not let the, what I describe as, 'the fog of euphoria' which occassionally seems to grip commentators and others about developments inside the Soviet Union and the East bloc obscure the fact the Soviet Union still possesses enormous military capability," he said.

Referring to "Soviet military capability", Cheney urged the congress to approve the Pentagon's draft budget for the next fiscal year exactly as it was drawn up by the Bush administration and which envisages predominant development of American strategic nuclear systems.

The U.S. defense secretary underlined the importance of full-scale funding of SDI works, construction of B-2 "Stealth" bombers, modernisation of ground-based intercontinental missiles, and also the submarine-based Trident missile system.

Answering questions, Cheney said that an agreement on a considerable reduction of conventional armaments in Europe could be concluded within the next two years.

Cheney Urges Further Arming

LD1409211789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Andrey Ptashnikov commentary]

[Text] I want to remark right away that for the first time in many years—I'm thinking of U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney's predecessors—in the utterances of the head of the Pentagon regarding our country, negative assessments, though they predominated over positive ones, did not do so quite as much. Judge for yourselves: Cheney said among other things that today our two countries are perhaps on the threshold of a new era in relations, which may mean that there is a period of lessening tension ahead. The U.S. defense secretary also did not exclude the possibility that in the next 2 years the USSR and the United States could agree on a substantial reduction of conventional arms in Europe. I think you will agree, comrades, that these are clearly encouraging prospects. For them to become a reality, however, concrete steps are needed, and they must be steps toward rapprochement.

As for the Soviet Union, its actions directed toward reducing the threat of war and improving Soviet-U.S. relations are well known, so I won't describe them in detail. But the United States, for its part, is so far obviously—and unfortunately—in no hurry to support our efforts. The Cheney speech that I'm discussing is one more confirmation of this, if one were needed. He stressed that—and I quote—in the present era of enormous uncertainty, the United States and its NATO allies must not change their strategy, which they have pursued so successfully in the postwar period. They must not allow a mist of euphoria to hide from us the fact that the Soviet Union still possesses a vast military potential.

Incidentally, that was said just slightly more mildly than a month ago, when the same Cheney bluntly accused certain members of the U.S. Congress of trying to cut allocations for a number of Pentagon projects on the erroneous thesis—erroneous in his opinion—that the Soviet military threat has been reduced.

By the way, the present speech by Cheney was also mainly addressed to the U.S. legislature, which is currently debating the Pentagon's draft budget for the next fiscal year. Therefore, the boss of that department did not fail to declare that it is imperative to approve the version of the budget submitted by the U.S. Administration. This envisions that funding for SDI projects will continue, along with the building of the latest B-2 bombers and modernization of ground-based ICBM's and other strategic nuclear systems.

The question legitimately arises how to reconcile Cheney's argument about a forthcoming period of lessening tension with his own call for further arming of the United States. As yet, it remains unanswered.

China

Lukyanov Visit to PRC Continues 14 Sep

Moscow TV Notes Tian Jiyun Meeting

LD1409180189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 14 Sep 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] The visit to China of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Comrade Lukyanov is continuing:

[Correspondent V. Kulikov] Today a meeting took place at the House of People's Assemblies with Comrade Tian Jiyun, member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, vice premier of the State Council of China. The reform in China and perestroyka in our country, the prospects for broadening and deepening of all-around contacts—these were the themes of today's conversation. Both the people of China and the people of the Soviet Union are interested in equal measure in cooperation on a long-term basis, and in expansion of contacts in the sphere of science, technology and culture. [video shows Lukyanov and Tian Jiyun conversing]

In the intervals between the discussions and sittings, the Soviet guests are becoming acquainted with the Chinese capital, and with the ancient culture of this great people. Here, at the Great Wall of China, warm meetings took place between the Soviet comrades and the inhabitants of Peking and Shanghai and Chinese tourists who have arrived from other districts and provinces of the country. [video shows smiling Lukyanov on top of the Great Wall]

TASS Reports Meeting

LD1409221889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Excerpts] Beijing, 14 Sep (TASS)—The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is in Beijing, had a meeting today with Tian Jiyun, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and vice premier of the PRC State Council.

During a comradely conversation Tian Jiyun told the Soviet guests about the progress of implementation in the PRC of the economic reform and the policy of expanding ties with the outside world and of enacting the line aimed at putting the economy in order.

A.I. Lukyanov dwelled on the role of the elective organizations of state power in implementing the tasks of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

This evening the delegation of USSR people's deputies had a meeting at the Soviet Embassy with the staff of Soviet institutions abroad and members of their families. The delegation members talked about the progress of perestroyka, the changes in the life of the people of our country, and the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet and answered numerous questions.

PRC Counterrevolutionaries' Public Trial Noted

PM1409154189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "On a Charge of Stealing Weapons"]

[Text] In connection with the preparations for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the communists' coming to power in China, a Reuters correspondent reports, the newspaper BEIJING RIBAO republished its June appeal which promised a reward for supplying information about the "counterrevolutionary rebels," at the same time containing a threat of severe punishment to those concealing persons involved in antigovernment demonstrations and those who are continuing to resist.

"The broad masses of cadre employees, workers, university students, and all citizens must reveal and report criminal elements to the authorities. Those people who refuse to do this or hide criminals will bear the responsibility for it in accordance with the law," the appeal says.

According to Chinese sources, the authorities are afraid of attacks on the military subunits which are maintaining martial law and on government buildings during the celebration of the anniversary of the victory of the people's revolution. Several servicemen who were carrying out their duty in the period after the June events in the streets of the city have already died at the hands of unknown people.

On Friday, the public trial of 14 "counterrevolutionaries," accused of stealing weapons, was televised. In the opinion of diplomats, this subject was a kind of warning from the authorities who are afraid of excesses in the days of celebration of the 40th anniversary of the formation of the PRC. The words of Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, about the fact that martial law, which was introduced in the capital on 20 May, cannot be lifted for the time being, as "bad elements" are still in possession of weapons and are hatching a conspiracy against the government, are being cited.

Millions of television viewers watching the evening program on Friday, witnessed this public trial which was organized in a stadium in Beijing in the presence of hundreds of observers. Seven people were given prison sentences of between 2 and 13 years on a charge of seizing weapons from soldiers. According to an official spokesman, they hid these weapons at the homes of their families, acquaintances, and friends, who subsequently betrayed them. One of the accused, Meng Fanjun, removed a machine gun from a burned out tank and hid it at home. He was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment for this. His two brothers, who helped him, were put behind bars for 10 years. The court acquitted seven people, taking into account the fact that they had given themselves up voluntarily.

PRC Peace Delegation Visits Soviet Cities

OW1409040789 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] A delegation of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. The delegation is led by Zhu Shanqing, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee. According to the plan, the Chinese guests will visit Kiev, (name indistinct), Yalta, Alma-Ata, and Vladimir to gain knowledge about the activities of the local Soviet committees for the defense of peace.

Northeast Asia

Economic Cooperation Agreement Signed With Japan

LD1409130889 Moscow TASS in English 1252 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Tokyo September 14 TASS—By TASS correspondents Anatoliy Krasnov and Andrey Nesterov:

A cooperation agreement signed today by the Soviet state-of-the-market research institute of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Socialist Research Institute of the Japanese Society of Trade with the Socialist Countries, will promote the development of economic, scientific and technological relations between the two countries.

The agreement points out that research in 1989-1990 will be devoted to devising forms of bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation between the countries of the Sea of Japan basin.

It is also planned to search for new forms of cooperation between the Soviet Union, Japan, China, DPRK and South Korea.

The agreement will help involve Soviet and Japanese enterprises, amalgamations, foreign trade and other organisations in foreign economic activities and boost the establishment of direct business ties between them.

The sides agreed to exchange the results of scientific, information and publishing activities with interested organisations and firms in both countries, help obtain orders for research and information materials, exchange delegations and hold conferences and symposia.

Specialists from both institutes will participate in the scientific work of the other side, consultations will be held and the exchange of scientific books, statistical and other materials of mutual interest will be carried out.

Commentary Views JSP's Policy on Nuclear Arms

OW1409113189 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 1 Sep 89

[Station commentator Dmitriyev commentary]

[Excerpt] The chairman of the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], Takako Doi, gave an interview to the Australian daily SYDNEY EVENING HERALD on 31 August, and publicly promised that if the JSP assumes power, the party will ban U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear arms from calling at Japanese ports. Please listen to a commentary from Moscow Radio commentator Dmitriyev regarding this statement.

These remarks of Chairman Doi reconfirm the JSP's stand to oppose nuclear arms even when the party assumes power. According to recent papers from the JSP, the party's position on the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has considerably softened, but it is still clear that the party intends to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles. This indicates the possibility of the party desiring to deal squarely with the question of making Japan a non-nuclear country.

The three non-nuclear principles were declared in 1968, reflecting the wishes of the majority of the Japanese people. These principles, however, have not been given any legal endorsement, which the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] is apparently using as an excuse to overlook the obvious facts concerning U.S. naval vessels calling at Japanese ports.

The U.S. side, in response to this, has not changed its attitude of neither denying nor admitting the presence of nuclear arms. In this way, the U.S. and Japanese Governments have created a sort of confidential agreement, according to which if one side keeps mum, the other side will not raise any questions.

This arrangement has resulted in a situation—as opinion polls show—wherein the majority of the Japanese people have come to believe that the three non-nuclear principles are not being adhered to.

A survey conducted at the end of July showed that 70 percent of advanced class students hold this view. This belief probably stems from the revelation of an incident involving the loss of a nuclear bomb by the U.S. carrier Ticonderoga in the sea near Japan in 1965. According to expert testimonies, this hydrogen bomb continues to release radioactive substances into the sea water.

Diet members from the opposition parties have started expressing a determination to bring an end to this ambiguous attitude of the Japanese Government. Comments by the independent member of the House of Councillors, Hideo Den, concerning this matter in particular are brought to mind at this time. A month ago, this Diet member declared that he was ready to present to the Diet a bill aimed at giving a legal basis to the three non-nuclear principles. [passage omitted]

Leadership Recognizes DPRK's 41st Anniversary

PRAVDA Publishes Text of Greetings

PM1509091989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 89 Second Edition p 1

[USSR leadership organs' greetings to DPRK leaders on anniversary of formation of DPRK]

[Text] To Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee and president of the DPRK

To Comrade Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the DPRK Administrative Council

We send you, the WPK Central Committee, the DPRK Central People's Committee, the DPRK Administrative Council, and all the republic's working people fraternal greetings and cordial congratulations on your national day—the 41st anniversary of the formation of the DPRK.

The proclamation of the DPRK on 9 September 1948 was the logical outcome of the Korean people's long and heroic struggle for their freedom, sovereignty, and social progress and opened up broad prospects before the country for rapid development along the new path.

Today the DPRK is a socialist state with dynamically developing industry and agriculture. The republic has achieved high standards in the development of its science, culture, education, and health care. Welcoming the achievements of the DPRK's working people in building socialism, we are confident that they will achieve new successes in their implementation of the Sixth WPK Congress decisions and the tasks of the 3rd 7-Year Plan for national economic development.

The Soviet Union invariably supports the peace-loving initiatives and proposals of the WPK and the DPRK Government aimed at improving the situation on the Korean peninsula by reducing military confrontation between North and South Korea, withdrawing foreign forces from South Korea, turning the peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone, and organizing inter-Korean dialogue. This course is in the interests of strengthening security in the Asian and Pacific region and the interests of international detente.

The friendship between the Soviet and Korean peoples has long-standing revolutionary traditions. Relations between our countries, sealed by the 6 July 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the DPRK, are steadily expanding and strengthening in line with the immutable principles of Marxism-Leninism. We are confident that all-around, fruitful Soviet-Korean collaboration will continue to contribute to resolving the topical tasks of economic and social development facing the peoples of both our countries.

On your national day we wish the Korean people progress, prosperity, and success in achieving their cherished wish: the reunification of the motherland.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
USSR Council of Ministers

Yazov Greets Counterpart

PM1509085989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 89 First Edition p 1

[Greetings message from USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov to DPRK counterpart O Chin-u]

[Text] To Vice Marshal of the Korean People's Army Comrade O Chin-u, minister of the DPRK People's Armed Forces

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

In the name of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own behalf, I ardently congratulate you and all Korean People's Army servicemen on the national holiday—the 41st anniversary of the proclamation of the DPRK.

Soviet Army and Navy servicemen are following with profound sympathy and friendly interest the implementation of the resolutions of the 6th Workers Party of Korea Congress, welcome the DPRK working people's achievements in socialist building, and resolutely support their just struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korean territory and for the unification of the motherland on a peaceful, democratic basis.

On this significant day I wish Korean People's Army personnel new successes in military and political training and in further strengthening the country's defense might in the interests of safeguarding the Korean People's peaceful labor.

[Signed] Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

Moscow Meeting Hails Anniversary

PM1409103189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 89 Second Edition p4

[TASS report: "Ceremonial Meeting"]

[Text] The formation of the DPRK was an important event in the life of the Korean people. It opened up broad prospects for the country to develop rapidly along a socialist path. This was said on 8 September in Moscow at a ceremonial meeting of representatives of the capital's working people, dedicated to the 41st anniversary of the formation of the DPRK.

The speaker—G.M. Korenko, deputy chairman of the Central Board of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society—said that over the 40 and more years that the republic has been in existence the complexion of its cities and villages has changed beyond recognition and major successes have been achieved in improving the population's standard of living and developing the country's science, education, and national culture. He stressed that the Soviet Union is guided by the Leninist principles of socialist internationalism in its relations with the DPRK. For more than 4 decades, relations between our countries have served as an example of good-neighborliness and mutual assistance. Mutually useful bilateral contacts in the sphere of culture, science, and sport are becoming increasingly varied.

Kwon Hui-kyong, DPRK ambassador to the Soviet Union, talked about the work done by the republic's working people to resolve the tasks of socioeconomic development, to implement the decisions of the Sixth Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Congress, and to struggle to realize the program for their country's peaceful reunification. He dwelled on the republic's initiatives, the implementation of which would make it possible to considerably reduce the level of military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, improve the atmosphere in the Asian and Pacific region, and turn the peninsula into a zone of peace. The ambassador wished the Soviet people success in implementing the policy of restructuring.

The following took part in the meeting: R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; the leaders of a number of ministries and departments; and representatives of party, soviet, and social organizations. Also present was a delegation of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society led by O Mun-han, vice chairman of its Central Board and vice chairman of the DPRK Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

Kwon Hui-kyong organized a reception on the same day to mark the important occasion.

It was attended by R.N. Nishan[illegible] L.I. Abalkin, and other officials.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Supreme Soviet Delegation Ends New Zealand Visit

LD1409113889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0500 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Wellington, 14 Sep (TASS)—Aleksey Voronin, TASS special correspondent, reports:

The official visit to New Zealand of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by N.I. Dementey, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has ended.

Before they left, the delegation visited Wellington University of Victoria today, where they met the leadership of that higher educational establishment and the professorial and teaching staff of the Russian language faculty and political research.

We evaluate the results of the visit to New Zealand as fruitful, the head of the Soviet delegation told the TASS correspondent. Its aim was to strengthen the active contacts which have developed between the parliaments of the two countries in recent years and to continue what we see as the mutually useful dialogue of representatives of the legislative organs of the USSR and New Zealand on a broad range of topical international and regional questions. The problems of disarmament, of ridding mankind of the nuclear threat, and the situation of the Asia and Pacific region occupied an important place in our conversations.

Vietnamese Troop Pullout From Cambodia Hailed

BK1409004089 Hanoi VNA in English 1508 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA September 13—The total pullout of the Vietnamese Volunteer Army from Cambodia by the end of this month will be an eloquent proof of the peace-loving policy, the goodwill and the desire to settle the Cambodia issue politically of both Vietnam and the State of Cambodia, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a press briefing in Moscow yesterday.

Gerasimov was quoted by TASS as reminding the world public that the Khmer Armed Forces opposed to the Phnom Penh government still cling to their attempt to settle the issue militarily, which makes it all the more imperative to stop all foreign military aids to the Khmer factions as well as foreign interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.

He also stressed the current need of achieving a political solution for the Cambodia issue and preventing the Pol Pot clique from kindling a civil war to seize power again.

Observer Raps Accusation Against Cambodia

BK1509112389 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Commentary by Radio Moscow observer Oleg Alekseyev]

[Text] Propaganda circles in various countries have been commenting on the outcome of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia which ended its work on 30 August. Many observers agree that although the conference did not reach any overall solution to the Cambodian problem, it laid the groundwork for future common efforts.

It was reiterated at the conference that the restoration of peace in Cambodia is an indispensable condition for a political solution in this country, and it is in this direction that all those who want a fair solution to the Cambodian problem should work. Unfortunately, however, some individuals have tried to use this indisputable fact as a means to distort the reality about the policies of Cambodia and Vietnam. These individuals claim that the policies of Phnom Penh and Hanoi constitute the main obstacle on the road toward restoring peace in Cambodia and will only broaden the war.

Such a claim runs counter to reality. I would like to recall some facts. At the Paris conference, Phnom Penh opposed the Pol Pot group's participation in the administrative system to be established in Cambodia within the framework of the solution. Why did Phnom Penh oppose this? Because, like before, the Pol Pot clique has tried to seize power through force of arms. What is more dangerous is that the leaders of this group do not in the least deplore the genocidal crimes they committed in Cambodia in the 1970's. Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the State of Cambodia, said in Paris that before joining in the solution, the Pol Pot group must give up its genocidal crimes, dissolve its military organizations, and stop waging armed struggle. The Pol Pot group, however, refused to accept this, and has even taken measures to step up the conflict in Cambodia. Who, one may therefore ask, is it who really wants to broaden the war?

As for Vietnam, during the Paris conference it voiced total support for Phnom Penh's stance. Hanoi has kept its promise regarding the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia, announcing that the final batch of troops totaling 25,000 men will leave Cambodia between 21 and 26 September.

Most importantly, Hanoi and Phnom Penh have declared that the final withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia will be carried out openly and publicly.

In a letter to the UN secretary general, Comrade Trinh Xuan Lang, Vietnam's permanent representative to the United Nations, stressed that the two countries have invited the co-chairmen of the Paris conference, the chairman of the informal meetings in Jakarta, the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, the secretary general of the United Nations, and other persons interesting in the settlement of the Cambodian problem to observe the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

Does this fit in with the claim that Hanoi desires to broaden the war in Cambodia?

Alatas Addresses News Conference on Suharto Trip

PM1409103589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Important Landmark"]

[Text] The visit to the USSR by Indonesian President Suharto is an important landmark in Indonesian-Soviet relations which promotes their strengthening and development. This was stated in Moscow 12 September by Indonesian Foreign Minister A. Alatas, speaking at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The minister stressed that relations of friendship and cooperation have long been established between the two countries. He noted that for a certain period Indonesia had to focus its main efforts on resolving domestic political and domestic economic tasks. The country has now reached a stage in its development when there is an opportunity to devote greater attention to external ties.

People in Indonesia, the minister continued, are following perestroyka in the USSR with great interest. The renewal processes in our countries seem to be complementary and promise to expand bilateral cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere.

Answering journalists' questions, A. Alatas said in particular that the visit has emphasized the common approach of Indonesia and the USSR to the development of international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and to a Cambodian settlement.

Comparison of Shevardnadze-Alatas Talks

PM1409102389

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 13 September 1989 publishes in its Second Edition on page 4 a TASS report on the 12 September meeting between Soviet and Indonesian Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Ali Alatas. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "Ministers' Meeting," with the item headlined "Shedvardnadze, Alatas Meet" published in the 13 September issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 11, column two, reveals the following variations:

Page 11, column two, first paragraph, PRAVDA reads: ...had a meeting 12 September within the framework-...(subbing "12 September" for "today")

Paragraph two, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...ministers stressed the major political results achieved...(subbing "major" for "significant")

Paragraph three, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: A specific conversation was conducted...(adding "specific")

Paragraph four, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...Indonesia, the sides stated with satisfaction that...(subbing "stated" for "ascertained").

Near East & South Asia

Embassy in Kabul Under Rocket Attack 15 Sep

LD1509145189 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—The Soviet Embassy in Afghanistan came under rocket attack today, a TASS diplomatic correspondent was told at the USSR Foreign Ministry.

It was reported to the USSR Foreign Ministry from Kabul that a rocket exploded 10-15 meters away from a residential house of the embassy at 4:30 p.m. local time. Great material damage was inflicted. By a lucky chance, nobody from the Soviet Embassy staff was hurt.

Several rockets fell in close proximity to the embassy.

Defense Ministry Notes Israeli Missile Test

LD1409192789 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—The Soviet Defence Ministry informs that according to data at its disposal, a ballistic missile with a range of 1300 km was launched today from the area around Jerusalem.

The missile hit the ground [as received] in an area 400 km north of Banghazi.

An analogous start of a ballistic missile took place in Israel in January 1989.

Article Notes Little Hope For Mideast Crisis

18070357 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian Morning Edition 27 Aug 89 p 5

[Article by political observer A. Bovin: "The Intifadah, What Next?"]

[Text] The intifadah [uprising] began on 9 December 1987; the "war of stones," as they sometimes write. But one side, the Palestinians, throws stones. The occupiers respond with bullets—plastic ones—but still bullets. According to the data of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, over 20 months 597 Arabs have died (to clarify, approximately 90 of them were killed by the Arabs themselves, for collaboration and cooperation with the Israeli authorities).

The events on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip have caused major political repercussions. The necessity to defend the regime of occupation by shooting, mass arrests, school and university closings intensifies the range of opinions and the tension within Israel, and promotes the appearance of a split between Israel and the Jewish communities in other countries, first and foremost, in the United States. The continuing intifadah chips away at the policy of completed facts, holds the Palestinian problem at the center of world political life, and strengthens the international position and authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO].

The intifadah seems to have pushed and accelerated the movement of political time. Jordan's King Husayn announced his break-off of administrative and judicial ties with the West Bank. The National Palestine Council declared the creation of the State of Palestine, with its capital in Jerusalem; the new state has already been recognized by 104 countries. Direct contacts have begun between the United States and the PLO. The so-called "Shamir Plan" has been proposed. What next? Are there real prospects for regulating the Near East crisis? In light of the history, what are the correlation and efficacy of the violent and peaceful methods of regulation?

Let us look back.

On its current scale, the Near East crisis emerged in the late forties. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly decided to divide Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish. All Arab states who were UN members at the time voted against the decision. And when the State of Israel was declared in Tel Aviv on 14 May 1948, the troops of five Arab states (Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria) invaded Palestine. The Jews won the war, but they could not with the peace; the Arabs were never reconciled to Israel's existence.

In October-November 1956, Israel participates in an Anglo-French venture aimed at "punishing" Nasir for his nationalization of the Suez Canal company. The venture failed. But Israel managed to defeat the Egyptians and lift the blockade of the Strait of Tiran.

In June 1967, Israel starts, and in 6 days, wins a war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the Golan heights come under Israel's control.

In October 1973, Egypt tries to get its revenge (the Yom Kippur War). The Egyptian troops assault the Suez Canal. However, after several days, the Israelis take the initiative in their hands, and the status quo is restored.

Only in 1979, after recognizing Israel and concluding a peace treaty with it, does Egypt get the Sinai back for itself.

In June 1982 (the "Sea of Galilee Operation"), Israel undertakes to eliminate, to physically destroy the PLO leadership and combat subdivisions located in Lebanon. Their destruction was not achieved. But 'Arafat, his people and the Palestinian sects loyal to him were forced to leave Lebanon. A period of internecine struggle within the PLO begins. Israel retained control of a strip of Lebanese territory along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Five wars in four decades. And the chief lesson is that military force is incapable of finding a way out of the conflict. It cannot provide Israel's genuine security, calm on its borders, or good relations with neighbors. It can neither "throw the Zionists into the sea," nor affirm a state of Palestinian Arabs in Palestine, alongside of Israel. Power is rendered powerless. A way out of the situation, full-scale regulation suiting all parties can be found only by means of peaceful negotiations.

It may seem at first glance that Israel has learned the lesson of history. They speak a great deal about peace there, about striving for peace. It is theoretically apparent that they understand that reliable, guaranteed security requires setting up normal relations with the Arabs. But in practice, the policy has taken a different course. The task which has been set is to preserve control over all of Palestine, to prohibit the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

In his day, M. Begin proposed the idea of Palestinian autonomy within Israel's borders. This idea, which the Palestinians rejected long ago, has now been re-animated by I. Shamir. He proposes that the intifadah be halted and that "democratic, free elections" be held on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. These would elect representatives of the Palestinians for conducting negotiations on self-management with Israel (an interim agreement). And then there would be negotiations "on the final resolution of the issue."

The Shamir Plan does not specify what this "final resolution" is. In any event, it is clear that Israel does not intend to enter negotiations with the PLO, nor to leave the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All Jewish settlements, and they number over 220, with a population of over 150,000, remain untouchable. Consequently, the matter will not get past administrative autonomy.

Israel's intolerance feeds extremism on the other side of the field. In certain countries, and in the Palestinian groups supported by them, they continue to view Israel as an "illegal Zionist formation." Not a Palestinian state alongside of Israel, but in place of Israel—that is their optimum program, their variant for the resolution of the Near East conflict. Thus, for example, it is emphasized in the communique which concluded the meeting of the Syrian and Iranian foreign ministers with the leaders of the Lebanese Muslim forces and the Palestinian organizations opposed to Arafat that the "jihad" and the armed struggle are the only route to the liberation of Palestine.

But in the entire Arab world, the Palestinians are learning the lesson of history and are making a transition to more moderate positions; they are trying to grope for political, compromise paths to a way out of the Near East opposition. The push toward such positions is coming from the natural process of the "maturation" of the Palestinian liberation movement and of the entire Arab world, the pressure of world opinion, the desire of realistic Palestinians to ensure if not the support, then the favorable neutrality of the leading powers of the capitalist world toward the PLO.

The general idea is peace and security for Israel in exchange for land for the Palestinians. Israel must give up the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in 1967, and eliminate all the settlements created there. The Palestinian state is granted the the opportunity to actually implement its sovereignty in these territories. The convening of an international conference on the Near East is proposed. In order to create a climate favoring the conference's work, the occupied lands are temporarily transferred to UN control.

Israel can be counted upon to accept these demands only in the event that its right to exist is recognized unconditionally. It is felt that the formula for such recognition is contained in the materials of the 19th session of the Palestinian National Council (November 1988) and in Y. Arafat's speech to the plenary meeting of the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly (December 1988).

Indeed there are positions in these documents which could be interpreted as agreement to coexist with Israel. At least when the Americans decided to open a dialogue with the PLO, they interpreted them that way. At the same time, the ambiguity and lack of clarity of many documents and utterances give Tel Aviv the chance to reproach the Palestinians for insincerity.

To illustrate, I cite the extensive reflections of one of the leading figures of the PLO, executive committee member Yasir Abd-Rabbu: "Our position has been and remains the following: That which has been happening for 40 years now is the result of a historical injustice, and not the natural right to self-determination in the Palestinian land. We must take into consideration the reality which arose in history... We are therefore prepared for a historical compromise. But no one may demand of us an ideological compromise. In the ideological sphere, we have opposed and will oppose Zionism as a concept, movement, and practice. We also feel that the Israelis cannot grow into the Near East, its culture, heritage and population as long as Zionism continues to exist as an ideology and a practice... We are prepared to live in peace with the State of Israel, but we do not desire ideological disarmament."

The sense is simple: The fact of Israel's existence is recognized, and yes, you here, and we are both forced to take that into consideration. But you do not have the right to exist, the right to be in Palestine. In other words, we are prepared to live in peace with the State of Israel, but we reject the "Zionist resolution of the Jewish question," that is, the historically-psychologically conditioned separate state for Jews in the Palestinian land.

Such a statement of the issue will hardly strengthen mutual understanding or create conditions for peace in the Near East. Citing such conclusions, Israeli politicians insist that the formulas proposed by the Palestinians be considered as evidence of changes in their positions—they have a tactical nature—and that this is a forced, temporary maneuver, not a strategic line to recognize Israel as an inalienable element of the landscape of the Near East.

I recall quite well the political and psychological circumstances which interfered with the PLO's explanation of the position which clearly and unambiguously formulated the thesis of how both the Jewish and the Arab states of Palestine have equal rights to existence and security. Among these circumstances was the failure to fully overcome the force of habit and inertia, and pressure on the part of the extremists, and last but not least, Israel's decisive refusal to have a Palestinian Arab state alongside of it. It is Israel's stubborn unwillingness to agree to the creation of such a state which prevents a turn away from confrontation to negotiations, to growth of mutual understanding and mutual trust.

And here we have come to the underlying question: Are there any visible prospects to hope that Israel will change its position? I am afraid that there are no such hopes.

Really.

Another war? I am of the impression that it would not lead to the liberation of territory for the State of Palestine.

The intifadah? I do not think that stones will force Israel to leave the occupied lands. In the abstract, another variant could be supposed, that bullets will fly instead of rocks. However, as I recall, the PLO is categorically opposed to such a variant, for it is hard to imagine that an armed uprising would be victorious.

An international conference? It would be a useful business. It would allow for more precise manifestation of intentions and positions. But somehow, it is not to be believed that the "entire world" could persuade Israel to give Arafat a piece of Palestine, even if the Americans joined the persuaders...

In general, you're damned if you do, damned if you don't. It's a dead-end situation. And, in my view, it will remain so for quite some time. A new generation of politicians is needed, a new generation of people unburdened by the bloody primary history of Jewish-Arab civil wars. Only they will manage to come to agreement. They must come to agreement.

And in the meantime? Life does not recognize dead ends. The history, the policy, the "elucidation of attitudes" will continue. The confrontation will continue. And it possesses its own logic—the logic of escalation. It cannot be excluded that a possible change in the correlation of forces and the fundamental sentiments will put the military variant back on the agenda. This is why it is important to not make the situation worse, but to strive toward steps and actions which would improve it. In particular, I have in mind the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel.

Comparison of Varennikov Afghanistan Interview

PM1409112189

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 14 September 1989 publishes in its First Edition on page 3 an interview with Soviet Army General V.I. Varennikov, USSR deputy defense minister, conducted by TASS political observer Ye. Babenko. Comparison of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA item entitled "There Is Only One Specific Way," carried under the "Topical Interview" rubric, with the item headlined "Varennikov Comments on Afghanistan Situation" published in the 13 September issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 17, reveals the following variations:

Column one, second paragraph, last sentence, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reads: ...as the second major defeat after Jalalabad...(adding "major")

Column two, paragraph one, sentence two KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reads: They need some kind of small military victory, at least. (retranslating)

Same paragraph, sentence three KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reads: ...tribes, particularly the Azadran [name as transliterated], Tani, and Zalihal...(subbing transliteration for "Jadran").

Sub-Saharan Africa

Adamishin on Angolan, Mozambican Civil Wars

MB0909182689 Moscow in Afrikaans to Southern Africa 1915 GMT 8 Sep 89

[Report on discussion by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin of Angola's and Mozambique's civil wars]

[Text] The hope of a quick end to the Angolan war seems far off. The agreements reached in Gbadolite by African heads of state did not contribute much to peace efforts. UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] broke off negotiations with the Angolan Government and announced a resumption of the war with the intention of sabotaging the negotiations. One week after the Gbadolite summit the rebels violated the ceasefire agreement. What is the cause?

This is the view of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin:

One must look at the negative role played by the United States while South Africa has ended its support of UNITA in accordance with the agreement on Namibian independence. Cuba, which has been regarded as the stumbling block by the Americans, is busy withdrawing its troops. The Angolan Government is willing to normalize its relations with the United States, and under these circumstances the United States supports UNITA, which, according to Western countries, consists mainly of bandits who are not approved of by African states. They are waging war against the legitimate Government of Angola. Why?

I think it is an incomprehensible situation. I think the Americans are sponsoring Savimbi as a candidate for the presidency. Perhaps the U.S. view can be seen as an error that we had made so often. Earlier we had also ignored African views and said that we were busy creating a socialist society. [words indistinct], but later it seemed as if there were still conditions under which socialism was necessary.

Now, by supporting certain ideological approaches, the Americans are making the same mistake of portraying Savimbi as the champion of democracy. He is too untrustworthy to be a champion of democracy. He is a politician who has the deaths of tens of thousands of his countrymen on his conscience. It is best to stop the bloodshed in Angola, and the civil war can only be settled if there is no outside interference in Angola's affairs.

The country has suffered a long war which has damaged the economy. President dos Santos' view is that the government's and party's priority is to stop the fighting. Any interference in Angola's internal affairs should cease. Angolans themselves should try to conclude approved agreements; the Gbadolite accords could be used as a basis for this purpose. The Soviet Union will approve any decision that the Angolan people make.

A similar situation exists in the discussions between church leaders on behalf of the Mozambican Government and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. At the moment a second round of talks is under way. The main stumbling block in the talks is the struggle waged by Renamo, which has demanded a review of the Constitution and the holding of multiparty elections, preconditions which Mozambique's government refuses to accept.

Mozambique finds itself in the same situation as Angola as far as the war is concerned, which is hampering efforts to tackle socioeconomic problems. The difference is that Mozambique's war is of a more destructive nature. According to the Americans, the so-called Renamo are true bandits who kill aimlessly and who abduct people. Nevertheless, Mozambique's and Angola's leaderships have decided to begin negotiations with the rebels with a view to ending these wars. The Soviet Union will support any efforts to promote this process.

South Africa Linked to Lubowski Assassination

MB1509131089 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Mikhail Tsirolov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Anton Lubowski was killed on the evening of 12 September on the threshold of his home from an automatic rifle.

The assassins, allegedly two of them, made their getaway in a red Volkswagon in an unknown direction. The police have ordered an investigation. Such are the facts.

Reaction to them worldwide can be summed up in one word: shock; that was used by Perez de Cuellar when he heard of it; Louis Pienaar, administrator general for Namibia, had the same word. No one has [word indistinct] as to the political character of Anton Lubowski's murder. Provocativeness of that terrorist act is also evident.

The 37-year-old white lawyer, Anton Lubowski, was one of the leaders of the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] election campaign. He was well known in Namibia and South Africa as a defender of the political detainees and human rights fighters. He was a barrister in a terrorist case of the 14 from Upington, who were charged of killing a constable and sentenced to capital punishment.

Anton Lubowski was killed on the day when nine political parties engaged in the election campaign for the November elections signed the so-called behavior code, the document with 16 provisions emphasizing the obligations of all parties to comply with the results of the future voting, stay away from any form of intimidation of opponents, and from possible violence. Martti Ahtisaari, who has been [word indistinct] United Nations representative in Namibia, called the code an historic document for the holding of free and fair elections and for the national reconciliation.

Anton Lubowski was killed a day after the return to Namibia of the SWAPO general secretary, Toivo ya Toivo, and 2 days before the planned return on 14 September of SWAPO's president, Sam Nujoma. On analyzing the facts, the (?shocks) in Windhoek do not seem accidental. The situation in Namibia is dangerously unstable now. A tiny spark is enough to cause (?blasts). One can assume who it came from.

Most of observers are unanimous in that SWAPO will win in the upcoming elections and form the country's new government. There is practically no alternative to such a result of a political struggle. SWAPO's platform that presupposes a broad participation of both black and white Namibians in the building of a new and independent Namibia and guarantees equal rights to everyone is widely known. No less of this is the position of the South African ultrarights, who, despite all the facts, cannot reconcile themselves to the loss of the colony.

Governed by the vicious principle aims justify means, the Pretoria [word indistinct] make no scruples in choosing them in order to disrupt the decolonization process and deteriorate the situation in Namibia to hold up the course of history. The Windhoek murder is yet another tragic testimony to it.

Commentary Questions U.S. Military Aid to Somalia

LD1509052189 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Commentary by Igor Potovskiy]

[Text] Two months ago, fighting broke out in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. There has been no reason to return to those tragic events were it not for the fact that practically every report from that country is like an echo of those days. Speculations are still rife as to the reasons that touched off the rioting. Somalia's interior minister, Brigadier General Ahmad Sulayman Abdullah, put the blame on the Muslim fundamentalists. As you may remember, the rioting was triggered off by the arrest of six imams who had criticized the authorities for promising 5 million Somali shillings to anyone who would betray the murderers of the Catholic bishop, Salvatore Colombo, who was shot in Mogadishu on 9 July. The minister also mentioned 20 Fellatas, who are soon to go on trial, but he did not say who they were and what they had been plotting. Other questions that remain unclear is the toll of the rioting and the reasons behind the crackdown on members of the Issa clan in Mogadishu.

The alarming note sounded by the reports from Mogasdishu is the rising interethnic hostility. The three basic insurgent groups—the Somalia National Movement, the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia, and the

Somali Patriotic Movement in the South—are all formed under tribal principles. Judging by foreign news agency reports, neither has the central government avoided this unfortunate principle. If Somalia's tangled problems are viewed from the angle of ethnic interests, they may well become stalemated.

The latest eruption of armed clashes across the country in the wake of 14 July has raised another problem: Western humanitarian organizations working on agreement with the government are hurriedly recalling their specialists. The Government of Somalia has already protested over what it terms the unilateral decision of the United Nations to discontinue its food relief program to Ethiopian refugees in the country's north. We can understand the Government of Somalia; the country's economy is practically paralyzed and the food stocks in the region will not last long, but we can equally understand the organizations on the humanitarian missions; the ongoing fighting is a threat to the life and health of their staff, to say nothing of their work.

It is a bit harder to understand the United States, though. An announcement in Washington says that the United States program of military aid to Somalia is now under revision and several new projects are being mothballed because the Mogadishu government is not keeping to democratic traditions. Does Washington mean that in its opinion the Mogadishu government had been keeping to democratic traditions earlier? The United States Congress has been barring field weapons to Somalia since 1987, but in June last year a major consignment of weapons was delivered to port Berbera. That was what enabled the government troops to repulse the onslaught of the insurgents at two strategic points in the north of the country. True, the United States mission claimed the weapons had been unloaded by mistake. The DAILY TELEGRAPH in London claimed that it had reliable information to the effect that Washington's decision regarding military aid to Somalia would depend on how the Bush administration assessed the country's improved relations with Ethiopia and on whether such an improvement could be utilized as an alternative base. What the reliable source of the DAILY TELEGRAPH meant by base is not clear, either. Now talks on prolonging the agreement on the American military base in Berbera are just around the corner. Could that be what Washington means when it speaks of human rights at this trying moment for Ethiopia?

East Europe

Ligachev Meets SED Leaders, Tours GDR Rural Areas

Notes Gorbachev Intends To Visit

LD1409195189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1807 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Excerpt] Berlin, 14 Sep (TASS)—The working visit to the GDR of Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is continuing with the aim of studying the experience of intensification of agricultural production in the fraternal country and activities of SED organizations in the rural area.

Today he met G. Mittag, member of the Politburo, secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee. A friendly and cordial conversation took place; those taking part were members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the SED Central Committee H. Dohlus, W. Krolikowski, and W. Jarowinsky, and candadate member of the SED Central Committee Politburo G. Schuerer. Ye.K. Ligachev passed on M.S. Gorbachev's greetings to E. Honecker and to members of the party and state leadership of the GDR, communists, and all the working people of the republic and informed them that M.S. Gorbachev intends to visit the GDR during its 40th anniversary.

The interlocutors noted that the stable and dynamic development of the GDR is a considerable contribution in the strengthening of the position of world socialism. The 40th birthday of the GDR also represents 40 years of indestructible friendship with the USSR. The German comrades stressed that the further advance of the GDR along the path of socialism will continue to be connected to the development of relations between the GDR and the USSR.

It was stressed unanimously that the GDR's very existence and its active policy aimed at strengthening mutual understanding between peoples fosters the provision of peace, security and good-neighborliness in Europe.

Ye.K. Ligachev noted that the USSR condemns the provocative campaign against the GDR recently unfolded by some mass information media and certain political circles in the FRG. During the conversation, it was unanimously stated that the GDR is an inextricable link of the Warsaw Pact, a loyal friend and ally of the USSR. This must be clear to everyone who is trying to encroach on the sovereignty of the GDR and its independence.

G. Mittag briefed Ye.K. Ligachev on preparations for the 12th SED Congress. Ye.K. Ligachev spoke about the course of perestroyka in the USSR, and about tackling current and long-term tasks for the renewal of Soviet society.

Taking part in the conversation were members of the CPSU delegation and V.I. Kochmasov, the USSR ambassador in the GDR. [passage omitted]

Further on Talks, Farm Visit

PM1409102989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Working Visit"]

[Text] Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had talks here 12 September with W. Krolikowski, member of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee; H. Semmelmann, chief of the SED Central Committee Agriculture Department; B. Lietz, GDR minister of agriculture, forestry, and foodstuffs; and D. Spaar, president of the GDR Academy of Agricultural Sciences. There was an extensive exchange of opinions on questions of improving the efficiency of agricultural production and party work in the countryside.

In the afternoon the CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the Naechst-Neuendorf agricultural production cooperative in Potsdam Bezirk, where he familiarized himself with this labor collective's experience in achieving the highest results in crop farming and stock-raising by combining the achievements of science with peasant practice. He visited a number of production units at the farm. The high productivity of these units, which allow the agricultural cooperative to implement an extensive program of social and cultural development in the countryside, was noted.

Ye.K. Ligachev told the GDR comrades about the progress of perestroyka in the USSR.

V.I. Kochemasov, USSR ambassador to the GDR, took part in the talks and the tour.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary laid a wreath at the monument to Soviet liberation servicemen in Berlin's Treptow Park.

More on Agricultural Enterprise Visit

LD1409120189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1035 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Berlin, 14 Sep (TASS)—The working visit to the GDR by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is continuing. Its aim is to study experiences in intensification of agrarian production in that fraternal country and the activity of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] organizations in the countryside.

In the Potsdam area the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee familiarized himself with specific forms of interaction between the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and peasants working in cooperatives. The activity of agrarian scientists is organized in such a way that they have an interest in the final results of the peasants' labor, in the speedy introduction of intensive technologies. A considerable part of their wages are paid by the agricultural enterprises themselves, depending on the economic impact of their ideas. All our scientific experiments, said D. Spaar, president of the academy, are carried out not on experimental plots, but directly on land belonging to agricultural production cooperatives (APC) and people's estates. This permits the reduction to the minimum of the time required for transferring the latest developments from the laboratory to the peasants' fields or stockbreeding units.

In Frankfurt-am-Oder District, Y.K. Ligachev and members of the delegation were familiarized with forms of organization and the results of the work of cooperative members at the Werner Lamberz APC. Since 1960, when local peasants individually joined a cooperative, the volume of production in plant breeding has doubled and in livestock breeding it has trippled. D. Welkisch, APC's chairman, noted, that the farm's land was not very fertile; however, thanks to the competent farming, industriousness, and frugality of the peasants, net profits reached 6 million marks this year.

Direct links between producers and trade are being introduced on an increasingly wider scale in the GDR. Cooperative members deliver agricultural products not to state procurement stations, but directly to shops, and in packed form. The benefits are obvious: there is continuous supply of high-quality products to the population, while loss during storage is reduced to a minimum. Even in years which were extreme in terms of climatic conditions, losses of agricultural products in the GDR were kept to a level of 6.5 percent, whereas in more favorable years they are brought down to 3 percent. "Your experience is of great interest for our country, too," the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee noted concluding the conversation.

Ye.K. Ligachev visited enterprises of rural commerce, whose range serves as convincing evidence of the fact that the food problem is being tackled successfully. In consumption of major food products per capita the GDR has reached the level of the most developed countries of the world. Agricultural cooperatives operating on principles of financial autonomy form the main volume of the republic's foodstuffs base. Fruit, berries, and honey produced in various vegetable gardens and orchards, as well as poultry and rabbit meat are a substantial addition to the working people's diet.

The guests from the USSR were heartily welcomed in the families of toilers. Their apartments and private homes with all modern conveniences do not differ in comfort from the housing of townspeople, and are often better. In the course of frank conversations the members of the cooperatives and their families, and party workers took a lively interest in Soviet restructuring, in the problems that the Soviet Union is tackling today. It was unanimously noted that at the present stage in socialist construction the deepening of cooperation between our countries in all spheres of public life is acquiring an exceptionally important role.

Citizens of the GDR expressed sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for its principled stand set forth in the TASS statement supporting the German socialist state, against which certain forces in the FRG are launching a concentrated campaign of incitement these days.

Ligachev Interviewed on GDR TV

LD1409201689 Hamburg DPA in German 1852 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] In an interview with GDR television, Ligachev has emphasized that in the Soviet Union there is no alternative to the policy of restructuring the renewal. "It is not a fad, but simply a necessity and a need."

In spite of all economic progress, the Soviet market is "unfortunately flooded with money to such an extent at present that much of it is not covered by goods at all," he continued. This resulted in the "fairly unexpected" difficulties in national relations. They will be discussed in the coming days at a session of the Central Committee. Everything possible will be done to guarantee all republics a maximum of rights and possibilities, "within the framework of a unified Soviet Socialist Federation."

The most important thing is "a comprehensive perfecting of our party, of all its limbs." "If the necessary order, corresponding to the Party Statute and not the consequence of some dictate or other, or of the tightening of thumbscrews prevails in our party, then order will also prevail in society because the party is the most important leading force." A multiparty system is rejected for the multinational state. The consolidation of the party is of decisive importance.

Hungary's Barabas Visits, Talks With Medvedev

Received by Medvedev 13 Sep

PM1509090789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] On 13 September V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau, met with J. Barabas, member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Political Executive Committee and secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee, who is in Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

There was an exchange of opinions on questions connected with the development of processes of socialist renewal in the Soviet Union and Hungary and the improvement of Soviet-Hungarian cooperation and ties between the CPSU and the MSZMP.

Medvedev, Barabas Hold Talks

LD1309205489 Budapest MTI in English 1833 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow, September 13 (MTI)—Janos Barabas, secretary of the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party] Central Committee and member of the Political Executive Committee, held talks with Vadim Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee PC [Political Committee] and Central Committee secretary in charge of ideological affairs, in Moscow on Wednesday. The Hungarian politician arrived in the Soviet capital on Wednesday.

Mr Barabas told the Moscow correspondent of MTI that he was informed about preparations for the CPSU Central Committee session to be held next week, and the topical problems of Soviet society (including nationality and economic issues). Mr Barabas gave briefs on preparations for the HSWP congress to take place in October.

The sides discussed preparations for the forthcoming multilateral consultation of the secretaries in charge of social policy and ideological issues in the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries.

GDR Refugees 'Not Discussed'

LD1409145189 Budapest MTI in English 1339 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow, September 14 (MTI)—The affair of the GDR refugees was not discussed either at the meeting between Janos Barabas and Vadim Medvedev, or at the conference of deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states. The Western press reports originating from Moscow, which do not name authentic sources and seek connections of this kind in view of the Moscow talks of Hungarian politicians, are groundless.

In answer to a question by MTI's Moscow correspondent, both Janos Barabas, secretary of the HSWP [MSZMP]] Central Committee and member of the Political Executive Committee, and Deputy Foreign Minister Istvan Oszi reconfirmed that the issue was not discussed at their talks.

The Hungarian politicians stressed: similarly to other bilateral debates, Hungary handles this issue as problem to which the sides directly concerned should seek and find a constructive solution acceptable to all, instead of shifting this task to a third party.

PRAVDA Reports Hungarian Plenum Decisions

PM1509112589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Sep 89 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Preparing for the Congress"]

[Text] Budapest, 14 Sep—A Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee plenum has ended here. An information report published at the end of it points out that the participants listened to and took note of an announcement on the course of the tripartite political talks to coordinate interests. The MSZMP Central Committee approved the proposals on continuing these talks.

Within the framework of preparations for the MSZMP Congress at the beginning of October, the Central Committee discussed the theses of the accountability report and the draft program statement. It was decided to finalize both documents at the next plenum and then present them to the congress delegates.

The plenum participants also examined the draft party statutes. It was noted that the proposed draft creates the relevant framework for the organizational foundations of a party which will be functioning in a new way. The new statutes are devised for the purpose of facilitating the party's adaptation to the conditions of multiparty parliamentary democracy and creation of the organizational foundations for the implementation of the MSZMP program which will be elaborated at the congress and the establishment of a framework for the functioning of a party that is capable of united action.

The MSZMP Central Committee adopted a proposal on MSZMP political strategy in Europe and in the world economy and also long-term MSZMP plans vis-a-vis the cooperative movement.

An account was given of the economic processes in 1989, as well as proposals connected with the directives of the government economic policy program for 1990-1992.

The MSZMP leading organ relieved L. Kovacs, chairman of the Hungarian National Council of Trade Unions, and S. Nagy, general secretary of the Hungarian National Council of Trade Unions, of membership of the MSZMP Central Committee at their own request.

Leadership Recognizes Bulgarians on Anniversary

Government Sends Greetings

PM1509091589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Sep 89 Second Edition p 1

[USSR Party-Government greetings to Bulgarian leaders on Bulgarian revolution anniversary]

[Text] To Comrade Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council
Comrade Georgi Atanasov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers

Dear comrades!
The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, USSR Council of Ministers, and all Soviet people cordially congratulate you, the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, Bulgarian State Council, Bulgarian Council of Ministers, and the fraternal Bulgarian people on the 45th anniversary of the socialist revolution and Bulgarian national day—Freedom Day.

The victory of 9 September 1944, which embodied the will of the Bulgarian people and the desires and aspirations of many generations of fighters for the freedom of their country, opened up broad, historic prospects before Bulgaria and made it possible to effect far-reaching, progressive transformations in all spheres of life. Extensive work has now been launched in Bulgaria today under the leadership of the Communist Party to renew society and more fully realize socialism's potential.

Soviet people highly value the relations of friendship and all-around cooperation linking our fraternal countries. At the present stage, resolving the tasks of revolutionary restructuring creates new incentives for developing and improving Soviet-Bulgarian collaboration and enhancing its effectiveness.

Acting in the spirit of the new political thinking, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and other socialist states are actively working with all peace-loving forces to liberate mankind from the threat of war and create a nonnuclear, nonviolent world.

The decisions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference held in Bucharest open up new opportunities for thoroughly improving the situation throughout the European Continent and implementing equal, mutually advantageous cooperation in conditions of reliable international stability.

On this important day we wish you, dear comrades, Communists, and all the Bulgarian people great success in your socialist creativity, peace, happiness, and prosperity.

CPSU Central Committee
USSR Council of Ministers
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Moscow Ceremonies Mark Bulgarian Day

PM1509090389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Sep 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Anniversary of Bulgarian Revolution"]

[Text] The date 9 September 1944 marked a radical breakthrough in the history of Bulgaria and its desire for freedom and independence. A new, socialist page was opened in relations between our countries at that time, a page incorporating all the valuable things with which the centuries-old friendship between the Bulgarian and Soviet peoples are so rich. This was marked in Moscow 7 September at a ceremony attended by representatives of the capital's working people devoted to the 45th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria.

The presidium comprised: L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Moscow City party committee; R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; leaders of a number of ministries and departments; representatives of party, soviet, and public organizations; military chiefs; and a delegation of the All-National Committee for Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship led by R. Karausinov, secretary of the Bulgarian Central Council of Trade Unions.

The keynote speaker, Academician A.A. Tupolev, chairman of the Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society Central Board and chief designer, noted that Bulgaria had made a historic leap forward in the physical production and spiritual spheres and in improving the people's standard of living during the years of people's power. Soviet people share the Bulgarian people's pride in the major accomplishments which have marked the path of socialist building in Bulgaria.

Today our countries, the speaker continued, are at a difficult stage of development—the transition from one qualitative state to another is under way. The profound transformations initiated in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria are directly aimed at further enhancing their people's prosperity and creating increasingly favorable material and spiritual conditions for people's lives.

It was thanks to the Soviet Army's heroic struggle on the battlefields of World War II and multifaceted Soviet assistance and support in the post-war years, G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR said, that a socialist revolution became possible in Bulgaria and a strong foundation was established for the country's all-around development. The constantly strengthening cooperation with the socialist states, particularly the USSR, is an important factor for further progress in various spheres of Bulgarian society's life. The revolutionary transformations in our countries, the ambassador stressed, are creating favorable opportunities for further strengthening friendship and collaboration between the Bulgarian and Soviet peoples.

G. Pankov held a reception to mark this notable date, which was attended by L.N. Zaykov, R.N. Nishanov, P.I. Mostovoy, and other officials. The delegation of the All-National Committee for Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship headed by R. Karausinov was also in attendance.

Yazov Greets Counterpart

PM1509085189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 89 First Edition p 1

[Greetings message from USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov to Bulgarian National Defense Minister D. Dzhurov]

[Text] To Army General Comrade Dobri Dzhurov, Bulgarian minister of national defense

Esteemed Comrade Minister!
In the name of the Soviet Armed Forces and on my own behalf I send you and all Bulgarian People's Army servicemen fraternal combat greetings and sincere congratulations on the the 45th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria.

Over these years the Bulgarian people have achieved great successes in socialist building in all spheres of the country's economic, political, and cultural life and in strengthening its defense capability, thus confirming their loyalty to the historic choice made in September 1944.

Relations between our countries and armies, which have deep historical roots, have developed dynamically and have acquired particular strength on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

We highly value the contribution of the Bulgarian People's Army to strengthening the defense might of the Warsaw Pact states.

May friendship and all-around cooperation between the fraternal peoples and armies of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria develop and strengthen.
[Signed] Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

Bulgarians Hold News Conference on Turkish Issue

PM1409153189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent A. Kapralov: "Bulgaria-Turkey: Trip Abroad"]

[Text] Kapitan-Andreyevo, Khaskovo, Sofia—A large group of Bulgarian and foreign journalists has visited the Kapitan-Andreyevo checkpoint on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The media representatives put many questions to Bulgarian citizens who had just returned from Turkey. There was a press conference in Khaskovo, the oblast center.

As a preliminary condition for the normalization of relations between the two neighboring countries, S. Staykov, chief of a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry department, said, Turkey is insisting on the conclusion of an agreement on migrants. Bulgaria cannot agree to negotiations for a number of reasons. In the first place, the question of an agreement on migrants has been taken off the agenda of bilateral relations, as confirmed by the joint communique on the visit to our country by the Turkish head of state in 1982. Second, we have no population to which such an agreement might be deemed to pertain. The Bulgarian state does not intend to encourage or compel a single Bulgarian citizen to migrate. We have big plans for the country's socioeconomic development and we need everyone's knowledge, skills, and labor. Third, Bulgarian legislation fully regulates citizens' property rights. And, finally, agreements on migrants have had their day and have nothing to do with the decisions of the Vienna meeting and trends of international law.

As of 31 August, Kapitan-Andreyevo checkpoint chief A. Bylchev announced, 307,660 people—descendants of Islamicized Bulgarians—had gone to Turkey. The widest opportunities were provided for obtaining a Bulgarian foreign passport. Yet those who met with a refusal were sometimes reluctant to accept the fact. At the checkpoint they told me about the following tragic case: To get their draftee son to Turkey illegally, the parents "packed" him in a basket of bedlinen, and he suffocated.

Often people have tried to take out 1,000-2,000 leva in excess of the set amount. In such cases the money has not been confiscated, but has been credited to them in a Bulgarian savings bank. A kind of duty, but also returnable, has been levied on outgoing televisions and refrigerators. I would point out, however, that people will rarely return with them. More often than not they will be sold in Turkey for a song, to feed the family and get some money together for the return journey. Some 4,324 people have already returned to Bulgaria. What kind of a welcome do they get?

"Anyone who returns," D. Barakov, first deputy chairman of Khaskovo Oblast People's Council, said, "can count on our being helpful and responsive. But whether or not these people return to their former jobs will be decided by the labor collectives they left in the lurch."

Those who went to Turkey at the height of the harvest included Anna Marinova, from the village of Okush. "We decided to go to relatives in Turkey to have a look and compare. We lived there for more than 2 months. It was 70 days of torture! As we were boarding the train to return to Bulgaria my husband was beaten up so badly that he is now virtually a cripple. We will never go to Turkey again..."

It is Bulgarian policy, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry spokesman said, answering a question, to establish good-neighborly relations with Turkey, relations of mutual understanding, cooperation, and trust. The change which has brought about a marked decline in contacts between the two countries was not Bulgaria's fault. It is clear that Turkey is conducting an extensive campaign to discredit our country and validate its absurd claims to it. It was for this reason that the Turkish Government rejected the summit talks planned for Vienna in July.

Bulgaria, it was said in conclusion, cannot make concessions that damage its national interests. Our country advocates constructive dialogue on all problems, but without preliminary conditions. In other words, we are striving for equal dialogue without diktat, ultimatums, and threats.

...Only 2 weeks ago 3,500-4,000 Bulgarian citizens were crossing the Turkish border daily. Now Turkish border guards raise the barrier to the descendants of Islamicized Bulgarians—on that side of the border they are called Turks—only when they have Turkish visas. Those who manage to obtain visas are continuing to leave. Over 300 left the day before the press conference. But during that same 24-hour period 594 Bulgarian citizens returned.

West Europe

West Germany Aims To 'Destabilize' East Germany

LD1209165389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 Sep 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As already reported, Hungary has opened its border to the West for the GDR citizens staying there. Our correspondent in Bonn reports:

[V. Kondratyev identified by screen caption] Recently the GDR has been officially granting many of its residents the right to settle in the FRG for good. In August alone there were about 15,000. However, there are also quite a few people who chose another way—by fleeing from the republic. After the recent relaxation of the border controls between Hungary and Austria, a convenient gap to the West has opened up. All they had to do was to make a tourist visit to Hungary. Then numbers of people wanting to leave for the FRG began to build up in special camps near the Hungarian border. By the end there were over 6,000. The GDR authorities insisted that they return home and guaranteed them immunity and a review of emigration cases in the proper order.

The FRG in turn put a certain amount of pressure on Hungary on the pretext of the observance of human rights, urging it to allow unobstructed departure. Finally, Hungary unilaterally declined to observe the 1969 agreement with GDR forbidding citizens to cross the border to the West without appropriate documentation from their country.

Joy is unbounded in the FRG. The FRG prepared in advance for such a turn of events. Back in the Hungarian camps, GDR citizens were given FRG passports and money. On the very eve of the GDR's 40th anniversary, its FRG neighbors very much wanted to present the GDR as a country without a future, which even its own citizens are abandoning. Not everything here, of course, is unambiguously simple. The forbidden fruit effect is playing its part; some GDR citizens want to see the world and rapidly acquire a car, house and other good things. Some are moved by political motives.

One thing is clear. Without the FRG's so-called German policy, which stimulated the escape [begstvo] from the GDR, the present conflict situation would hardly have been possible. The FRG is experiencing a certain number of economic and social difficulties with people requesting asylum. Now, for example, they are already refusing to accept Poles and Soviet citizens of non-German origin. Nothing is threatening them at home, they say, send them back. However, in the case of the GDR, their approach and aims are different: to destabilize the GDR authorities, to create conditions for a split in the social community and German reunification. There is an enormous amount being spoken and written about this now.

However, open pressure on a sovereign state—and the GDR is no exception here—has never yet turned out well. What is needed is concerted actions from all interested parties.

UK Premier Thatcher Cited on Perestroyka

PM1409154389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Sep 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Thatcher Speech"]

[Text] London, 7 Sep—"A triumph for the policy of perestroyka and glasnost" was how British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described the work of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Addressing participants in the 82d Interparliamentary Union Conference here, she stressed that, in her opinion, this event was the "cornerstone" in the development of Soviet democracy. Mrs Thatcher stated that she awaits with "great pleasure" her working visit to Moscow to see M.S. Gorbachev at the end of the month.

In her speech the British prime minister broached a wide range of questions. She touched on the situation in the countries of East Europe, particularly the transformations in Poland and Hungary, and dwelt on the situation in the countries of Asia and Latin America.

Abalkin Talks With Swedish State Secretary

LD1509085889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2112 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Comrade Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has received Suhlmann, Swedish secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, who is heading the Swedish delegation to the second roundtable session on exchanging experience on the socioeconomic development of the USSR and Sweden. In the course of the discussion, the great significance of regular meetings between Soviet and Swedish experts in the area of the management of the economy and of finances was stressed.

Akhromeyev Meets Finnish President, Ends Visit

LD1409232189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1438 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Helsinki, 14 Sep (TASS)—Today the visit to Finland of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev ended. He was received by M. Koivisto, president of the Republic of Finland, and by Minister of Defense O. Norrback, and delivered lectures at the "Paasikivi Society," at the General Staff of the Defense Forces, and at a sitting of the Central Board of the "Finland-Soviet Union" society.

The speeches of the Soviet military leader examined tasks connected with ensuring the defense capacity of the USSR, issues pertaining to the correlation of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and Soviet-Finnish relations. Speaking at the sitting of the Central Board of the "Finland-Soviet Union" society, he noted the topical nature of the Murmansk initiatives advanced by M.S. Gorbachev in October 1987, and declared the Soviet Union's support for the idea of creating a nonnuclear zone in the north of Europe. The speaker emphasized that Soviet-Finnish relations in the post-war period are a model for relations between states with different social systems.

Sakharov Publicizes Wallenberg Prison Story

PM1409113589 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 37, 10 Sep 89 p 6

[Letter to MOSCOW NEWS from Academician Andrey Sakharov: "The Fate of Raul Wallenberg"]

[Text] Like thousands of people all over the world I have long been worried about the fate of Raul Wallenberg.

I cannot believe in the official assurances that Wallenberg's file is not to be found in the KGB archives. Papers like this bear the stamp, "To be stored for ever". The file of a foreign diplomat, which could some day become crucial for the reputation of this country and its leadership could not possibly be destroyed. I feel that the day has come when the Soviet and world public and the Swedish Government ought to demand that all documents pertaining to Raul Wallenberg be made public.

Is he still alive? If not, when and how did he die? Nobody knows.

It is imperative that a non-governmental group of independent inspectors be allowed to verify all the clues about Wallenberg having been seen by various people at various times in various places; to question the witnesses and visit the prisons and psychiatric wards they've mentioned, and with full authority to investigate and talk with the guards and inmates.

My wife and I had come across some such clues. In the early 1970s I received a letter from Wallenberg's mother with a request that I help her find her son. After her death, Raul's material half-brother Guy von Dardel came to Moscow in 1976 and visited us. He said there were people in Moscow, Leningrad and Tbilisi who had not long ago seen Wallenberg. We repeatedly asked Dardel to give us their addresses so that we could verify the information, but he never did. Perhaps, he did not know the addresses.

After our return from the city of Gorkiy in March 1987, Guy von Dardel phoned me to say that he had received information about Wallenberg being held in custody at a secret prison 300 km north of Moscow. In May that year, a letter was passed on to me with this postscript in longhand I'm quoting from memory: "Raul Wallenberg is being kept prisoner in the Mirnyy settlement 18 km south of Torzhok. Other inmates are Poles held since World War II. Between December 1986-January 1987 there was a flu epidemic in the camp. Many Poles died, Wallenberg was badly ill, too, but survived. It is not known if he is kept under his own name or an alias."

In August 1987 my wife and I found the Mirnyy settlement. But we found no camp there, although one of the establishments looked suspicious. Later on my wife went there again, once on her own, the second time with me.

In March 1988 during my interview with Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev (which focused on a different subject) I raised the issue of Raul Wallenberg and asked him to investigate the signal about Wallenberg's alleged whereabouts in the secret Mirnyy prison.

Shortly after that I received a reply from the local authorities to the effect that no person named Wallenberg ever lived in Mirnyy. Nor did the local old-timers remember anyone of that name.

When Dardel returned to Moscow in late summer 1988, it transpired that the Mirnyy clue was based on a misunderstanding. Dardel gave us another address and the number of the camp in which Wallenberg was allegedly being kept.

My wife and I once again went on a reconnaissance trip. But as we approached the assigned place we realized we had again been given wrong direction. The local residents we turned to knew nothing of a camp existing nearby.

Suddenly my wife saw two men and a woman walking towards us. She instinctively felt they might know something. She slowed down and asked if they knew how to get to camp number so-and-so. The woman said we needed to go in the opposite direction and suggested she show us the way if we gave her a lift. After some time we approached a typical "establishment" (which is a timid euphemism for camps, prisons, mental homes and other places which prefer to draw as little attention as possible)—with the barbed-wire fence and watch-towers. At the checkpoint there was a bright plaque with the number we sought. Several lieutenants, apparently just off duty, were getting into a jeep. There was a captain with them. I came up to them and said I was looking for a prisoner, a Pole. There was a momentary confusion among the officers (or was I imagining?), and the captain intervened: "There are no Poles around here. They are somewhere else." There was no point in continuing the conversation.

I'm sorry Guy von Dardel hadn't given me the number of the camp earlier (although he had known it all the time). Had I known it during my interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, it could have proved more effective, to say nothing of the three useless trips to Mirnyy.

However, the most important thing today is to receive confirmation of Wallenberg's being or having been kept at that camp, or to refute the version which in my view seems far more tenable than most.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Meets With Baltic Leaders 13 Sep

LD1409135189 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] Good evening. For Estonia and for the entire Baltic area the most important news comes today from Moscow. This afternoon Vayno Vyalyas [first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee], Arnold Ryutel [chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium], Indrek Toome [chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers] together with the leadership of Latvia and Lithuania, met with Mikhail Gorbachev. Hopefully, the Estonian leadership will return to Tallinn tonight [Wednesday] on the last plane from Moscow.

Vyalyas Describes Meeting

LD1409184289 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 89

[From the "Echo of the Day" program]

[Excerpts] Those who followed late last night what was going on on the radio or television (?would have been the first) to hear the impressions of the republican leadership's meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Commenting on this meeting today is Vayno Vyalyas, first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee.

[Vyalyas] We presented with full candor the republic's positions and analyzed their causes and possible solutions. I will not repeat them, as the 15th plenum of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee and our statement already voiced them and we said the same things in Moscow.

Mikhail Gorbachev said in this respect very calmly: From time to time there are moments when poignant resolutions are adopted, which perhaps do not find understanding on each point, and this is hardly even possible. Then he brought out the other, namely the constructive, side of the matter. He said that we are here today for the purpose of advancing together with you because we are indeed (?allies) [words indistinct]. We will perhaps finally find this grain of truth (?which should exist.) [passage omitted]

He said, let us abandon this old stereotype [words indistinct] A union republic must be sovereign; a full right to decide must belong to it. Everything that provides complete authority must belong to it: the right of possession upon that territory, the right to decide; and only then can it become sovereign; only in this way can one finally resolve the people's right of self-determination. So I can indeed say that when we spoke about the sovereignty of union republics and about rights, our understanding was indeed mutual.

But we also have to keep this factor in mind. When Mikhail Gorbachev says that perestroyka is experiencing one of its most serious and difficult (?periods), with extreme forces consolidating, and with the conservative wing consolidating those whose interests are seriously endangered, then, as politicians, we must also voice our (?clear) opinions in this respect, being responsible people. If we speak of sovereignty, we must still speak of sovereignty within the (?composition) of the Soviet Union. We must find a path in this respect, because the political game around terms like separatism and secession from the Union—that is not the path that we should take; we should decisively rebuff that. If we want the republic's sovereign interests—our deciding for ourselves and doing things ourselves—to be [word indistinct], where we were yesterday, then we must also say very unambiguously that we support what is understood by the [word indistinct] term: federation and union.

'Only' Baltic Media Report Talks

AU1509101889 Paris AFP in English 0946 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, Sept 15 (AFP)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev convened the top leaders of the Baltic states for surprise talks in Moscow, amid growing tension in the three republics where nationalists are pressing autonomy demands, Baltic officials said Friday.

The meeting took place Wednesday, only six days prior to next Tuesday's much postponed special Communist Party Central Committee plenum on ethnic issues. This is expected to tighten party discipline and unity in the wake of nationalist unrest around the country.

Only local Baltic media reported Wednesday's talks, with Estonian radio saying Thursday that Estonian leaders had "brought good news from Moscow, another confirmation of the fact that we have chosen the right path, reached hundreds of homes, added some feeling of security and a will to act".

It gave no other details. The Estonian party chief, Vayno Valyas, who took part in the talks, only confirmed that it had taken place in an interview on Estonian television, a spokesman for the Estonian foreign ministry said.

A Lithuanian deputy party chief [as received], Algirdas Brazauskas, meanwhile, told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE he could not confirm reports that Mr. Gorbachev had given his support for economic independence in the three republics.

The meeting involved the Communist Party leaders, presidents and prime ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Politburo members Georgiy Razumovskiy and Vadim Medvedev were also present. [passage omitted]

Forthcoming Supreme Soviet Session Outlined

LD1509060789 Moscow TASS in English 0602 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent reporting from the Kremlin:

The parliamentary recess will be over in the Soviet Union on September 18 as the Supreme Soviet will resume its session in Moscow.

Committee and commission members are the first to start work. The full parliament's second session will begin on September 25.

There is a great deal of hard work for the Supreme Soviet members. The content and significance of this work are determined by the acuteness of problems facing the country and by the urgent character of tasks that are to be resolved in the near future.

The autumn session is to examine the draft state plan and budget for 1990, already submitted for consideration to the legislature by the Soviet Government.

The drafts are extraordinary in their character as they are designed to stop the economic situation from deteriorating further and secure first steps towards financial improvement and the continuation of the economy's social re-orientation.

In addition to that, the deputies are to discuss a package of draft laws that would make up the legal basis for a new stage in the radical economic reform.

Among these are bills on ownership, on land and land tenure, on leasing and lease relations, on a uniform tax system as well as on general principles of economic management and the social sphere in the constituent republics.

A separate item on the agenda deals with documents designed to enhance the efficiency of the parliamentarians' own work, including draft rules of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and a draft law on the status of people's deputies.

The autumn session is to become a kind of preparatory stage for the second Congress of People's Deputies. Top priority is being given to constitutional issues. Overdue changes and amendments to the fundamental law of the country are to be discussed by the Supreme Soviet and then handed over for final approval to the congress.

In implementing the programme of the second session, the deputies will draw on the unique experience they accumulated in the first session, the experience that has enabled the Supreme Soviet to become an authoritative link in the Soviet political system now in the making.

Shalayev Notes Current Trade Union Tasks, Plenum

PM1209151589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Sep 89 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, by Yu. Nikolayev: "Adjustment of Objectives"—place, date of interview not specified; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] In our newspaper's last issue we promised to provide detailed coverage of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] plenum which was held 6-7 September. We honor this promise by publishing an interview with S.A. Shalayev.

[Nikolayev] An unusual [neobychnyy] plenum of the AUCCTU has just ended its work and I realize, Stepan Alekseyevich, how difficult it is to give an impromptu interview right away, hot on the heels of the event. But after all, there is really keen interest in the plenum, especially in view of the debate's extraordinary nature. I must admit that when I read the title of your report ("The Current Moment and the Trade Unions' Immediate Tasks") I automatically recalled what I had read about the first few years after October. At that time, as it is well known, there was a widespread practice of speaking about "the current moment..." both at street rallies and at authoritative assemblies, right up to congress level....

[Shalayev] The coincidence is probably not accidental. Is it all that impossible to compare our present with those days in terms of both the scale of life's renewal and the social tension in society? And also, if we were to speak frankly, in terms of the acuteness of the situation....

[Nikolayev] What do you have in mind?

[Shalayev] I shall explain. But first let us look at what determines the essence of the present moment. It is, evidently, primarily the fact that the country is living through what is almost the most critical period of perestroyka. Yes, the radical transformations which had to be implemented in the material, social, and spiritual spheres were defined, but their implementation is progressing with great complications and in a contradictory fashion. Our plenum demonstrated most obviously that the working class and the working people today are clearly dissatisfied with **the way** perestroyka is progressing and **the pace** at which it is progressing. The most serious concern is caused by **the incompleteness, the halfhearted nature of measures** for the implementation of economic reform. The transition to forms of economic management is being held back under all sort of pretenses at various levels of management. Much is being said about the creation of a rule-of-law state, but at the same time the labor collectives' legitimate rights are frequently and grossly flouted.

Ordinary working people and their families are suffering from the imbalance in money circulation and the consumer market, the notorious shortage of prime necessities with which we all are so fed up, the growing acuteness of the food and housing problems, all imaginable distortions in the cooperative movement, unbridled speculation, rising crime... As we can see, a most fertile ground for social tension. Matters are further complicated by negative processes in the spiritual sphere, slackening discipline and order, declining morals among some sections of the population. A contribution to society's destabilization is also made by the increasingly frequent conflicts in interethnic relations. I spoke of all this from the plenum rostrum...

[Nikolayev] It is, of course, good that the report and the speeches during the discussion amounted to an honest and critical analysis of the prevailing situation. It is, however, time to draw appropriate conclusions and adopt specific measures.

[Shalayev] This is indeed the reason why the plenum was convened. It frankly admitted that a serious crisis of confidence in many of society's traditional structures, including the trade unions, has developed in the prevailing conditions. The current sociopolitical situation has raised urgently and afresh the question of their position and role. And the mass strikes by miners and collective conflicts in a number of other sectors have simply demanded of us that we effect a radical and serious turnabout in the entire activity of the 140-million-strong trade union ranks.

[Nikolayev] Actually, our newspaper wrote a lot about the strikes in the Kuzbass and other regions, and this material provoked a far from uniform response by our readers. What were the summated, generalized conclusions drawn by plenum participants?

[Shalayev] There is nothing surprising in the fact that different opinions are being expressed. This is the first time in the years of perestroyka that our country's working class has autonomously entered the arena of struggle for its socioeconomic and political rights and has once more made its presence felt as a mighty force. The question of the forms and methods of this struggle really gives rise to quite a few arguments. But before I describe the plenum's stance, as expressed in its resolution on the report, I would like to give you an idea of the phenomenon's real scale. The report noted that, according to our information, mass strikes were held in 40 oblasts, krays, and autonomous and union republics. Most of them were at enterprises in the coal and metallurgical industries, motor transport, and the construction materials industry. In other words, the sectors where there is a most acutely felt dissatisfaction with the organization of labor, the neglect of the social sphere, and the existing material difficulties. Lack of economic autonomy for enterprises and regions, floundering economic reform—these are the invariable components of collective mass conflicts.

This situation was consummately and very accurately described by one of the USSR people's deputies in his speech to the Supreme Soviet session. "Have you heard of owners going on strike?", he said. The main misfortune perhaps lies in the fact that labor collectives still lack both economic and juridical rights, that they still lack control over the profits they earn. And yet this is their right, something one would have thought had been agreed a long time ago, something that was confirmed and emblazoned on the banners of perestroyka.

And now let us turn to evaluations. Having thoroughly analyzed the situation, it is impossible to deny that by going on strike the workers have yet again expressed **their resolute support for perestroyka,** even though the method they used was very drastic, dramatic, and unusual for our society. They were perfectly justified in perceiving the cause of difficulties as being the shortage of economic and even political—as well!—rights. This is evidently the primary starting point in evaluating the strikes.

It now appears exceptionally important to thoroughly analyze, as the saying goes, the causes and effects in every individual case. Quite a few of them are common or similar. The situation in labor collectives was aggravated by gross violations of current labor remuneration provisions, including those governing evening and night shift work, transfer to new wage rates, and so on. People are tired of working on "black Saturdays" for years on end, without standard days off, and at times in very difficult conditions.

All these questions were repeatedly "presented" and "raised" as phraseology has it; they were included in collective contracts, they were examined at economic and trade union meetings at various levels. But the majority of promises by both local administrations and ministries remained unfulfilled, social tension gradually built up, and the prestige of trade unions as the workers' protectors declined. There you have the result. The workers preferred to express their protest against gross violations of social justice not through their trade union organizations but through work stoppage and strike committees. It is sad to have to realize this, but it is an inescapable fact.

[Nikolayev] And yet trade union committees did adopt different attitudes...

[Shalayev] Yes. Some of them unhesitatingly took the strikers' side, joined strike committees, participated in the elaboration of their demands, organized supplies and food, and took care of order, discipline, and safety at enterprises. Others—including many trade union committees in railroad transport, the oil, gas, and chemical industries, and some other sectors—channeled their efforts in these complex circumstances toward the prompt solution of labor conflicts and prevented their exacerbation. But there were many trade union committees which—having found themselves in conditions of acute political and social tension and having come up against the need to swiftly make principled decisions—

got confused, displayed timidity, let other social forces take the initiative, and thus failed to perform their basic function—to be always with the working people.

The resolution adopted by our plenum bluntly states: "The stance of trade union committees which unhesitatingly backed the strikers' just demands and dispatched their representatives to strike committees merits support." That selfsame document condemns the actions by trade union leaders who got confused and failed to swiftly make the correct decisions.

[Nikolayev] Stepan Alekseyevich! I recall that at the plenum you called for a display of fortitude, for an admission that blame for getting confused should not be laid only at the door of some specific trade union committees, that it is necessary to look more deeply "into the chronic illnesses of our trade union movement, which we have come to accept and which we tried to overlook until quite recently." One could also add that some of the debate speakers—like V.P. Shcherbakov, chairman of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, for example—adopted what was perhaps an even more critical attitude in evaluating the state of our trade unions.

[Shalayev] I carefully listened to Vladimir Pavlovich, but my attention focused also on his very businesslike proposals, not just on his criticism. He said: Social processes are developing at such speed that, unless we correctly evaluate them and determine our position in them, we might find ourselves being just bystanders, right? But he also noticed something else! The trade unions are now given an opportunity to regain the working people's confidence, provided they learn to properly uphold their interest.

Let me repeat the report's conclusions. Of course, the behavior of many of our leaders was dictated by the fact that trade unions and their internal life are lagging behind the transformation under way in the country and the greater demands. We felt the effect of the habit, which we have inherited from the past, of obeying orders from the top. There was a display of readiness to rest content with halfhearted measures, to yet again "put ourselves in the shoes" of the enterprise management, the sector leaders, the government.

The trade unions seem to have gradually become part of the administrative economic management system and distanced themselves from their protective functions. We have got used to the absence of conflicts, and hence the working man's typical feeling that the director and the trade union committee will always strike a deal. This was promoted by the multitude of trade union functions, the vague borderlines of their responsibility, the obligations imposed on them to get involved in everything and everywhere. The paramount task for us all now is to extricate the trade unions from this system and restore Lenin's original ideas in their activity. Only thus can their prestige be restored.

At this point I cannot fail to emphasize the following. The July events taught us another important lesson. They proved that strikes are a powerful but at the same time a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, they are quicker to attract the attention of top state, government, and party offices and of the entire country. The process of seeking solutions and reaching acceptable compromises is accelerated, questions which have been waiting for their turn for years and decades are resolved within a matter of days or weeks.

It is obvious that trade unions will have to use the strike weapon in the future, to apply it when all other means for resolving conflicts have been exhausted. At the same time, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the other edge of the strike weapon hits the striking collectives themselves and their long-term interests. The most powerful blow is dealt against the country's economy, and through it against the population and its living standards. Let me recall the damage resulting directly from the miners' strikes alone. Delivery shortfalls amounted to 7 million tonnes of coal, and 60 percent of mine faces became unworkable due to excessive gas buildup or flooding. The total cost to the state is calculated to run into billions of rubles.

Concern for the working people's interests and the future of the country, democracy, and perestroyka makes it imperative to exercise utmost responsibility in the use of strikes as a means for solving labor conflicts. We cannot share the euphoria displayed by some mass media in their one-sided appraisal of strikes and their consequences, the attempt to absolutize strikes as the sole means of struggle available to the working class, almost as a panacea for all our misfortunes and problems today. Let me repeat that strikes are **an exceptional and extreme** means. And in order to ensure that we resort to it as rarely as possible, we need a reliable and effective mechanism to promptly examine and solve any emerging conflict situations.

[Nikolayev] It is well known even last year the AUCCTU advocated the adoption of a special legislative act to create such a procedure.

[Shalayev] Even this year, in April, the AUCCTU and the government submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium a draft decree "On Collective Labor Conflicts," envisaging a procedure for their solution. It is to be regretted that USSR people's deputies from the trade unions and the AUCCTU did not insist on its urgent examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Nikolayev] If only the adoption of yet another good, and certainly needed, law could solve all the problems that have emerged, including the acceleration of the perestroyka of our largest organization's activity...

[Shalayev] An amplification is evidently needed here. Laws are laws, of course, but the situation cannot be remedied by laws alone. The working people, and primarily the country's working class, demand that their trade unions adopt fundamentally different approaches toward the performance of their functions, a sharp turnabout in the direction of protecting the working man's rights and legitimate interests. Properly autonomous and principled mutual relations with state and economic organs and with central and local soviets of people's deputies.

This is, of course, a very serious, enormous, and politically important question. We strove to thoroughly discuss it at the plenum. We had consultations as to what should be done first and foremost. What are our immediate tasks. The AUCCTU Presidium deemed it necessary to express a series of principled considerations. Let me dwell on just a few of them.

We are certainly facing the question of **reviewing priorities** in the activity of primary trade union organizations and of trade unions as a whole. This does not at all mean that hitherto trade unions had dealt only with extraneous matters, had lost their way, and had misunderstood their role and their position in society's political system. The trade unions **have been, are, and will remain** a Leninist school for working people's unification and solidarity and the protection of their interests, a school for economic management and administration. At every specific historical segment of time, however, priorities can and must be changed in line with the specific nature of social development and the conditions in which it is necessary to act.

There can be no argument that the introduction of economic accountability and self-financing, of market and lease relations, and of the cooperative system, and the creation of enterprises with involvement by capital from abroad will significantly expand the enterprises' economic autonomy and will promote the growth of production efficiency. At the same time, however—and in a number of instances, especially during the transition stage—these new forms of economic management can be accompanied by sundry negative manifestations which deal a direct blow against the interests of workers and employees.

We can observe deformations in labor remuneration and the development of group egoism among individual categories of working people in many labor collectives, while the desire to gain maximum benefit with a minimum delay pushes onto the back burner the concern for people's health, rest, and labor safety. These are the reasons behind the erosion of the production of cheaper goods, including goods for children and the elderly. To our great regret, we increasingly often encounter instances of collectives overlooking the needs of their veterans and large families, and squeezing out women with small children or workers who are frequently ill. Quite often access to economically accountable collectives is not available to young people who have not yet managed to gain sufficiently high skills.

This list of newly emerging problems and situation can be continued. And apart from the trade union, the labor collectives have no other public organization whose duty, calling, and position make it incumbent upon it to stand up against these shortcomings and protect the legitimate interests of every working person.

Of course, the trade unions are vitally interested in the development of production, in enhancing its efficiency and on this basis boosting people's earnings and their material prosperity. Proceeding from these interests, the trade unions' activity for decades on end had focused on mass production and economic work. In this process, as plenum participants correctly noted, **the protective function** was drowned in production worries. The situation is changing today. The trade unions can and must influence the solution of management and economic tasks primarily through labor collective councils, through their representatives on these plenipotentiary organs of production self-management. Now, and in line with the Law on the State Enterprise, it is no longer the trade union committee but the labor collective councils which, jointly with the administration, are called upon to be the direct organizers of labor and production and of the struggle for scientific and technical progress, high quality output, and savings of material, fuel, and energy resources. They are the ones whose primary concern is the training and further training of cadres, the economic incentives for training, and the introduction of progressive labor organization forms.

Proceeding from this premise, the AUCCTU Presidium proposed that trade union committees be relieved from direct organizational work associated with economic tasks, including mass production work. Also that they be relieved from a whole series of functions which are not part of trade union committees' work and are at times still imposed on them by local party, soviet, and economic organs.

Even the 19th All-Union Party Conference noted that some party organs have started perceiving the mutual relations between party and trade unions as the rigid meshing of cogwheels in a transmission assembly, precluding even the thought of any trade union autonomy. Direct interference in internal trade union affairs was deemed permissible. Unfortunately, this flawed practice is still with us.

Many trade union leaders have reason to complain that they have to scatter their attention and to simultaneously perform a mass of different jobs and assignments outside their sphere of competence, like distribution of goods in short supply, fuel supplies, lottery and other tickets, and so on and so forth. Why not have the administration, the labor collective council, or the trade union committee appoint, for example, a special group of comrades to tackle the distribution of goods in short supply, accountable to the labor collective itself?

Furthermore, the trade union committees are literally encircled by different public organizations and are, for some unknown reason, obliged to help them—often by collecting contributions on their behalf, and frequently enough even to work for them. All these organizations are autonomous. Our sponsorship only diminishes their responsibility for their own work. And why should a trade union committee sponsor, for example, the activity of organizations like scientific and technical societies, the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers, the All-Russia Lifeboat Society, the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, the philatelists' society, the bibliophiles' society, and many, many others? There are over 200 such societies at present.

But to be perfectly honest, trade unions often volunteer to take on duties which are outside their proper sphere like, for example, the organization of tourism, movie services, and so on.

The plenum declared most definitely that nobody is entitled to impose on trade unions functions which are outside their proper sphere, force them to do the jobs of other social formations or of the administrative and economic management personnel, and thus divert them from the performance of their main task—the protection of working people's legitimate interests.

[Nikolayev] Stepan Alekseyevich! This is not the first time there has been talk about the need to intensify the trade unions' protective functions, but the required turnabout in this direction has yet to materialize. Even the protective function itself is often perceived somewhat one-sidedly, narrowly. More often than not, the issue seems to revolve around protecting some worker from an administrative official's arbitrariness...

[Shalayev] Precisely! Insufficient understanding of the task, or its simplification, is what prevents the center of gravity of the trade unions' entire activity being shifted toward the protection of working people's legitimate interests.

[Nikolayev] To which of these interests should priority be given at the present stage of perestroyka?

[Shalayev] The AUCCTU plenum which has just ended once again sharply criticized the central and all other areas or sectors of trade unions because we are giving inadequate attention to questions of wages and material incentives. This is the only reason which goes a long way toward explaining the inefficiency and confusion in the present labor remuneration system. Errors, and at times even distortions, in the introduction of new wage rates and salary scales, numerous instances of delayed wage payments, deliberate miscalculations or, at the other extreme, payment of money which has not been earned. It is violations of social justice in labor remuneration that primarily lead to mass labor conflicts and strikes.

An equally serious dissatisfaction is caused in many labor collectives by the unsatisfactory state of working conditions and labor safety. This is no accident. Until this day, between 10 and 26 percent of workers in the machine building complex, in the coal, chemical, and timber industries, and at ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy enterprises work in conditions which simply degrade human dignity. The incidence of occupational diseases in these sectors is 3-8 times greater than the average for the country. Workers are right in believing that economic leaders in ministries and departments would not have adopted such a scornful attitude toward working conditions and labor safety if the trade union committees, the technical inspectorate, the trade union central committees and councils, and the AUCCTU had displayed the necessary strictness and demandingness in these matters.

[Nikolayev] So far we have been discussing questions whose solution is traditionally associated with trade unions' work. Labor remuneration, the creation of proper techniques in production... But the plenum discussion ranged much more widely.

[Shalayev] Because it became necessary to more accurately define the trade union stance on some other social problems which have become extremely exacerbated recently. Even though, as a matter of fact, our stance on these problems was stated in the trade unions' election platform. But circumstances have changed since then and they demand more decisive and more assertive actions, a more active participation in overcoming the tension which has developed in society. This is primarily a question of the deteriorating situation in the consumer market. Growing shortages of many categories of prime necessities and foodstuffs and uncontrolled price rises give working people a sense of uncertainty about the future, and at times even lead to disturbances.

Under pressure from the rising cost of living, growing numbers of cadre workers and specialists are forced to resort to sideline earnings, to change their vocation or their place of work. Discipline is declining and there is a swelling outflow of skilled cadres from the national economy's base sectors. In our opinion, the measures taken by the government to improve the health of the economy and money circulation are not exhaustive in these conditions, they are inadequate to ensure a stabilization of working people's material position in the shortest possible time.

The AUCCTU Presidium deemed it necessary to submit for examination by the plenum, in addition to the proposals already submitted on the trade unions' behalf to the government, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and at the first Congress of People's Deputies, a series of new demands which the AUCCTU and our people's deputies ought to promote at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet or submit to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The first of them is to halt rising prices. It is well known that the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on Progressive Taxation of Money Payments, which curbs the growth of working people's money incomes. In a specially adopted statement, the plenum expressed extreme concern over the growing shortage of consumer goods and uncontrolled price rises at the consumer market. With the fact that not only meat and dairy products but also infant food, soap and detergents, many types of medicines, and other prime necessities are not available in the free market. Articles which were available in the stores until recently have also disappeared: washing machines, refrigerators, television set, crockery, light fitments, footwear, children's clothing, and even exercise books. The people are fed up with empty shelves, waiting lines, "new" prices, and chasing goods in short supply. Inflationary processes are intensifying, the working people's material situation is deteriorating, life is becoming harder for the low-income strata of the population, social tension in society is rising. This situation can no longer be tolerated.

The AUCCTU plenum demanded that the USSR Government and union republic Councils of Ministers immediately take measures:

to "freeze" prices for basic foodstuffs and industrial goods which make up consumers' budgets, in the conditions of rigid taxation of working people's money incomes as introduced by the USSR Supreme Soviet from October 1989 and for 1990;

to create a uniform statewide price control system, including state, cooperative, and public organs;

to introduce ceiling prices for potatoes, fruit, and vegetables as has been done in the Ukraine;

to solve in the next few months the problems of shortages of products and goods in constant demand like infant dairy foods, soap, detergents and hygiene requisites, medicines, toothpaste, and exercise books.

Trade union organizations everywhere have been instructed to oppose price rises and to step up the struggle to eliminate shortages of goods in constant demand.

[Nikolayev] Since we are talking about one special statement, it would probably make sense to describe another—"On Distortions in the Cooperative Movement."

[Shalayev] There is obviously no need to dwell in detail on the activity of cooperatives which have earned a sound reputation in industry, agriculture, the construction industry, and the cooperative services sphere, where enterprising people make efforts to create additional food resources, consumer goods, and new types of services at state prices and tariffs. It is, however, impossible to overlook and underestimate the danger of grave distortions in the cooperative movement and of large-scale manifestation of negative elements like grabbing, personal enrichment, cupidity, and disregard for citizens' interests which inflict irreparable damage to the very nature of the cooperative movement and cause legitimate indignation among working people. I am talking about cooperative members who, taking advantage of flaws in the economic mechanism, legal loopholes, and steadily growing shortages, use the cooperatives to make excessive gains. These are primarily trade-purchasing cooperatives, sundry brokerage cooperatives, and public catering cooperatives which strike deals with state enterprises and the retail trade network, purchase large consignments of food and goods, and resell them at inflated prices without making any substantial changes in their consumer qualities.

There is a widespread flawed practice whereby individual sectors, shops, and production units at state enterprises are leased to cooperatives. These cooperatives, often involving enterprise or production unit chiefs and members of their families in their activity and operating in advantageous economic conditions, are making superprofits, pumping credit transfers [beznalichnyye dengi] into the wages fund, and channeling the bulk of profits into wages. This policy leads to the outflow of skilled workers and specialists from base production to cooperatives and clashes of working people's interests in one and the same enterprise, and destroys the labor collectives.

All this disrupts the economy, intensifies pressure in the consumer market and inflation, and leads to people's stratification according to property status, it leads to social explosions.

The AUCCTU plenum demanded of central and local organs that:

immediate measures be taken to protect the cooperative movement from sundry middlemen, speculators, and extortioners;

the activity of trade-purchasing and brokerage cooperatives engaged in resale of state and imported industrial goods and foodstuffs at speculative prices, of public catering cooperatives in breach of price formation procedures laid down for them by the USSR Council of Ministers, of cooperatives set up at individual enterprise production units and sections and producing additional goods and services at prices in excess of state prices be stopped;

the introduction of legal and economic normative acts defining the role and position of cooperatives in society and placing them on an equal footing so that enterprises be accelerated, and order be imposed in price formation;

the cooperatives' activity be channeled toward the manufacture of goods in acutely short supply, their social standing be boosted, and that mainly the free labor resources, pensioners, disabled persons, housewives, students... be involved in this important work.

I deliberately quoted these two documents virtually verbatim... The point is that recently there has been a spate of requests by a whole series of ministries and individual republics' Councils of Ministers to raise the prices of various goods or of train, ship, and bus tickets. The State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports demands higher prices for spectator sports events, the USSR State Committee for Cinematography demands higher prices for movie theater tickets, and so on. So far we have managed to oppose these intentions. But prices are still going up and up, if not directly then indirectly.

It is important to ensure that a more principled stance on these matters is taken by republic, kray, and oblast levels of trade unions, especially in the conditions of regional economic accountability. I think that we shall gain for them **the right to veto** the approval of economically unjustified prices for goods and services for the population.

Another one of our demands: Soviet people perceive with great irritation the prevailing situation as regards the supply of goods and produce in daily demand like children's dairy food, soap, other detergents and hygiene requisites, medicines, exercise books, and toothpaste. We believe that the shortage of these goods is totally unjustified, it cannot be blamed on any difficulties in our economy. The country's government can and must, in the next few months, resolve the problem of these goods and eradicate this social irritant from our life.

In this process, it is impossible to overlook numerous instances when foodstuffs and prime necessities which are in short supply in our own country are exported, thus aggravating the situation in the domestic market. For example, according to data from the USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration of State Customs Control, the "Littorgodezhda" Association exported 280 tonnes of unsalted butter during the second half of July and the first half of August. Pay attention: "Littorgodezhda" is exporting butter from Lithuania! The "Druzhba" Lease-Trading Firm in Ternopol City exported about 12 tonnes of raisins, the "Rostovrybprom" Association exported 1.5 tonnes of soft caviar and 0.5 tonnes of Beluga caviar.

There is absolutely no check on the sundry trading, purchasing, and brokerage cooperatives and public catering cooperatives. They strike deals with state enterprises and ravages the retail trade network. According to data from the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, cooperatives have withdrawn R1,602,000,000 from their accounts with the city banks in the first 7 months of this year alone. They have paid in only R685 million. In July alone they pulled R384 million out of the banks, an amount equivalent to one-third of the wages fund for all of Moscow's working people. To top it all, a sizeable proportion of this money is put into personal incomes rather than into consolidating the cooperatives' production, and expanding the sphere of their activity and services. Despite the withdrawal of such huge amounts in the current year, the volume of cooperative services for Moscow's residents as regards both consumption and consumer services... was almost halved compared with last year.

Unless these processes are halted, it would be hard to foresee the social explosions that might be caused. And if we were to seriously talk about the trade unions' protective function, it ought to also take the form of protecting Soviet people from speculators and thieves, and taking to task those on whom the creation of normal working and living conditions depends.

There is no question that we must give more attention to the problems of people's employment and the provision of equal civil and political rights for them in all our union and autonomous republics regardless of nationality, residence, religious belief, or membership of any social associations.

Many other questions were raised during the discussion. An especially heated debate developed around the democratization of trade union life and the improvement of the forms and methods of work. We suggested that plenum thinks about organizing a special AUCCTU Bureau for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, but the participants did not agree on any halfhearted measures. The plenum decided to convene an all-Russian constituent conference to create either a republican council of trade unions or some other central organ.

[Nikolayev] The plenum heard a report on the work of people's deputies from trade unions at the Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet session, it examined and adopted a draft Law on Trade Unions. Are you satisfied with the course of the discussion on these items on the agenda?

[Shalayev] The plenum expressed its opinion in the documents it adopted. I personally would add this. Of course, so far our deputies have not yet utilized all their potential to fully implement the trade unions' mandates and their election program. New sore spots have emerged which demand the application of their efforts. The exchange opinions which took place was certainly useful, and I hope it will galvanize those whom we have elected.

As regards the draft Law on Trade Unions, it was discussed at quite some length. There were 360,000 suggestions and amendments. Essentially, it was almost reworked from the start. If the approved version is adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, then I think that Soviet trade unions will acquire a sound legal document which will provide a basis enabling them to make a weightier contribution to perestroyka.

And in summing up our conversation, I cannot fail to mention this. During the plenum we exchanged opinions on the best and most democratic way for conducting the report and election campaign in trade union organizations, on how to expand our aktiv with new leaders who have grown up in labor collectives. In my view, it is good that plenum participants displayed serious concern about the forthcoming elections to republic Supreme Soviets and local soviets. It is, after all, no secret that during the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet trade union organizations were often satisfied with their allocated quota of deputies' mandates and did not join the political struggle. This detached stance clearly damaged the working people, and primarily the workers and peasants. After all, it was their representation on the supreme organ of power that declined. Such an apathy must not be allowed at the forthcoming elections if we seriously intend to protect all the material, political, and spiritual interests of working people.

Lithuanian First Secretary Brazauskas Interviewed

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[Interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by IZVESTIYA special correspondents L. Kapelyushnyy and Yu. Orlik under the rubric "Nationalities Question: Policy and Practice: What Is Happening in Lithuania"; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Vilnius—[Correspondents] A question that worries everyone today is: "What is happening in Lithuania?" We tried to compile a chronicle of the first few days of the fall. The picture turned out to be a varied one. Kaunas' "Auda," which is renowned for its knitwear goods, went to Leipzig for the traditional trade fair. Rallies and meetings have been held in the republic by various social forces and trends concerning the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Region. A Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power in Lithuania has arisen. A kind of warm-up for a strike, the motives for which seemed quite vague to us, took place at the "Zhalgiris" machine tool plant. The date of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session was postponed for the third time and this fact in itself provoked various commentaries. Three Lithuanian yachts returned to Klaypeda after a transatlantic trip to New York and back. Shalchininkskiy Rayon declared itself to be an autonomous Polish rayon. Party organizations continued their keen debate on the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party. In the mornings, lines formed at newsstands—readers were interested in what the press would report on events in the republic; it must be said that these reports often failed to coincide with the readers' personal opinion. The local press talked about how the agricultural year is drawing to a close. Industrial enterprises were working without holdups. In short, life was normal. Nonetheless, this fall, the Baltic region does seem to be a kind of "hot spot" in the whole country. That is why we ask: What is happening in Lithuania?

[Brazauskas] I can answer you with one word: perestroyka. But I must add that, in my opinion, it is outstripping the all-union pace. It is proceeding with difficulty and with a great diversity of opinions, positions, and views. Personally, I consider this situation to be normal and to be brought about by our past. It has also been brought about by the fact that perestroyka lacks a rigid structure and a tried and tested model. We are perhaps restructuring sociopolitical structures with consideration for national features for the first time in the history of our state. Watching this from the sidelines and from a distance provokes questions, misunderstanding, and suspicion.

It is abnormal that attention is often paid to extremes when assessing the situation in the republic. For instance, an eloquent photograph—a man at a rally holding a poster proclaiming: "Down With the CPSU!"—was all over the central press. This did happen. Our journalists hunted down this demonstrator. He is a school janitor, incidentally, not a Lithuanian. By no means, does he possesses an unblemished reputation. You have to have a truly rich imagination to draw far-reaching conclusions from one man's arrogance and interpret it as sentiment shared by all Lithuanians. People have been found in our republic who have violated general human moral norms and shown disrespect for monuments of military valor. Generalizing straightaway? Why not share the indignation of the entire people (and I know the people's reaction!) over these cases?

No, extremes must be rejected when assessing the present situation. We must gain a sense of the people's underlying mood. Unfortunately, there is no way of gauging this. A sociological service (rather than a sociological opinion poll) is only just being set up. But contacts with the masses, meetings and discussions with people of the most varied social strata, convictions, and sentiments, press polemics, and also other sources of information accessible to a first secretary as part of his job enable me to formulate the main element in Lithuania's aspirations—a desire for sovereignty and for independence in matters great and small.

Perestroyka awoke in the people a craving for freedom which they had always possessed. Every people has this craving. But if we have already mentioned specific features, let us bear in mind that prior to 1940 Lithuania was a sovereign state. Represented in international organizations and associations, its own diplomatic corps, and a weak but independent economy. I am by no means looking at our past through rose-colored glasses. But I will not disregard the fact that the memory of this past is still alive and is handed down from grandparents to their grandchildren. How can we fail to consider this?

Yet you would think that so much had been achieved in the last year! The Lithuanian language has acquired state language status, the national anthem and flag have been revived, and a great and very important step has been taken toward economic autonomy. Freedom of speech has been acquired. Political self-expression has become possible. But, as is well known, even a great deluge will not immediately soak land that has been dried up by a long period of intense heat.

[Correspondents] Indeed, we rarely failed to hear these words—craving for freedom, national rebirth, acquisition of sovereignty, and independence—in conversation, be it at official establishments, at enterprises, or in the street. The declarations, statements, and platforms of sociopolitical currents are full of them. But the content of these terms is different and sometimes contradictory. The restoration of national symbols, the whole package of draft laws strengthening Lithuanian sovereignty, and the transition to economic independence are nonetheless what many people see as the present. They are setting their sights higher into the future....

[Brazauskas] Let us return to the starting point of our discussion. People want to be free masters on their land. Peasants, plant directors, and rayon party committee secretaries have grown tired of instructions, sermons, and dressings-down. I realize perfectly well that both vast Russia and small Lithuania are in an identical position in this respect. But in our republic the sense of lack of freedom is compounded by a sense of wounded national dignity. We will not investigate whether that is right or wrong now! The fact that this feeling exists is important and we often hear claims that if Lithuania were independent it would have already begun to live. The worse things are—and, as is well known, we must not boast of our successes—the stronger and sharper these sentiments become.

I also believe that acquiring independence and strengthening the union republics' sovereignty is the way to salvation. We have reached the point here where varying political trends have varying ideas about sovereignty and independence.

Independence is idealized by many people and—I beg your pardon for this sharp word—primitivized. People say: We will wake up independent tomorrow—and in heaven.... How will this happen? It will certainly happen somehow! It will be granted. Assistance will be given. Lavish gifts will be bestowed....

Political leaders who play on freeloading sentiments are at the height of their popularity. Who would not like this—gifts and presents! Yet that is not what we want—we are urging people to roll up their sleeves and sweat their guts out. We also warn people that things will not right themselves immediately with the transition to autonomy and that things may even become worse at first. We must wait and see. But people have grown tired of waiting! They have spent decades in anticipation. They have had their fill of expectations!

We are getting through to people through solid layers of mistrust. We have used up our quota of mistakes. We can only acquire the trust of the masses by getting involved in their aspirations and interests. We have revamped the customary slogan "The Party's Plans Are the People's Plans" and worded it differently: "The People's Plans Are the Party's Plans!" That is no mere shuffling of words. That is a radical break with policy and a rejection of what appeared to be unshakeable dogma. These dogmas have become part of our flesh and blood. The infringement of these dogmas is seen by some people as a violation of Soviet power itself. They rush to save it without always realizing that the very structures of power and their functions cannot remain unchanged today.

Suppose some of my people's demands appear as separatist and "deviating from the line" in Pyatigorsk or Magadan. Let us not draw hasty conclusions, let us hide the labels as much as possible. Let us ponder the following: If the party does not exercise the people's will, is it a people's party? Does it have the moral right to describe itself as the leading force in society?

There is an old parable about a herd of horses galloping across the steppe. The herd was charging toward an abyss. The herdsman had to make a choice: He had to either try to erect a barrier, in the certain knowledge that the first horses to encounter it would be maimed and trampled underfoot, while most of the herd would sweep away the barrier and rush on. Or he had to risk mounting the fastest steed and outracing the rest in an attempt to draw the horses away from the death trap...

I am well aware now, as is everyone, that there are forces in the republic for whom independence and sovereignty are associated with secession from the Soviet Union. These forces must not be disregarded. But it is time to stop lumping people together. There are certainly a few extremist leaders. But who will answer and tell me how many hearts harbor the seeds they have sown?

In our view, isolated totally independent states and people do not and cannot exist in the modern world—either in East or West, North or South. There are no states and people who "fall outside" general world interconnections. Nonetheless, in this interconnected world every state and nation are sovereign insofar as they can independently choose the substance and form of their dependence—that is, insofar as they voluntarily abandon their rights for the sake of all-union aims. That is the normal situation in civilized democratic states, for which the Lithuanian SSR is also striving. That would ensure its existence as a sovereign state with an age-old history of statehood, the material and spiritual well-being of its inhabitants, social justice, the development of its culture, education, and science, and democratic conditions for its political life.

The position of all sensible people in the republic is unequivocal—Lithuania is so integrated into the union economy and has such firm political, cultural, and simply human ties that it would be fatal to rupture them. As a man who has been involved in specific economics for many years and who knows the republic's resource capacities and potentials, I do not harbor any illusions about our independence. What kind of secession from the USSR can be at issue when the republic's industry is provided with almost 100 percent of its metal, petroleum, gas, cotton, wool, and chemicals by the Union?

Independence is not just an objective. It is also a means of achieving a higher quality and standard of living for the people. It should ensure the development of a normal society free from the residual deformations of the past and insured against any repetition of them in the future. Independence should be an organic part of all our relations: economic, political, and state relations. A great deal has already been set out in the CPSU's draft nationalities platform and the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. A great deal still remains to be found. This search is under way in the republic. I would define this search as a discussion, a dialogue among all political forces and movements. Part of this search is a discussion about the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Correspondents] To go back to the story about the horses, one cannot avoid the unpleasant thought: What if the rider slows down but the excited horse does not always respond...

When preparing for this conversation with you we reread the records of the last few Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenums. They said a great deal about the fact that the Central Committee has lost the initiative and been tardy in adopting highly important decisions. This "slow start" is directly connected to the delayed restructuring of the CPSU. Why are we late? What is the reason? It seems to us that the delay is no longer just a matter of lost time. Yanina Gagilene, first secretary of the Leninskiy Lithuanian Communist Party Rayon Committee [raykom] in Vilnius—and it was in this rayon that the discussion about the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party began—told us: "If we don't try to be devious or hide behind the words 'informals,' 'broad range of social forces,' and so forth, we have to admit that we are already working under a multiparty system. Political competition has become a reality. A power struggle is under way. But we are continuing to act just like before, under the cozy one-party system."

We also heard the following: In a year of perestroyka and national regeneration a great deal has indeed been done. Done by the party. But done at the initiative of and under pressure from "Sajudis." It has brought honor and fame to the party and its big shots.... But fame is not what matters! A certain number of Communists are getting the impression that "Sajudis" can wrap the party around its little finger. We would quote the opinion of Vladislav Sved, first secretary of Oktyabrskiy party raykom in Vilnius, in that respect. On your advice, we would reject the extreme arguments used by "Unity," which accuses the Central Committee leadership of "total Sajudisization"....

[Brazauskas] Yes, we have been tardy. Why? We are not looking into the reasons just to come up with excuses....

What did the apparatus value in years gone by? Discipline. Executive action. Obedience. Initiative within reasonable limits. If there was no word from on high, the underlings wouldn't stir themselves. That was how we lived in the first few years of perestroyka too.... That is why "Sajudis" overtook us when national regeneration began. It raised questions of importance to society, while we fearfully looked to see whether this constituted sedition. Would the center understand us? Well, we are all children of our time.

The first tough lessons that the Lithuanian Communist Party learned at the beginning of national regeneration were not lost on us. We started changing our work style, freeing ourselves from the syndrome of obedience and from conservative cadres, calling "eternal truths" into question, and anticipating directives from above—there would be no command, but we would act nonetheless. Then we started taking flak from the grass roots and the top brass. The former believed that we were too slow, they were thirsting for radical change. The center, on the other hand, thought that we had steamed ahead of the ship of perestroyka....

I will not claim that we made no mistakes. But, clearly, each republic has its own pace of perestroyka determined by the degree to which concepts such as democracy, glasnost, and pluralism mature in society.

When I hear the charges of party "Sajudisization" I think the following. This movement has considerable support among the people. It is popular. Many Communists work in it. Its activists are widely represented in the country's corps of deputies and occupy high leading posts in the sphere of state administration, science, and the mass media. A realistic politician cannot ignore that.

It is time we asked ourselves whether we alone are the fount of all wisdom. Of course, we could refuse to concede a single principle, that is well known. But who would benefit from that?

I'm not talking about conformism or appeasement. I'm talking about sensible compromise without conceding the most important and truly fundamental points without which progress is impossible.

I was accused of everything under the sun when I attended "Sajudis" rallies. But what was I supposed to do? Would it have been better not to have gone? Not to have talked with 100,000 people?

The time of the cozy one-party system is over. The time of senseless confrontation and an apparatus monopoly on the truth is over. The apparatus—and, incidentally, not just the apparatus—initially thought that a discussion about the status of the republic's communist party was not yet in the offing. That it was not the time to hold such a discussion. But Communists in the primary organizations thought differently. The discussion began without our permission. We had to choose whether to lead it or allow vitally important issues for the republic's party organization to be resolved without the participation of its Central Committee.

[Correspondents] We shall also risk voicing the following opinion. It is not only discussion in Lithuania but also discussion with Lithuania that is under way. The difference in speeds of perestroyka predetermines the difference in assessments of the processes taking place. A view from afar often cannot distinguish details and nuances and does not understand the reasons for events in the republic and, in assessing a bald fact, is inclined to conclude that it is a case of nationalist manifestations, separatism, and deviation from the ideas of socialism. It is not a matter of extremes, as in the example of the poster. The intensive resurrection of public organizations which existed in bourgeois Lithuania is perplexing. The separation of creative unions and organizations from all-union structures is proceeding no less intensively. Just 6 months ago Lithuanian journalists were among the first to declare their union to be independent.

and this seemed to be almost a "rebellion." Now this single track has become a main highway: Writers, composers, trade unions, the communist youth league—18 organizations in all—have opted for self-determination.

[Brazauskas] Do you think that poets have begun to write worse poems or composers to compose worse music as a result?

[Correspondents] We do not.

[Brazauskas] That's what I think too. Not one of the 18 organizations has started to function worse. It is true that none has yet become better either. But no one now would venture to say that they would be glad to do something, but the strong center does not permit it. The main idea of decentralization indeed consists in determining the fullness of responsibility. We defend the idea of economic autonomy so persistently so that we ourselves can be answerable to the people for everything. Of course it is possible to see covert separatism in this. But I appeal to reason: In the country's economy, Lithuania's "ranking" is a volume of 1.5 percent. All the Baltic republics account for a total of about 4 percent. Could this have any serious, even negative, effect on the course of events in the country?

It seems to me that today there is nothing more important for us all than using **any** opportunity to find a way out of the crisis. It is not only the economy—the basis of society—which has found itself in crisis. The superstructure is in need of no less repair. When the former pompous slogan about the masses' creative participation in management and social life becomes real practice, what do we do? We shout for help! Why? To leave everything the way it was?

The administrative-edict system's strength was not in its firmness or its apparatus' indestructibility. It ensured everyone in society without exception with a necessary minimum. The most inveterate drunkard and idler would still get something from the cash office at the end of the month. The statistically average worker would be kept at a living standard which had been averaged out: the gymnast with the doctor, the taxi driver with the pilot, and so forth. The idea of economic accountability raises a sword of levelling down. Some people may be left without bread, some without circuses. Hence the fear of change, especially radical transformation. But as I understand it, "discussion with Lithuania" does not come down merely to the secession of some of our organizations from all-union structures.

[Correspondents] Of course not. One of the most acute issues is the position of the Russian-speaking population in Lithuania and the encroachment on their civil rights. There is no single word to define how they feel. Some people are displaying disquiet, others alarm, while others—forgive us these words—are in a state of hysteria. In the opinion of the latter, an interethnic armageddon is imminent and innocent blood will be shed and they are therefore asking the Motherland for protection. Here is a curious detail. In Klaypeda, at the "Baltiya" ship building plant, where they tried to persuade us that Russians are discriminated against in Lithuania, the selfsame people with whom we talked stated unambiguously: We are living harmoniously at the enterprise, there are no conflicts. Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians are in approximately equal numbers there. We heard the same opinion in other mixed collectives.

At the same time we must admit that the Russian-speaking minority feels uneasy and is concerned for its future. We could cite examples now of who has offended whom on either said and where and when. Unfortunately, there are more than enough of these examples. But in our view it is more important to find the roots of the tension.

[Brazauskas] I repeat what I have said many times. I repeat it in the hope of being heard: Nothing threatens the Russians, Poles, Belorussians, and other peoples inhabiting Lithuania. No one is encroaching or will encroach on their civil rights.

Anyone who is acquainted to the slightest degree with the history of Lithuania will agree and admit that intolerance toward people of another nationality has never been in the Lithuanians' nature. From ancient times to the most recent history Lithuania has been drawn toward its neighbors, including Russia, in its policy. But I shall not deny the obvious: There is interethnic tension in the republic. Its roots lie in the repressions and repatriations, in the compulsory collectivization, in the direspectful attitude toward the rights of a sovereign republic, and in much else which comes within the concept of the deformation of socialism. We are experiencing these troubles together with all peoples of the Soviet Union. But Lithuania's pain has been keener than that of others. It is possible to see in the "Baltic path" action an outbreak of nationalism, but you could not fail to see also the grief in the eyes of the people, the hundreds of thousands of people who formed a living chain right cross Lithuania. As one does on the day of remembrance of the dead, they held lighted candles. So should we see politics where what was dominant was ordinary human suffering? It believe that in this case compassion is more appropriate than denunciation....

The search for ways to consolidate all citizens of Lithuania is the main task; I am sure it will be resolved. It is being resolved today, right now. The more mutual understanding and tolerance we display toward each other, the sooner peace will prevail.

[Correspondents] The question could be considered exhausted on this optimistic note. But we cannot overlook the demand of a section of the republic's nonindigenous population that they be given the opportunity to leave Lithuania for other parts of the country.

[Brazauskas] We do not have a closed border for either entry or exit. But I would like to call on everyone to be reasonable and to add that it is possible and necessary to find a common language with people who want to live in Lithuania. I venture to hope that they are in the majority.

[Correspondents] Before thanking you for the conversation we would like to share our impression of one meeting. You undoubtedly know Kyastutis Ashmonas, member of the republic communist party Central Committee. He works at the above-mentioned "Baltiya" plant and is the team leader of a polyglot team. We found him at his work place in the shop where metal is cut under the high vaults and where the ship hulls are created. He was very busy. We managed to talk to him only near the end of the shift. His assessments of the situation largely coincide with yours. He cannot understand why on the plant's territory, that the entrance—his team is one family yet beyond the entrance—divides Lithuanians and the Russian-speaking population. He does not see the reasons for reprisal. The vigorous and well built Kyastutis differed strikingly from the people who have a different view. He lives by faith. He knows what to take with him into the future.

TASS Opens Vilnius Office; Citizenship Poll Cited

LD1509080189 Vilnius in English to North America 2200 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] An office for the correspondents of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, TASS, has been set up in Vilnius. It is headed by (Kaziz Ustila), who formerly worked at the Department for Ideology at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. Until recently TASS had no correspondent in Lithuania. Information concerning this republic was provided by the Lithuanian news agency ELTA. So let's hope the Soviet people will be getting unbiased information on developments in Lithuania.

That this is virtually important is best proved by a commentary of a TASS correspondent from the center on the recently conducted sociological survey on topical issues of political and public life in Lithuania. The commentary comes out strongly for the defense of non-Lithuanians' rights that are allegedly violated and will be violated still more blatantly on passing certain Lithuanian bills, first and foremost a bill on citizenship.

TASS (?asks) but one question [words indistinct]. Do you approve of the bill on Lithuanian citizenship being passed at the coming session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet? Seventy-eight percent of the non-Lithuanians polled said yes. Yet this is not an argument for TASS. The very wording of the question is allegedly biased since the surveyors fail to specify what kind of bill the Poles, Russians, Jews, and others would like to see. As a counterargument against those 78 percent of non-Lithuanians in favor of adopting a bill on citizenship, citations [as heard] are given from a resolution of the meeting at the (Zalgiris) machine tool [plant] in Vilnius. Let me remind that it was at this plant that a political stoppage was recently held.

Meanwhile, the TASS correspondent presents exclusively negative response on the issue of those non-Lithuanians he talked to. Well, and the sociological survey itself is treated as a kind of pressure on the Supreme Soviet deputies and not reflecting public opinion but helping to shape it.

Lithuanian Poles Appeal to Gorbachev for Glasnost

LD1409140689 Warsaw PAP in English 1310 GMT 14 Sep 89

["Poles of Lithuania Send Open Letter to Gorbachev" by PAP correspondent Jerzy Malczyk]

[Text] Moscow, Sept 14—Poles of Lithuania appealed in their open letter to Mikhail Gorbachev for revealing all the circumstances of the Katyn crime and for clarifying other blank spots in the history of Polish-Soviet relations.

"The openness—one of the key elements of your policy and also the basic feature of the political activity of today, is indispensable in every area. The policy of openness that you initiated brings its fruit such as restoration of healthy social relations, more and more new historical facts that are brought to light and does away with taboos and bans on untouchable matters, people and problems," said the letter, carried by papers of Vilnius, Lithuania.

The authors called for official rehabilitation of Poles in the Soviet Union after the fashion of the rehabilitation of Germans carried out in 1964 and also for taking up with full concern the problems of Poles living presently in the Soviet Union and creating for them conditions favourable for dignified human and national existence in the form and contents which they themselves hold appropriate.

Estonian Separatist Sentiments Criticized

PM1409144189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 89 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev article under the rubric "Facets of Interethnic Relations": "Lessons in Estonian"]

[Text] Tallinn-Moscow—The fall has arrived in Tallinn. Judging by the flame-colored rowans and hawthorns, the hot weather is unlikely to last long. Every now and again, cold wind gusts from the gulf blow along the dark labirynths of the old city. They blow in, fluttering the blue, black, and white flag that flies on top of Big Hermann Tower and rustling through tattered remains of posters, leaflets, and slogans.

But this happens at night; the city still basks in summer warmth during the day, the ancient Town Hall Square is noisy and crowded. People exchange news, engage in heated arguments, eagerly listen to unsponsored orators, and enthusiastically buy news sheets and newspapers published by sundry political groups and movements. For countless days now a table can be seen in the square with a pile of bound ledgers on it, used by members of the "Estonian Democratic Movement-88" aktiv to collect signatures in support of a referendum on self-determination.

Generally speaking, "self-determination" has lately become virtually the most popular word in the republic. It is used in sundry appeals, newspaper articles, routine conversations, and public statements. Of course, everybody perceives and interprets it in his own way. Some see it as an opportunity offered by perestroyka to display responsibility, activeness, and competence in solving the multitude of problems the republic is facing today. Others see it as an excuse to discredit the values and goals for whose sake generations of people sacrificed their lives. Yet others see it as a pretext for stepping up the propaganda of frankly separatist, nationalist, and extremist ideas. They—these ideas—are far from being like cries in the wilderness, they are responded to, supported, and developed.

Special activeness is displayed in this process by functionaries from the so-called Estonian National Independence Party [PNNE] (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on the PNNE 29 January this year, in the article "What Did the Central Press 'Keep Silent' About"). During the year since its "constituent" congress, this organization has already succeeded in trebling its membership and acquiring allies, among them the so-called Society for the Protection of Ancient Monuments ("Maynsuskaytse") and the Estonian Christian League. It was they who initiated the creation of committees of "legitimate citizens of the Estonian Republic who alone have the right to determine the Estonian people's future." Once this action is completed, according to T. Kelam, one of the PNNE's leaders, "a congress of Estonia to decide the question of self-determination" will be convened. The actual form [of self-determination] is unambiguously specified in the declaration by the Second PNNE Congress: "An autonomous Estonian state is conceivable only outside the Union."

The Russian-speaking section of the republic's population is clearly not satisfied with the authorities' assurances that the extremists are few in number and their separatist schemes are unrealistic. They are not satisfied because the logic of the development of recent events in Estonia indirectly confirms their worst fears. Insulting rantings about one nation's priority over another, discriminatory provisions in the Law on Languages, introduction of "residence qualifications" which infringe citizens' rights, plans to set up an immigration service—all these are, in one way or another, elements of a movement aimed at revising the shape of our single union state.

Centrifugal ideas are frequently and clearly noticeable even in party debates. Speaking about this, and without mincing their words, Communist workers from Tallinn's three largest industrial enterprises cited by way of an example the so-called "platform of the four." This refers to a statement by four first secretaries of Estonian Communist Party rayon and city committees, published by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA on 31 August. Arguing on the inevitability of the USSR's transformation and the need to take into account the various regions' different level of preparedness for democracy and the nations' different level of preparedness to exercise their right to self-determination, they insistently advise USSR people's deputies from Estonia and representatives of the Estonian Communist Party to submit a draft document on state transformation at the second Congress and the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum respectively. The essence of this document is to transform what they perceive as an unitary state into a truly federative one, into a union of republics and states.

"In the Soviet Union's future transformation," the article "Estonia's Path to Autonomy" reads, "we deem it expedient to combine two different principles. Consequently, some union republics and some autonomous republics could form a federative association. And some of the present republics, including Estonia, could have political, economic, and defense ties with the Soviet Union on the basis of fixed-term treaties.... The Estonian people will never abandon the idea of their statehood and the knowledge that it was forcibly taken away from them. Belonging to a federation on an equal footing with regions which lack their own statehood traditions is unacceptable to the Estonian people."

There is hardly any need to say that, in these circumstances, the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics produced different reactions in Estonia. Some people hastened to perceive it as a threat, a harsh bellow, a sign of pressure rather than as a word of advice, a warning, a call for restraint and balance of interests. The contradictory nature of opinions and evaluations was to be seen not only in hasty and incorrect statements by a number of USSR people's deputies, the Estonian Council of Trade Unions Presidium, and the Estonian Women's Union, but also in statements by participants in the 15th Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum which discussed the republican Communist Party's tasks for stabilizing the political situation.

Extracts from speeches by plenum participants:

"As a Communist, I would like to say that the CPSU Central Committee statement contains—obviously as a result of biased or inadequate information—propositions which do not correspond with the situation in Estonia.... The statement also contains propositions which I cannot accept under any circumstances, either as a Communist or as head of government.... In my view, the situation in Estonia is unlikely to transform the striving for set goals into a catastrophe for our people...."

I. TOOME, chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers.

"We should have drawn our own conclusions from the prevailing situation a long time ago, without waiting for the CPSU Central Committee statement, and should have taken measures to normalize the situation rather than trailing in the wake of events.... It is necessary to conduct a dialogue with the whole people rather than just with one section of them... A large share of the blame for the prevailing situation rests with the republic's government, with all of us who are sitting here.... I read the CPSU Central Committee statement, I read the address by USSR people's deputies from the Estonian SSR, then I re-read the statement. And, you know, I—unlike some people—found nothing reprehensible in this statement. Obviously, everyone interprets it in his own way. Obviously, there is a special striving to present the desirable as real, to take umbrage. But this does not promote consolidation."

V. BOYTSOVA, team leader on "Kokhtla-Yarve" State farm.

Unfortunately, all calls for mutual understanding and dialogue, for consolidation and compromise, still fail to generate any response among people. And today it would be naive to imagine that the People's Front—which has consolidated its position and is enjoying prestige [among the people] and the authorities' support—would be willing and able to reach agreement with the International Movement on fundamental and certainly difficult questions. Especially since the latter has not been officially registered to this day and, in the report by the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, was spoken of in the same breath as unsavory organizations like the PNNE.

Of course, it cannot be said that there is no condemnation of confrontation along national lines in the republic. There is. And quite sharp, at that. In real life, however, confrontation is to this day regularly fueled by additional fresh problems. There are countless examples of this. The "strike saga" is probably the most indicative. Instead of embarking on a considered and patient political dialogue which would guarantee equal treatment of all groups of citizens, at the height of the crisis the republican leadership attempted to use strongarm, administrative edict methods to take the dissatisfied Russian-speaking workers in hand. "The whole irony," THE WASHINGTON POST remarked in this context, "lies in the fact that Estonia, which proudly declares itself to be the most progressive Soviet republic, has now become the first to pass antistrike legislation."

Actually, this is neither the sole not the entire point at issue. The political consequences of such a step were very correctly described at the plenum by Ya. Allik, first secretary of Vilyandiskiy Rayon Estonian Communist Party Committee. "If a worker has to come in and do the job of someone else who is on strike and if, in addition to that, such relations develop on ethnic grounds, the ethical abyss with far-reaching consequences into which we have cast the workers shall become terrifyingly deep and we shall be paying for it for a long time to come." One cannot but agree.

Take the press for example. It is an open secret that, with all the good will in the world, the majority of local newspapers and journals cannot be described as objective and unbiased. The content of articles, the evaluations by their writers, and the stance taken by them are clearly and primarily geared to the national affiliation of potential readers. Take for example the bilingual publication VIKERKAAR (RADUGA in the Russian version), which is very popular in Estonia. How can anyone describe as accidental the fact that a number of items published in Estonian are not translated into Russian? Obviously, the journal's leadership has grounds to believe that they are likely to generate indignation. Take for example a feature by Mart Laar on Estonians who served in the German Army in 1941-1945. "...To this day, Soviet Estonia's attention has focused mainly on the men who fought in the Soviet Army's Estonian Riflemen's Corps," the author complains. And then, having exposed yet another "blank spot" in history, he eagerly goes on to explain that "considerably more Estonians fought on the other side at that time... According to Kh. Tulnol, who was in charge of military archives under the Germans, there were 90,000 Estonians associated in one way or another with the German Army. We are dealing with an impressive quantity, especially bearing in mind that the number of those who served on the Soviet side was several times smaller...."

History, as the saying goes, cannot be rewritten, and there is no point in keeping this information secret. But the whole question is: How is it to be used, for what purpose? There is no way that the emotionalism displayed by Laar—poeticizing the "valor and courage" of fascist associates who were often used to "cover the most crucial sectors," who "opened the way for the whole army," and who even "highly impressed" Himmler himself—can be fitted in with calls for consolidation and declarations of commitment to socialist ideals. On the other hand, the request with which the author concludes his lengthy narrative seems perfectly logical: "We ask all who know the location of razed graves where the dead men lie to say who they were and where they were buried." It is also clear why this is needed. Fresh paths are being beaten in Estonia today to "historical sites" associated with the names of enemies of the revolution and Hitler's stooges. Obelisks in their memory are already being erected.

One of them was solemnly unveiled by members of the local Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments aktiv in Kautla on 30 July. According to the announcement, it was erected in memory of "members of 'Erna,' 'forest brethren,' and civilians killed by a punitive battalion on 31 July 1941." "The Communists brought destruction and death, but there were people who struggled against them," one of the speakers declared. The "festivities" were attended by about 500 guests, including a certain Mr Arvola, former gunman from the "Erna" Battalion, and... A. Maarend, second secretary of Paydeskiy Rayon Estonian Communist Party Committee.

How can anyone be amazed, therefore, by the fact that attitudes toward "the other" monuments are clearly being revised here? The latest example of this can be seen in the 1 September sitting of Pyarnu City Soviet Executive Committee, which examined the question of dismantling the tank-monument erected in the city's northeast outskirts to commemorate the 25th anniversary of its liberation from the German fascist invaders. That tank belonged to the 221st autonomous [otdelnyy] tank regiment which was directly involved in the battles and was given the honorary title "Pyarnuskiy." So far, the members of the executive committee have not made their final decision on this question. Its discussion has been postponed until a joint sitting with the rayon soviet executive committee, due to be held in November.

Other monuments have been less fortunate in this regard. A gravestone with the names of 11 frontline soldiers was simply thrown in a stream in Kharsyuskiy Rayon's Kikhra Settlement last fall. Prior to that, five gravestones were smashed in Tartu. They have been restored now, but the criminals who committed this act of vandalism have yet to be found. The gravestone of internationalist soldier Aleksandr Stelmashchuk in Tallinn was broken last year....

Of course, none of this is being written as a reproach against the entire Estonian people who are certainly respectful of the dead men's memory. In this case, I take exception to a statement by V. Beekman, chairman of the Estonian Writers Union Board, who declared for everyone to hear that claims about desecration of graves are provocations and rumors whose dissemination is unethical and dangerous. In my view, it is far more dangerous to deny the obvious, to pretend that nothing is happening, that the grievances and lack of understanding among part of Estonia's population stem only from passiveness, ambition, dogmatism, and unwillingness to properly interpret events. This does exist, of course. There are also quick tempers, there are extremist appeals, and even threats. But this is not what determines the mood of the masses who are sincerely striving to overcome the confrontation and to channel their social energy into the wearying political struggle to solve the specific economic tasks stemming from the decisions of the 19th party conference and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Having returned from Estonia, I cannot fail to mention those who are performing their military service on the republic's territory. Officers and ensigns face no end of problems and worries in the present situation. Primarily in the social sphere. Many hundreds of servicemen's families have no apartments there. It is painfully difficult to solve questions of placing children in kindergartens and creches or finding jobs for wives who do not speak the Estonian language and have virtually no real opportunity to learn it. Servicemen are profoundly grieved by unfair accusations leveled against them, by half-baked opinions about the role of the Armed Forces, by noisy campaigns in defense of those who, in breach of the USSR Constitution, refuse to serve in the Army. Misunderstandings and conflicts also develop as a result of cadre transfers....

The summer—which brought strikes, heated polemics, and newspaper battles to the republic—is over. But, judging by everything, the fall does not promise to be calm and problem-free, either. Difficult talks are still going on between representatives of the republican Council of Strike Committees and the government. The next session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is due to open in Tallinn 5 October and will examine the question of the inconsistency between some provisions of recently adopted Estonian SSR laws and the Union Constitution. This is why I would like to wish that wisdom and responsibility are displayed by all who live and work in this beautiful and fertile land. It is only through joint efforts, hand in hand, and relying on equal rights that they will be able to resolve the fateful tasks by implementing the ideas of perestroyka. Only through joint efforts.

Estonian Party Leaders Advocate Federation

PM1409152889 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 31 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Yaak Allik, first secretary of Vilyandiskiy Estonian Communist Party Rayon Committee (raykom); Toomas Kork, first secretary of Rakvereskiy Estonian Communist Party Raykom; Tynu Laak, first secretary of Tartu Estonian Communist Party City Committee (gorkom); and Yuri Raydla, first secretary of Pyarnuskiy Estonian Communist Party Raykom, reprinted from the newspaper SAKALA for 23 August 1989: "Estonia's Path to Autonomy"]

[Text] It is nearly 5 months since the day when we published in the newspaper EDAZI the article "What Is the Estonian Communist Party To Do?" We hoped that it would start a debate on the Estonian Communist Party's action program, and that by today our party would already be transformed on the basis of the new program and we would be participating in Estonia's public life on equal terms with other political forces. But it turned out that we had touched on a very sensitive point. The reaction behind the scenes was very stormy, and it took all-out criticism of the party at the Congress of People's Deputies for the idea of the need for a thorough reform of the Communist Party finally to penetrate the leadership's awareness, and for the idea of an action program to reach the general secretary's lips.

On 4 May a commission was set up to draft an Estonian Communist Party action program, and this commission at last assembled for its first meeting on 28 July. The program theses are now ready, and discussion is beginning. But life has moved on, and a program compiled—and slowly, at that—by a large group of people cannot possibly keep up with it. The question of Estonia's economic and political independence and also the reform of the whole political system and state structure in the Soviet Union are now at the center of attention in public life. The Estonian Communist Party's official view on these matters has hitherto been rather vague, and consequently it has been criticized from all sides.

The Estonian National Independence Party and affiliated movements believe that Estonia's fate can and must be decided only by citizens of the Estonian Republic (as of 16 June 1940) and their direct descendants who have expressed a desire to join the movement of citizens' committees, irrespective of nationality or present place of residence. The Estonian National Independence Party accuses the Communist Party and also the Estonian People's Front of wanting to exploit the concept of "sovereignty" and the idea of a union treaty in order to perpetuate in reality the incorporation of Estonia in the Soviet Union and legitimize the unlawful act committed in 1940.

The Interdvizheniye [International Movement of Working People] accuses the Estonian Communist Party leadership of separatist aspirations, of wanting to secede from the Soviet Union, and of making concessions to the Estonian National Independence Party under cover of vague arguments about the paramountcy of the Estonian nation in Estonia, the right to self-determination, and so forth. These forces, like the majority of non-Estonians living in Estonia, find the idea of the restoration of the Estonian Republic and its secession from the Soviet Union unacceptable today. The suspicion that the Estonian Communist Party and the republic leadership are pursuing precisely this goal is currently retarding any constructive legislative and economic activity in Estonia that would meet the interests of both population groups. It is this fear that we see behind the strike movement, and it is these suspicious that make it impossible to treat the residence qualification as a matter of eligibility, or to discuss a federal party system as a question of party structure. In this uncertain situation the implementation of IME [Estonian self-management] will be very difficult, because uncertainty and suspicion will not encourage partners in East or West to develop economic ties with Estonia.

We cannot conceive of a discussion of the Estonian Communist Party program without a clear answer being given to this question. Furthermore, we propose that the present article be debated as an addition to the Estonian Communist Party action program theses.

In resolving the question of Estonia's possible political future it is necessary first of all to define a range of objective factors on which any decision must be based. The biggest difficulty now is that various political forces, in proclaiming their programs, and also in their practical activity, are very selective in choosing the premises on which they operate. In politics and in slogans, suitable attractive facts are used, while more problematic ones are simply ignored. Admittedly, this "policy" can result in quick popularity, but when the programs are implemented one impasse will be succeeded by another, and the outcome could be a situation that will satisfy no one.

Let us try to identify the facts that cannot, in our view, be ignored, whether anyone likes it or not.

1. The occupation of the Estonian Republic by the Soviet Union on 17 June 1940 and its subsequent incorporation in the Soviet Union was an act of force, and did not reflect the will of the Estonian people. In the period from 1920 through 1940 Estonia, which belonged to the League of Nations, existed as an autonomous state recognized by the majority of European states, including the Soviet Union.

2. Estonia's territory is the age-old home of the Estonian people. The political and economic system that exists here should meet the basic interests and wishes of the Estonian people, otherwise one cannot rely on positive, productive development, or on a feeling of confidence for other national groups living in Estonia.

3. The population of Estonia is not now mononational. Estonians account for approximately 60 percent of it. The non-Estonian population will not consent to being disregarded when Estonia's fate is decided. They now account for a significant proportion of Estonia's present economic potential, and might disregard the results of a possible referendum of Estonians on self-determination.

4. The vast majority of the Estonian people have lived in Soviet Estonia in the conditions of a socialist economic system for 45 years. This has to a great extent determined their way of thinking, labor habits, and human values. Two generations of Estonians have worked honestly under this system, creating Estonia's present economic, cultural, and educational potential. Whether this is regarded as good or bad, it is in any case the fruit of the work and life of hundreds of thousands of people.

5. Estonia's geopolitical situation has been fatal for us more than once in its history. The late 20th century offers an opportunity to make positive use of this situation. Estonia is an appropriate intermediary between the Soviet Union and Western and Northern Europe.

6. For the Soviet Union, Estonia is one of its openings onto the Baltic Sea. It still plays an important strategic role in the concept of state defense of the Soviet Union, although that role is diminishing. Europe's major states and influential political forces do not now have an interest in violating the borders enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki agreement and destabilizing the situation in the region.

7. The policy of perestroyka, started by the CPSU in 1985, restored to the Estonian people the possibility of preserving itself, and gave it hope of becoming the master of its own destiny. This course of M. Gorbachev's in domestic and foreign policy meets the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Europe, since it lessens the danger of the outbreak of a new world war and has already led to a reduction in arms spending. Political activity that undermines this course will not meet with understanding abroad, and is contrary to the Estonian people's vital interests.

8. The further democratization of the political system and state structure in the Soviet Union is extremely

necessary to the Estonian people. Otherwise the very existence of independent Estonia would be constantly under threat.

9. Ending economic links with the Soviet Union at present is virtually inconceivable, and would put Estonia in an extremely grave position, since it would markedly reduce the West's economic interest in Estonia. At the same time increasingly extensive links with the world market ensure Estonia's economic development.

10. The socialist economic system and the leading role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union will persist for a long time to come. Estonia, by virtue of its political traditions and level of culture, is ready for the transition to a multiparty parliamentary democracy and the equality of all forms of ownership.

It is not hard to see that the conclusions that stem from these matters, which we regard as serious matters, can easily be mutually exclusive. The supreme task for Estonian politicians, and first and foremost for the Estonian Communist Party as an organization that unites a significant proportion of our people's intellectual potential, is to formulate as soon as possible a model of Estonia's future political development that takes account of reality and represents the optimum synthesis. This would promote the unification of Estonia's population, help us to find a way out of the present crisis, and put an end to irresponsible declarations and the ever deeper sense of hopelessness.

It has been 50 years since the deal between Hitler and Stalin, which was fatal for the Estonian people. Recognition of the invalidity of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by the Soviet Government is an exceptionally important political step, which we seek and which we consider inevitable. At the same time we must be aware that it will not lead to the transformation of the system of state structure and state relations that developed in Europe after World War II: The present state and political structure in Europe is enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki agreement. But we do not rule out the possibility that the annulment of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the legal reassessment of the acts adopted by the Estonian State Duma in July 1940 could be followed by a change in the legal status of present-day Estonia.

The only acceptable form of transformation of the present society in Estonia would be parliamentary democracy and referendum. Condemning all deals made behind the people's back and consistently seeking the eradication of the practice of such deals in both domestic and foreign policy, we seek the creation of conditions in which the resolution of all matters of political weight will take place on a legitimate basis. The realization of the Estonian people's right to self-determination on their age-old territory, the logical culmination of which would be the choice of a particular form of statehood, is inevitable. The realization of this right is closely linked to the democratization of the Soviet Union as a whole and to respect for the fundamental rights of other peoples living in Estonia. The state transformation of the Soviet Union will inevitably have to take account of the far from identical readiness for democracy in different regions of that state, including the differing levels of nations' readiness for the realization of their right to self-determination. It seems to us that the people's deputies elected from Estonia at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the Estonian Communist Party representatives at the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations should put forward a concrete draft for the state transformation of the Soviet Union, on the basis of which the present basically unitarian state would be transformed into a federal state—a union of republics and states. We consider it expedient for the future transformation of the Soviet Union to combine two different principles. As a result, some union and some autonomous republics could form a federal association. And some of the present republics, including Estonia, could have political, economic, and defense links with the Soviet Union on the basis of fixed-duration treaties. On the basis of the above, Estonia would be a full-fledged entity under international law. This model would also be a good basis for the further improvement of the state structure.

Persuading the central authorities to adopt this idea and explaining it to the nonindigenous population of Estonia must be the aim of our political activity in the immediate future. At the same time it is necessary to embark on the drafting of a law on a referendum. We must realize that these processes should take place in parallel. Any other decision could, of course, produce results for a time, but unless we create a firm, law-based confidence, the tension in Estonia can only be further exacerbated. The change in the state structure of the Soviet Union proposed by the CPSU Central Committee platform on the nationalities question, which comes, so to speak, from above and does not take into account the Estonian people's opinion, or any attempt to conduct an oversimplified referendum, without parliamentary preparation, to answer "yes or no" to the question of belonging to the Soviet Union, will not really solve the problems we face today.

We are aware that what we propose may be displeasing to many people at first. The central authorities may see this idea as evidence of a desire to break up the Soviet Union, just as they initially saw the IME as evidence of a desire to undermine the so-called integrated national economic complex. Radical representatives of nationalities will see this proposal as an attempt to save the Soviet Union, which, in their opinion, is already collapsing. Any kind of departure from their own immediate and absolute statehood seems to them to be sacrilege. But it must be recognized that a sense of confidence and safety can only be ensured by political decisions that take into account the interests of all the forces involved. The Estonian people will never renounce the idea of their own statehood and the awareness that it was taken from them by force. Membership of a federation on equal terms with regions that lack their own tradition of statehood is unacceptable to the Estonian people. On the other hand, it is clear that the greater part of non-Estonian inhabitants of Estonia find equally unacceptable the idea of forcible separation from the Soviet Union, of being turned into emigres, without their opinion being taken into account. Our proposal does not injure the vital interests of either side, and should give both national groups a sense of both social and political confidence. After some thought, it could become acceptable to the central authorities too. Given the present state of affairs, this solution would be useful to them both politically and economically. We will not find in the past a path that can be followed today to eliminate tension in Estonia. But by looking into the future and taking account of the prospects for the all-European home, and also by acting on the basis of the process of integration that is inevitable for today's world, we will be able to create a new, independent Estonia which will join the family of states and peoples of Europe worthily, as an equal member, and whose level of economic development and political system will meet the interests both of all Estonia's inhabitants and of our neighbors.

Naturally, the aforementioned proposal cannot be implemented overnight. But if the Estonain Communist Party adopts it as a clear program goal, we are convinced that the proposal will be realized in the next few years.

Latvian Deputies Protest CPSU Baltics Statement

PM1509145989 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Aug 89 p 1

[Letter from group of USSR and Latvian people's deputies to CPSU Central Committee and Gorbachev under the general heading: "In Connection with the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics"]

[Text] To the CPSU Central Committee, Moscow

To Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Moscow

We USSR people's deputies and deputies of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet greeted with indignation the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic region of 26 August 1989.

We categorically protest at the assessment of the tendentious characterization of the political situation, which misinforms the population of the Soviet Union and the world public and impedes perestroyka in the republic.

On behalf of our voters we declare in all responsibility that there is no political crisis or violent clashes in Latvia and that the process of democratization and glasnost, which is approved by the people, is growing.

The statement supposedly in the name of the CPSU Central Committee and the threats it made to entire peoples unfortunately not only do not help to consolidate the inhabitants of Latvia but do the opposite.

We are sure that the people of Latvia will continue the policy begun of the third rebirth of society.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputies Viktor Abotinsh, Ilmars Bishers, Ervids Grinovskis, Indulis Zarinsh, Daynis Ivans, Edvins Inkens, Arnis Kalninsh, Ivars Kezbers, Rita Kukayne, Yanis Lutsans, Nikolay Neylands, Leopold Ozolinsh, Raymonds Pauls, Dzhemma Skulme, Andreys Tsirulis, Alfreds Chepanis, Voldemars Shlyakota, Andreys Dandzbergs, Yanis Peters, Vilen Tolpezhnikov, Mavrik Vulfson, Andreys Eyzans, Uldis Lautsis, Yuris Yaneks.

Latvian SSR People's Deputies Yanina Abolinya, Andris Berzinsh, Leons Vitols, Irena Gibiyete, Imants Daudish, Lyubov Zile, Viktor Kalnberzs, Dayna Konoshonoka, Atis Kraminsh, Ilmars Laksh, Veneranda Matule, Robert Misans, Ilmars Pileniyeks, Ivars Priyeditis, Peteris Pudniyeks, Marite Rukmane, Valda Semane, Visvaldis Skuinsh, Ilmars Kholshteyns, Yuris Tsinats.

Front Leaders Reject 'Great-Power' Statement

PM1509153589 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Aug 89 p 1

[Message from Latvian People's Front Duma Board to the people of Latvia under the general heading: "In Connection with the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Position in the Soviet Baltic Republics"]

[Text] To the people of Latvia

The time has come for tests of our words and assurances. The Baltic peoples' inalienable right to self-determination is in jeopardy!

The CPSU Central Committee statement of 26 August 1989 on the position in the Baltic republics confirmed the ruling sections' reluctance to understand the real situation in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and their inability to resolve national questions while acting in conformity with the peoples' interests. Small peoples are once again being talked to from positions of diktat. Again, as 50 years ago, they are trying to decide our fate far from the borders of the Baltic. The Latvian People's Front believes that the people and only the people have the right to decide how to live on their own land. Only the Lettish people together with other national groups have the right to decide what is desirable and useful for them and what is unacceptable to them. We categorically reject all external interference in Latvia's affairs, regardless of whether advice comes from the East or the West.

In responding to the incorrect and great-power CPSU Central Committee statement, we will be restrained and united and will not yield to provocations. We do not have the right to betray the people's self-awareness or the force and sense of justice acquired during our third rebirth!

We have felt the warmth of each other's hand and felt that we can rise up side by side and, if necessary, stand up for the land of Latvia. Now each of us must reinterpret once again what Latvia's freedom means to us and why no path exists for us other than that of freedom for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

God bless Latvia!
[Signed] Latvian People's Front Duma Board

Commemorative Meeting Held for 1st Latvian Leader

LD1409213289 Moscow TASS in English 1852 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Riga September 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Robert Ostrovskiy:

Hundreds of candles were lit today on the grave of first Latvian president Janis Cakste in Riga to mark the 130th anniversary of his birth. The ceremony was attended by thousands of Riga residents who carried national flags and laid live flowers at the foot of Cakste's monument. Leaders of the Latvian Popular Front, clergymen, actors and poets made speeches at the rally.

Cakste was the founder of the first independent Latvian state in 1918. He started his political career in 1906 when he became a deputy of the Russian state Duma (parliament). His political programme demanded freedom and the right to independent cultural and national development for all peoples of the Russian empire. Cakste was sentenced to imprisonment for his democratic convictions in 1908.

Cakste's progressive aspirations were realised only after the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. On November 18, 1918 he was elected chairman of the People's Council of the Latvian Republic recognised by Vladimir Lenin. Cakste was Latvia's president from 1922 until his death in 1927.

Coal Miners Vote Against Leaving AUCCTU

LD1409202489 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] An abortive attempt to quit the Soviet Trade Union Federation [AUCCTU] was made by the coal miners' union at a meeting here in Moscow.

(Mikhail Strogonov), a leader of the strike committee of the Donetsk coalfield, challenged the authority of the federation uniting all the trade unions in this country to take decisions affecting the affairs of their trade union.

The meeting, which brought together officials of the coal miners' union and leaders of the strike committees of the country's major mining areas turned it down by a majority vote.

Nevertheless, during the session the committee leaders were reassured of their rights to initiate legislation and to veto government decisions infringing upon the miners' interests. (Mikhail Strogonov) had told our reporter the results of the session hold some promise.

Radioactive Ampule Stolen in Vologda Oblast

LD1409195789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Vologda Oblast: The city radio is constantly broadcasting warning of danger. The local militia has mounted a dosimetric patrol. An emergency headquarters has been set up. These measures in the town of Sokol, Vologda Oblast, were prompted by the loss of an instrument containing an ampule of the radioactive isotope (?Iriga-)192. It was at the Sokol section of the No 6 directorate of specialized assembly works of the Nefteprovodstroy [oil pipeline building] trust and was used for checking the quality of welded joints.

It seems that all precautionary measures were being observed at the section. The fault-detector was housed in a metal tube buried in the ground with a lid and lock. Over it was another tube of greater diameter, also equipped with a locking bolt. The locks were found broken and the instrument had disappeared.

We asked the head of the main production and distribution directorate of the USSR Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industry, (Kreyzelman) to comment on this report. He said the incident is very alarming. The instrument could harm people's health even if it remains intact and is not smashed or damaged. Those who handle such fault detectors observe strict norms of work with such instruments, so as not to receive a dose of radiation. It has to be kept in a lead case. The ampule containing the isotope is not itself large: a little bigger than the safety fuse in a television set. It was in a leaden container. It has happened that such instruments have been stolen by people tempted by the lead: like a character in Chekhov, they have used it for making sinkers for fishing. And it has happened that the thief, unaware of the danger, has carried the ampule in his pocket and gone with it, say to a dance or to the cinema, endangering not only himself but also anyone near him.

Protesters Gather at Semilpalatinsk Test Site

LD1509090889 Moscow TASS in English 0856 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, September 15 TASS—Medical students from Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Riga, Kaunas and Semipalatinsk, as well as young people from Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, have begun a three-day protest action against nuclear testing near the Semipalatinsk Soviet test site.

The action, organised by the local branch of the Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Alma-Ata branch of the international youth organisation Next Stop Soviet, opened with a huge rally attended by thousands of people.

Speakers pointed to the need to increase anti-nuclear efforts and strengthen friendship among peoples.

The rally adopted an appeal to the heads of government of the Soviet Union and the United States, urging them to ban nuclear weapon tests and accelerate the solution of environmental problems.

Protesters will also hold roundtable discussions of health issues and meet radiologists, the military and test site personnel.

The action will end with a demonstration in a symbolic peace camp on the test site border.

Chapayevsk Chemical Arms Facility To Be Converted

PM1509092589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent S. Zhigalov dispatch: "Plant Near Chapayevsk To Be Converted"]

[Text] Kuybyshev City—N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has signed an order confirming the conclusion reached by a government commission headed by N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, that the Chapayevsk plant for the destruction of chemical weapons should be converted to a training center.

IZVESTIYA has carried numerous reports on the complex situation in Chapayevsk and throughout the region around it. Now that a final decision has been made, putting an end to the months-long struggle waged by the city residents and authorities against the danger of having combat toxins on their doorstep, you would think that passions would abate. Yet they are still raging there to this day, despite the unambiguous conclusion reached by the latest—third—government commission.

It is sad to realize that the local public's justified movement was accompanied by a certain extremism which was not particularly squeamish about using rumors and demagogic—and even provocative—slogans. On the other hand, the largely evasive stance taken by the two previous government commissions gave rise to nervousness among people and to disbelief that their opinion would be heeded. The way the Chapayevsk conflict was resolved should—indeed must—be a lesson to all who are still unaccustomed to a calm, respectful, and, most importantly, honest and constructive dialogue.

Nuclear Power Workers Set Up Union

PM1409155789 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Sep 89 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Ye. Kotyayev report: "Nuclear Power Station Operatives' Union"]

[Text] Kursk Oblast—Chernobyl revealed how much in nuclear power engineering depends on the skill, professional training, and psychological stability of nuclear power station personnel. Not just reactor efficiency but also the safety of thousands of people depends on those who sit at the power unit control panels. Therefore specialists at the Kursk nuclear power station decided to launch an initiative to set up an Association of Operational Staff.

Members of the action group contacted colleagues at other stations and leaders of the recently set up nuclear society and met with complete mutual understanding. The draft statutes prepared by members of the action group have been dispatched to nuclear power stations and other interested organizations. In a letter to Kurchatov city power workers Academician Ye. Velikhov expresses hope that the new society will help to resolve the problems which have accumulated in the sphere of ensuring nuclear power station safety.

International Research Center at Chernobyl Planned

LD1509085189 Moscow TASS in English 0840 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—An international research centre to be established at the Chernobyl nuclear power station will help strengthen cooperation between various countries in ensuring safety of nuclear power plants. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Soviet specialists discussed relevant questions in Moscow this week.

Aleksandr Protsenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, told TASS that IAEA plans to draft a package of programmes for future investigations and to send them to interested states wishing to participate in the joint work.

The Chernobyl plant has now the latest equipment and advanced technology to make the plant's work safe and reliable, Protsenko noted. He said that the USSR conducts work to raise safety at nuclear plants in two main directions. Firstly, higher skills and greater responsibility of personnel. Secondly, better designs of reactors, including means for an emergency shut-down. For instance the Chernobyl plant uses now a system of introduction of absorbtion rods which stop chain reaction in a much shorter time than it was provided for by the old design of the reactor used at the plant before the disaster.

Protsenko said that scientists from various countries can also study the influence of radiation on the environment over many years in the zone of the Chernobyl nuclear station.

Orenburg Gas Well Accident Leaves 10 Hospitalized

LD1409142789 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Orenburg (Russia) September 14 TASS—Over 1,200 inhabitants of the Nikolskoye village, Orenburg region, were evacuated following a huge gas release from a well nearly 50 kilometres away from the village today.

The accident occurred when an anti-blowout locking device at the well, which was closed for repairs, broke down and the gas was forced by high pressure to the surface.

At 2:20 the concentration of harmful substances exceeded the highest permissible level by nearly 69 times.

Fifty one people, including three children, needed medical help. Ten people were hospitalized with medium-degree poisoning.

Belorussian Management Changes Approved

LD1409164789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision on the immediate measures for the transition of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist republic to new conditions of management based on self-management and self-financing, beginning from 1990. Very important trends of this work in the republic should be the guarantee of strengthening social orientation in the economy, developing internal republican divisions of cooperation and labor to the fullest, improving economic methods of management, and strengthening financial and economic bases and local self-government.

The text of the decision and a list of enterprises, associations, organizations, and establishments, handed over from union subordination to subordination to the Belorussian Council of Ministers, will be published in the press.

Further Reportage on Ukrainian 'Rukh' Congress

PM1409190589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Sep 89 First Edition pp 1,4

[Own correspondents M. Odinets, I. Tikhomirov report under the rubric "We Discuss the Nationalities Question": "Where is 'Rukh' Heading?"]

[Text] Kiev—... Midnight on Sunday in Kiev. A dismal autumn drizzle. The streets and squares of the city were empty. Only a ragged column of excited, triumphant people was moving along Victory Avenue in the direction of the center. They were waving flags and chanting slogans, disturbing the first sleep of the people of Kiev. The flags were blue and yellow, and there were cries of "praise!" and "glory!" The few passers-by pressed themselves in fright against the walls of buildings, although the column was accompanied by a militia car, from which now and again came the warning over the radio: "Hey, you noisy people, you are causing a disturbance....!" "Hey, you have been warned...!" But the column continued moving.

This noisy nighttime procession and rally at the monument to Taras Shevchenko was the culmination of the 3-day constituent congress of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Restructuring, "Rukh." In the spacious assembly hall of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, hung with a multitude of yellow and blue flags, tridents, and the old emblems of Ukrainian lands and cities, which for some reason included Khelm, Peremyshl, and Kuban, a total of 1,109 delegates representing the movement's 280,000 members had gathered. All this time, from morning until late in the evening, the "Rukh" statute and program were discussed in an atmosphere of extreme exaltation fueled by anti-Soviet, antisocialist speeches, which received an approving roar from the audience. The nature of the congress' work determined the composition of the delegates: There were just 109 workers here and 16 representatives of rural areas. The rest were engineers, scientific associates, doctors, teachers, students, and priests.... Naturally, this structure far from reflects the social strata of the Ukrainian people. The unequal representation also made itself felt. Lvov Oblast, where, as is well known, the extremist wing of the movement has long been firmly established, received 190 mandates, while the proletarian regions—Kharkov, Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad, and Nikolayev Oblasts—received just 20 each.

It also came as no surprise that the Lvov representatives and their neighbors created a particular atmosphere in the hall and set the tone in the discussion, with the noticeable connivance of the congress leadership. Here is another detail. At the very start of the debates it was announced by the presidium that more than 130 people had expressed a wish to speak. It seemed that a broad exchange of varied opinions was guaranteed; after all, the "Rukh" leaders had made a great show of the fact that their movement united forces from all strata of society and all persuasions. However, this pluralism of opinions did not materialize: Throughout the congress, the overwhelming majority of speeches from the rostrum followed the same lines: anti-CPSU and antisocialism. And as the language became more colorful more insults could be heard in the speakers' vocabulary, the applause in the hall went on longer, and the shouts of "Ganba!" ("Shame!") became louder. And the standard-bearers waved their flags with more frenzy.

The attitude toward the party was the main question which faced the founders of "Rukh" from the moment of its inception. For a long time there were stormy discussions in the press and on television. The first draft program stated unambiguously: The movement recognizes the leading role of the CPSU. And at the congress itself, during the speech by L. Kravchuk, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department, Dmitriy Pavlychko uttered the following assurance from the platform: "Leonid Makarovich, 99.99 percent of those here—as they used to say in reports on election results—everyone is in favor of cooperating with the Ukrainian Communist Party." You couldn't ask for more sincerity, it would seem, but what about what we heard at the congress. The very next speaker after Kravchuk—USSR People's Deputy Colonel V. Martirosyan—harangued the party and its leaders with a torrent of totally groundless fabrications.

"Can you name," he asked to the accompaniment of shouts from the audience, "a single honest person among members of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo?" Another deputy, S. Konev, described the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Baltic republics as "yet another provocation." The party as whole, as well as specific individuals, were insulted. Nasty words were spoken about the first secretaries of Donetsk, Odessa, Chernovitsy, Khmelnitskiy, and other oblast party committees. Matters got as far as sacrilegiously accusing V.I. Lenin of chauvinism. That was done by someone named Byrledyanu. At that point even the presidium took alarm and issued a reminder that there were 224 CPSU members and 4 candidate members of the party among the congress delegates. After all, one in almost every four delegates was a Communist, and even the "Rukh" founders—Drach, Pavlychko, Yavorivskiy—hold party membership cards... But even that had no effect.

L. Lukyanenko from Chernigov region was especially malicious. He had already expounded his antisocialist views on many occasions. In an issue of the Munich-based Ukrainian nationalist newspaper SHLYAKH PEREMOGI, this figure held forth about the role played by Bandera's men who, in his opinion, "performed their historical mission," and he expressed regret that some of them—left behind for further subversive work—withered without producing any fruit. Had they died in battle and irrigated the soil with their blood, he wrote, it would have sprouted forth fresh fighters for freedom.

One recalls the tumultuous ovation with which A. Volkov, delegate from the Ivano-Frankovsk region, was greeted and sent off. Apparently his main virtue lies in the fact that his Communist work comrades expelled him from the party a few days ago for playing a double game.

Every now and then the congress leadership had to call the audience to order, begging them to be more selective in their expressions. This was especially strange in view of the fact that the hall contained dozens of doctors of sciences, hundreds of scientific associates, engineers, cultural figures—people who are commonly known as the intelligentsia. The vocal orgy really flared up whenever someone spoke in defense of the party. For example, S. Furmanyuk, a construction industry worker from Donetsk, and V. Pilipenko, a worker from Kremenchug, were heckled. Not only were they prevented from speaking, people made threatening gestures against them when they came down from the rostrum. No wonder, therefore, that the formulation about relations between "Rukh" and the party, as proposed in the first version of the program, disappeared without a trace. The document adopted by the congress says that "Rukh" supports nothing but the principles of society's radical renewal as proclaimed by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Its goals are to be attained, as the People's Movement of the Ukraine Statute declares, in cooperation with state institutions and soviet and party organs.

Everything becomes clear if you look into the real goals of those who had assembled to compromise the party in the people's eyes and to push it out of their way in order to come to power. No secret was made of this. USSR People's Deputy V. Chernyak, who was afterwards elected "Rukh" deputy chairman, bluntly declared: "The time has imperatively posed the question: Who will defeat whom? We must take power."

The tactics for winning the election campaign and getting a majority on the soviets were also worked out, after which, as they say, it is only a matter of the technicalities. "Their" parliament, their people in organs of power, will solve all "Rukh's" pressing problems.

"We know what we want," one of the movement's prime movers shouted from the platform. The 3 days of debate provided a pretty clear definition of precisely what "Rukh" does want. "So long as the Ukraine remains within the USSR none of its problems can be solved," one of the speakers thundered from the rostrum. Another demanded the abrogation of our country's present constitution. A third, condemning the "occupation" of the republic, demanded the withdrawal of the USSR Armed Forces and the creation of a Ukrainian army.... The list could be extended, but even what has been said gives an idea of the real intentions of the congress participants with the most reactionary attitudes.

The wording in the documents adopted by the congress is not so overt. Moreover, they reflect many of the real problems which have accumulated in the political, economic, ecological, national-cultural, and other spheres of the republic's life. The statute and program declare that "Rukh" intends to solve them. And that is natural. The compilers of the documents want to recruit as many people as possible into "Rukh." And even now it is impossible not to see that the People's Movement of the Ukraine also includes healthy forces who have realistic attitudes and sincerely want to play an active part in resolving the complex tasks of perestroyka.

It was said several times at the congress that "Rukh" has only just been born, that it is like a baby that has still to learn how to walk. This is a difficult task, and a great deal will depend on who is in charge of it. Describing the atmosphere at the congress at which the movement was formalized, USSR People's Deputy Ye. Stankevich, a guest from Moscow, made an apt remark:

"Bulging eyes and machismo have never made democracy more attractive, foaming mouths do not suit democracy. If there is any risk to our democracy today, it is the risk of drowning in the hatred which we ourselves are creating. It is very irksome when the vocabulary of new politicians, people who have just started on the political road, is limited to four expressions: 'gimme,' 'down with,' 'glory,' and 'shame.' Political vocabulary cannot be restricted to this. To become a politician you need to have a clear picture of what is going to happen to the country, the republic, and the peoples inhabiting the country and the republic in 5, 10, 15 years' time. You get the impression that here emotions are prevailing over constructive thinking."

The congress delegates have now gone home. What have they taken with them? Firm determination, doubts, thoughts about the future of "Rukh"—what will they take into their collectives and how will they be received? Let us not be categorical. We will just recount a small episode. During the nighttime procession a passer-by shouted sarcastically: "Football fans going home from a game, probably. A bad joke!"

He was wrong. The game is much more serious.

Movement Rejects Secession

LD1409131489 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Drach remarks recorded in vernacular fading into English translation throughout]

[Excerpts] Seats of interethnic conflicts have appeared in the past 2 years, in several republics pushing even economic problems to the background. [passage omitted]

The demand for greater economic and political independence is common for national movements in many republics, however, the limits of this independence are set in different ways. Some members of the Popular Fronts in the Baltic republics are radically minded and demand the right to leave the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Movement in Support of Perestroyka, called RUKH, in the Ukraine, the second biggest republic in the country, wants to preserve the federation, says the chairman of RUKH, Ivan Drach:

[Drach] One of our greatest concerns is the sovereignty of a free independent Ukraine as part of the union on the basis of a new, federal treaty. This is set down in the program of our movement. We don't have to separate from each other, Russia from Belorussia, the Ukraine from Moldavia. We live on historically common territory.

[Reporter] Whom do you consider allies of your movement? There have been reports in the press that you want to separate from other public organisations and the Communist Party. Ivan Drach again:

[Drach] From the very appearance of the movement we've been opposed. A representative of the Ukrainian party organization told us that our movement will never be. However, we've always been saying that we wanted to incorporate with all organizations.

[Reporter] Your movement is accused of nationalism. They say that you revive national symbols.

[Drach] This is such a delicate point that it can easily be criticized. There have always been national symbols, including the blue and yellow flag. But this is not nationalism, an attempt to disassociate ourselves from the rest. There are extremists in our movement who are ready to talk, day and night, about the separation of the Ukraine and the formation of an independent state. But they don't make up a majority in the movement. [passage omitted]

Former Ukraine Leader on Krushchev, Brezhnev

PM1409113789 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 37, 10 Sep 89 p 16

["Excerpts" from "recent" interview with Petr Shelest, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, by Andrey Karaulov; place not specified; full text to be published in TEATRALNAYA ZHIZN; introduction notes that 82-year-old Shelest's views "may be quite subjective"]

[Text] A.K.: Peter Yevimovich, why do you think Krushchev was toppled?

P. Sh.: I believe that there were no serious reasons for such an extreme reaction. What there was was a struggle for power.

A.K.: That alone?

P. Sh.: That alone....

A.K.: Is Burlatskiy right when he writes that Shelepin masterminded the conspiracy?

P. Sh.: No, he isn't. A lot of different things have been written, and all of them are figments. The masterminds were Brezhnev and Podgornyy. I never was a friend of Brezhnev's. I knew him little and not in a very good light. For Nikita Sergeyevich's (Krushchev's - ed.) 70th birthday there was a reception at which every kind of speech was made. People ate and drank, then Nikita Sergeyevich left—I think, it was at the House of Receptions. Brezhnev was rather smashed: He climbed up on the railing (some 25 of us remained) and began making a speech: Here I am, your President, and you are my subjects.... And so on . This produced an unpleasant impression on me. And on the others, too.

A.K.: What was Krushchev's attitude towards Brezhnev?

P. Sh.: I had a talk with Krushchev on this subject. He called Brezhnev a jester.

A.K.: Then Krushchev didn't see the danger he presented?

P. Sh.: No, he didn't. If he had seen it, he would have sent him to some peripheral place, believe me.

A.K.: Did it never occur to you that Brezhnev or Podgornyy might become first secretary?

P. Sh.: I wasn't scared that it might be Podgornyy. As for Brezhnev, I didn't even think about him. And I couldn't have thought about Shelepin even now.

A.K.: And Suslov?

P. Sh.: Even less.... If Suslov had come to power, it would have been horrible, even worse than under Brezhnev. Podgornyy perhaps, had more chances to occupy the chair of the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. But he refused. And he made a motion—Brezhnev. This was already after Nikita Sergeyevich had been relieved of his post, when a decision had been made to take the matter up at a plenary meeting. Then Brezhnev said: "Let's institute the post of second secretary of the Central Committee" [CC]. For the time being there was no second secretary in the CC. Everyone agreed. Whom? Podgornyy. But when we came to the plenary meeting, this item was not even on the agenda. I still don't know at what stage it was scrapped. That's the kind of kitchen there was....

A.K.: You observed Krushchev in the last hour of his rule. How did he behave?

P. Sh.: Nearly all members and alternate members of the Presidium spoke at the Presidium meeting. Their statements varied....

A.K.: Did anyone say kind words?

P. Sh.: Kind words were spoken. And in conclusion Nikita Sergeyevich said: "I thank the comrades who said kind words nevertheless...." In my statement I said that despite shortcomings in our work, we had achievements as well. But if we hadn't stopped our reforms at the halfway stage, the achievements would have been greater....

Mikoyan spoke in defence. He said: "Comrades, okay, Nikita Sergeyevich has his flaws, sometimes he skids, but still he is an experienced politician. Let's do this—criticize him, but leave him at least on the Council of Ministers." Brezhnev was frightened: If Nikita Sergeyevich were left as a member of the Presidium, it would turn out badly for Brezhnev, this was clear. But Krushchev held on."

A.K.: How did you feel at that moment?

P. Sh.: Honestly? I'll tell you...I experienced the most severe trials. The most severe. Then Nikita Sergeyevich said: "Good, but let me say a few words at the plenary meeting." Brezhnev said: No. Suslov said: No, no. At this point Nikita Sergeyevich burst out crying...sobbing.... "Well, if so, I'm getting what I deserved.... Good. Write a statement, I'll sign it." That was all. And the statement wasn't written by him. I don't remember who wrote it because it was hard for me to watch. To this day I remember Krushchev's face in tears. To this day I'll remember that face even when I die.

A.K.: Petr Yefimovich, at that moment, didn't you feel like getting up and saying: Comrades, what are we doing?

P. Sh.: (Slowly, with a heavy sigh.) No such possibility existed.

A.K.: Were you afraid of anyone?

P. Sh.: The situation didn't permit it. The situation.

A.K.: If you had had your say, would you have been supported, what do you think?

P. Sh.: No, it would have sunk.... Especially since Mikoyan had already refused at the last minute.

A.K.: And Leonid Ilich (Brezhnev—ed.)? What kind of a person was he?

P. Sh.: I would never describe Brezhnev as a strong, wise or iron politician. Never. He was a typical apparatchik and bore no comparison to Khrushchev. Brezhnev always played to the audience. He was an artist. He could even shed a tear if need be. He worshipped orders and medals, this was no longer a secret. Podgornyy once told him: "Enough, Leonid Ilich, people are already telling anecdotes." Brezhnev, they say, decided to have an operation to expand his chest—there was no more room to hang new medals. Everything was in vain. Once he was to India, put on his stars plus two Czechoslovak and two Bulgarian ones, and arrived looking like that. Then Grechko and Podgornyy phoned him in Delhi. They told him cautiously this isn't the custom in India. He obeyed and took them off. But the day later he put them on again. He couldn't do without medals, he simply couldn't. He came as a parvenu and he left like one. And he held on because his entourage was like him. In politics great importance attaches to one's entourage. In politics one person can hold on only if he is a dictator. Brezhnev wasn't a dictator. His was an impersonal cult.

A.K.: Did any real opposition to Brezhnev take shape during his 18 years?

P. Sh.: Podgornyy/Voronov, Kosygin. They weren't in the same harness with Brezhnev. Kosygin and Brezhnev were very unfriendly. I wouldn't say, of course, that this was opposition, for opposition is something organized. But what happened was this: We simply took exception to many decision emanating from Brezhnev. This began almost from the first years. During the first two or three years I supported him, then I began opposing him on a whole range of issues. Kosygin, too, had many clashes. Brezhnev said about him: he is a schemer. But behind his back, of course. Kosygin insisted that light industry was an indicator of trade, that we should purchase equipment and machine tools, so that instead of exporting cotton we could process it ourselves. He was told: No, we have no funds, no foreign currency....

A.K.: How did Kosygin react to his retirement?

P. Sh.: It came as a surprise and, in some way, hastened his demise.

A.K.: And Podgornyy?

P. Sh.: Podgornyy's retirement came as an even greater surprise. It was only at the Central Committee plenary meeting that Podgornyy learned about a proposal to combine the posts. He told me about this himself: "I was sitting at the Central Committee plenary meeting, Lyonya (Brezhnev) was next to me, everything was going well, and suddenly Secretary Kachura of the Donetsk Regional party committee took the floor and tabled a motion: 'I believe it advisable to combine the posts of general secretary and president of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium.' I was stunned. I said: 'Lyonya, what is this?' He replied: 'I can't understand it myself, but evidently the people want it this way, the people....'"

When Podgornyy was already retired, he gave a ring to Brezhnev. But Brezhnev refused to pick up the receiver, didn't want to...then Podgornyy was connected with Brezhnev's aide, who told him: "Comrade Brezhnev asked me to tell you that he has no questions for you...." Podgornyy was furious: "You tell him that... (he used an invective) that I have questions for him, but I will not phone again." And he didn't. Never again. But it was he who had made Brezhnev general secretary.

A.K.: So all retirements of Politburo members were like bolts from the blue?

P. Sh.: All of them. And do you know what he did to Polyanskiy? Polyanskiy was a Politburo member and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers for agriculture. And he asked many questions in a fairly sharp way. Brezhnev evidently was fed up with this. Once we were sitting at a Politburo meeting, the minister of agriculture had just been relieved. Polyanskiy sat pensively, writing something down. Brezhnev suddenly said: "I suggest making Polyanskiy the minister." But Polyanskiy didn't hear and went on writing. I was sitting next to him and said softly: "Mitya." He said: "Yes?" "It's about you." "And what did he say?" "He suggests making you a minister." Polyanskiy turned pale, seeming to grasp the meaning. But too late....

A.K.: Did you also assist in strengthening the general secretary's non-existent prestige?

P. Sh.: I wouldn't put it that way. What does it mean—to assist in creating prestige? It is established that way in the party, and if it were different, there would be no order. Once we have elected the general secretary, we are responsible for his activities. We must both correct and support him. What wold have happened otherwise? We elected a general secretary, let us remove him a year later, give us another one...

A.K.: But what we got as a result was the country's dislocation.

P. Sh.: The dislocation started some five to six years later. In the first years Brezhnev still dealt with the economy. He listened to us.

A.K.: When did he remove you from the Politburo?

P. Sh.: In 1973. And from the Ukraine in 1972. There was a plenary meeting of the Central Committee on international issues. Suddenly Leonid Ilich came up to me on the Presidium and tapped me on the shoulder: "Petr Yefimovich, let's go and have a talk." We went into a room. "Well, how do matters stand in the Ukraine?..." But the day before I have already told you. "That's all right.... Yes, we consider that you work well in the Ukraine. But now I have a proposal to make." I made big eyes. What kind of a proposal? "We want to take you to Moscow". I said: "What for?" I had already turned 64.... "You know, there is a need for change." "What do you mean?" I asked. "If I'm no good anymore in the Ukraine, just say so, without beating about the bush." "Now, Petr Yefimovich, don't say that." "No, Leonid Ilich, you tell me—are there any objections to my work in the Ukraine?" "No. None whatsoever," "Then what's the matter?" "There is a need to strengthen the Council of Ministers." I said: "Why do you take me for strengthening when I am 64. For me to sort things out will take at least three years, and then I will be almost 70. What kind of strengthening is that? At 70 it's time to stop working."

I didn't consent. "Petr Yefimovich, I beg you, you'll move to Moscow, you'll be a friend of my family...." "Oh yes," I said, "you can even turn me into your pet dog." That's the kind of talk we had, I didn't give my consent. Then Podgornyy assailed me. I still don't understand Podgornyy on this question. "Petr Yefimovich, you give consent because a major overhaul is due in the party." There you are. I said: "No I won't consent." Well, and then.... Properly speaking, I was violated....

A.K.: Why?

P. Sh.: It's hard to say. He sensed something. But I don't know what he was afraid of.

A.K.: Why didn't you change your mind at the last moment, why?

P. Sh.: Who knows...(a pause). I can't say...But I came here, feeling very heavy, indeed.

A.K.: Why did everyone surrender without putting up a fight?

P. Sh.: What kind of a fight could I have put up? What do you think?

A.K.: If you know that the Ukraine wouldn't let you go, if you had gone to a plenary meeting of the CP Ukraine Central Committee and said: Now, comrades, Brezhnev has invited me to Moscow, I want to consult you on whether I should or should not go...

P. Sh.: That is exactly what I feared the most. Because the plenary meeting would most probably take exception to my departure. And I would later be accused not only of nationalism, but also of separatism.

A.K.: What happend next? In Moscow?

P. Sh.: The Council of Minister. Brezhnev said: "You'll be in charge of the defence industry." But then everything changed. I didn't even object, there was no point. There were clashes. Well, and Lyonya, too, I believe was fed up with all this. But I had already decided I should quit. I went to Brezhnev with a written statement. "You don't, Petr Yefimovich, you so recently came to Moscow you have incorporated yourself so well, there are so many good comments about you: No." Persecutions started. Against my sons, and also against me. The magazine KOMMUNIST in the Ukraine published criticisms of my book. I wrote Brezhnev as follows: I believe that you, Leonid Ilich, and also Suslov are to blame for everything. He told me: "Petr Yefimovich, I beg you, rewrite the statement, do you want people to pick at me with their toes after my death?" That's what he told me. And we were one on one, this is not written down anywhere. But I told him: "Bear in mind that you'll end up in a bad way. I will not attend the plenary meeting. I'm in a distressed state and I ask to be relieved."

Armenian Economy Harmed by Rail Slowdown

LD1509085989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] A report from Yerevan. It is now the 10th day since the Azerbiajan railway stopped delivering national economic cargo. Construction has halted in the disaster zone. Gasoline storage tanks have been left without fuel. The supply of basic necessities to the population is beginning to be disrupted. Paper stocks are running out, as a result of which the publication of newspapers may stop.

As has been reported by the Armenian Civial Aviation Administration, flights to various towns in the country are now threatened with disruption. For many days now there has been nothing with which to refuel aircraft for local flights. Kandelyan, head of the Armeian department of the Transcaucasian Railway, explained that the Azerbaijan railway supplies 85 percent of the cargoes to Armenia. The remaining 15 pecent come from Georgia, where the make up of the railway does not permit an increase in its traffic capacity. At present there is a danger that traffic on the entire Azerbaijan railway will be halted, according to deputy minister of railways Sidenko. Minister of Communications Konarev and the leaders of other ministries and departments have now flown out to the region.

Armenian Party Discusses Nationalities Policy

NC1409212189 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 13 Sep 89

["The Nationalities Question Is an Important Component of Restructuring"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Yerevan, 13 Sep (ARMENPRES)—One of the most important components of the comprehensive conception for restructuring is regarded as the party's new nationalities policy which, based on the experience gathered at home and abroad, will create the conditions to strengthen friendship and cooperation between all the peoples of the USSR regardless of their ethnic origin on the principles of organic interaction among and equality of all in the USSR. The CPSU draft platform, which has been submitted to public debate, embodies these principled tenets of the party on the nationalities policy.

The recent joint session of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee's ideological committee and interethnic relations committee was devoted to discussion of that draft. The meeting was chaired by G. Voskanyan, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and chairman of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee's [CPCC] interethnic relations committee.

G. Galoyan, secretary of the Armenian CPCC and chairman of the ideological committee, briefed the meeting about the suggestions formulated by the Armenian CPCC and the aforesaid committees on the platform draft. The following participated in exchanging views: V. Petrosyan, first secretary of Spandaryanskiy Rayon of Yerevan; N. Ovanesyan, acting director of the Eastern Studies Institute of the Armenian SSR; Kh. Barsegyan, director of the publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR; E. Mirzoyan, chairman of the composers union of Armenia; V. Nazaryan, procurator of the republic; G. Simonyan, director of the Armenian branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute of the CPSU Central Committee; M. Nersisyan, academician at the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR; G. Ovanesyan, chairman of the writers' union of Armenia; V. Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian branch of the Cultural Fund; Yu. Mkkhetumyan, secretary of party committee at the Yerevan State University; Professor L. Karapetyan; historians G. Karapetyan, L. Urshudyan, V. Mikayelyan, G. Akobyan; scholar A.Yegiazaryan, and others.

The joint meeting, in endorsing the CPSU draft platform on the nationalities question, indicated that a number of important tenets have been included in it whose implementation would contribute to eliminating the perilous interethnic relations phenomena which deeply disturb the Soviet public. Among these tenets are above all the idea of reforming the Soviet Federation, expanding rights and possibilities for national autonomy, guaranteeing uniform rights for each group, creating conditions for the free development of national cultures and languages, and reinforcing the guarantees precluding encroachment on the rights of citizens because of their ethnic origin.

It also pointed out that the mechanism for implementing these ideas enumerated in the relevant sections of the platform is in substantial need of being made more concrete and that ways to solve the proposed issues should be further clarified. It is also necessary for the domestic policy of the state on nationalities relations to be brought in line with the norms of international law and with those responsibilities which the USSR has undertaken through international conventions, treaties, and agreements. It was indicated that though the platform correctly speaks about Lenin's principle of national self-determination and the need to restore it in its fullest sense, it does not expound on the interpretation of that basic tenet for contemporary conditions.

The participants in the meeting gave their consent to the Armenian CPCC's suggestion that the CPSU Central Committee plenum, devoted to radically restructuring the party's nationalities policy, make a principled political assessment of the events in Sumgait, Fergana, Novi Uzen, and several other places where the interethnic tension culminated in actions unimaginable in the conditions of our society and which claimed innocent human victims. Therefore, relevent articles must be inserted into the [word indistinct] legislative code stipulating punishment for crimes committed on interethnic grounds and in particular for acts of genocide as envisaged by the United Nations convention on genocide which was ratified by the USSR on 18 March 1954.

The underlying principles of the nationalities policy endorsed by the CPSU Central Committee plenum must be legislatively sanctioned in the new Constitution of the USSR.

The meeting participants also expressed their extreme unease over the perilous situation prevailing in the region and about the critical situation faced by the Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The Armenian CPCC and the Armenian SSR's Supreme Soviet Presidium were advised to appeal urgently to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the relevant organizations of the country with the request and constitutional demand for effective guarantees for the resolution of the explosive situation prevailing in the region and for the protection of the security of the population of the NKAO and the Armenians living in Azerbaijan.

Armenian Intellectuals Debate National Problems

NC1509132589 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 14 Sep (ARMENPRES)—The conference of the representatives of Armenian intellectuals, held between 9-10 September at the G. Sundukyan academic theater, discussed the national renaissance of the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], its reunification with the motherland, and diverse problems of the national movement. The proceedings of the conference was relayed by loudspeakers to the thousands who had gathered in front of the theater. [passage omitted]

During the speeches and addresses the extremely critical situation prevailing in the NKAO was underlined. It was pointed out that the already depleted stock of consumer and primary goods in the completely blockaded Armenian oblast has run out . The transport convoys from Armenia have been vandalized and stranded in blocked roads; banditry is rampant. [passage omitted].

The appeal by a group of intellectuals of the neighboring republic to their own people was roundly condemned; the appeal has virtually [word indistinct] interethnic [word indistinct] and brings no honor to a scientist or creative person or to intellectuals in general.

The speakers proposed that the NKAO National Council should be recognized until the oblast party and soviet bodies are restored. It was pointed out that in these difficult days the Armenian diaspora both in the Soviet Union and abroad will extend its support to the NKAO because this is a pan-national issue. [passage omitted] The central press was criticized for distorting the developments around NKAO.

The conference of Armenian intellectuals elected a council and an administration. The conference adopted a declaration defining the tasks ahead for the republic's intellectuals and ways and means to attain national sovereignty and unity, a just solution of the Artsakh problem, and the settlement of our various national problems.

The conference adopted a call addressed to the intellectuals of the Soviet Union urging them to raise their voices in favor of the NKAO's reunification and in support of the Armenian cause.

'Participation' for Armenians in Diaspora Urged

NC1509095689 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1600 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Interview with Vladimir Ovanesyan, lecturer for the state, administration, and legal affairs chair at the law faculty of Yerevan State University and candidate of juridical sciences, on the debate of the draft law on amendments and annexes to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution, by Juliet Abovyan; date and place not specified—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Abovyan] Comrade Ovanesyan, we would like to hear your opinion about this draft.

[Ovanesyan] In my opinion, the whole draft is a failure. It in no way reflects the present political situation and does not mirror the present concepts of transformations and establishment of a state based on law. [passage omitted] Our Armenian brothers and sisters in diaspora must participate in the deliberations of our Supreme Soviet. Although right now there is no existing mechanism for this, (?the Armenians) must conceive of and create a legal mechanism enabling the representatives of our Armenian communities in the diaspora to participate, if not effectively, at least with a consultative voice in the deliberations of our highest representative administration body. This will be morally, tangibly, and materially significant. Most important, it will be an enormous encouragement for our diaspora sisters and brothers and will serve as an additional and productive tie between the diaspora and the motherland.

Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet Opens 15 Sep

LD1509073389 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Baku September 15 TASS—Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet (Parliament), in an extraordinary session that opened here today, will examine a draft law on the transcaucasian republic's sovereignty and citizenship and its transition to principles of economic independence and self-management.

The deputies, representing more than seven million people of this multinational republic, will hear a report by the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers on the implementation of social and economic plans directed at raising living standards.

One of the central issues to be discussed at the session is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. The autonomous region populated by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, has been temporarily placed under a special administration committee to avoid inter-ethnic conflicts.

Run-up to Session

LD1409180889 Moscow TASS in English 1752 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Baku September 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov:

The whole of Azerbaijan is looking forward to an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet, due to open here on Friday [15 September] morning. Republican television plans live broadcasts of the sittings of the session, which for the first time is attended by representatives of the popular front of Azerbaijan and other informal organisations.

That so much interest is shown to the session is largely due to the fact that it will address urgent political, social and economic problems, which are crucial for the future development of the republic, and primarily the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. People expect the MPs [member of parliament] to take well-considered and realistic decisions.

The situation in the republic is far from simple. The nascent constructive dialogue between the leadership of the republic and the popular front of Azerbaijan, which put forward its own platform, nearly broke down yesterday. Although the two sides' positions have no major differences, the divergent views, expressed on Wednesday night as to ways and methods of attaining goals, nearly led to a conflict situation. Nevertheless, by agreeing to compromise and meeting each halfway, those involved in the dialogue came to mutually acceptable agreements. They were disclosed on Wednesday night at a rally in Baku and then broadcast by local television.

In the run-up to the session, the republican news agency AZERINFORM conducted a public opinion survey, in which Azerbaijani residents, representing practically all strata of the population and the main regions of the republic, made their proposals on ways of solving problems connected with Nagorno-Karabakh. The survey findings were sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan.

Volskiy Discusses Tension in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1409203789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, chairman of the committee for special administration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and USSR people's deputy by unidentified correspondent; date, place not specified—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Arkadiy Ivanovich, in the 1920's it was the practice to evaluate the so-called present moment. What is the situation today in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast?

[Volskiy] I think that it was not only the practice in the twenties to evaluate the present moment. In any case, if we failed to do this at any period of our life we were deeply mistaken. One should constantly evaluate the present moment. As far as the substantive side of your queston is concerned, I would say that never before has the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it been so tense, so in danger of exploding as it is turning out to be right now.

[Correspondent] Arkadiy Ivanovich, what lies ahead?

[Volskiy] The meeting of the Buro of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the Buro of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee in the CPSU Central Committee, which was attended by Comrades Slyunkov and Chebrikov, members of the Politburo, reassured me. It reassured me a little. The communique they adopted reassured me a little. The declaration that should be adopted in the near future by the republican Supreme Soviets reassured me a little.

One can't help seeing that Nagorno-Karabakh is a bone of contention. It is, you understand, it is a bone of contention in the hands of two great nations. It is not possible, in essence, to reduce the problems that have arisen between Armenia and Azerbaijan to Karabakh. That is not correct. When passions were raging and people were driving one another out there was none of that here. Here both the Azerbaijani people and the Armenian people were working peacefully and getting along. We relate with respect, on an equal level, to the Azerbaijani people and to the Armenian people, but the state cannot remain idle when blood is being spilled. For that reason we are obliged to use both internal forces and other forces we have at our disposal. All these are preventitive measures. Sometimes urgent measures are necessary; it is necessary to react, as it were, to something that has happened, but the most important thing is that the republics find steps toward reconciliation.

Azerbaijan Party Aide Views NKAO Problems

PM1509141789 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 25 Aug 89 p 2

[AZERINFORM report: "Visit to Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast"]

[Text] On 23-24 August V.P. Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, met in Shusha with the rayon's public and settlers from Armenia and Stepanakert.

A wide range of problems connected with the events in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] was discussed. Comrade V.P. Polyanichko spoke about the measures which the Communist Party Central Committee and the Azerbaijan Government are adopting with a view to normalizing the situation in the region and securing priority objectives in the republic's socioeconomic development.

The meeting participants spoke with alarm about the fact that the situation in the NKAO is not stabilizing and the unlawful actions of extremists, kindling interethnic strife and complicating the situation, are continuing. The implementation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the economic development of the NKAO is poor, and the funds allocated for this purpose are not being assimilated. There are many instances of the violation of the constitutional rights of Azerbaijanis living in the oblast. They have still not been reinstated in their jobs. Measures have not been taken to clear up the crimes that have been committed. Communications between Azerbaijani villages in the oblast have been disrupted, and their supply of electricity and essential goods has been cut off.

The meeting participants demanded that people guilty of kindling interethnic strife be made answerable for their actions, the constitutional rights of the Azerbaijani section of the population restored as quickly as possible, and law and order in the oblast reinforced.

Comrade V.P. Polyanichko also visited the village Kirkidzhan in Askeranskiy Rayon where he met with inhabitants and discussed questions of concern to them.

Georgians in Azerbaijan Appeal to USSR Deputies

NC1509093189 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] Appeal by Georgians who live in Azerbaijan's Kakh Rayon to the USSR people's deputies:

We have been deeply worried by the interethnic disputes in various parts of the country. These disputes may become a serious obstacle to the reconstruction course and to the revolutionary reformation of our people. Like all the residents of the republic, we have been greatly concerned by the incidents in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. Azerbaijanis and Russians, Ukrainians and Armenians, Miskhetians and [word indistinct], and Kurds and [word indistinct] have lived and worked on our fertile soil as a family. They have shared each other's joys and sorrows like brothers. The Georgians who live in Azerbaijan have never harbored nationalist feelings against [word indistinct]. In view of this, the intentions of those who have plotted against the well-being, peace, and territorial integrity of the republic have inflicted pain in our hearts. [Passage indistinct]

What right do the nationalist forces have to create an artificial problem like that of the NKAO and then demand that it should be resolved? The blood of dozens of people has been spilled because of the guilty acts committed by these forces. Meanwhile, the republic's residents have been deprived of tranquillity. However, what is more tragic is that it is the children who suffer from the instigation of interethnic discord. Allowing them to be influenced by the bitter experience of harboring malicious feelings against other peoples cannot be permitted. Allowing them to regard words like internationalism and brotherhood as insubstantial and meaningless cannot be permitted.

We are convinced that law and order must be established in the NKAO and that the malicious objectives of nationalist and extremist forces must be obstructed in order to restore normal life in the republic and strengthen interethnic relations in the region. Wasting time and allowing the dispute that has been created between the two neighboring peoples to turn into an unbridgeable chasm cannot be permitted.

The effort made to divide the community and stir people up against each other because of their national identity cannot be allowed. It is the general effort made within the framework of the reconstruction course that will suffer from this.

Mikhail Gorbachev was absolutely right to say in his speech on central television that the demand for a united effort for improving work in all areas of the reconstruction course is gradually becoming more and more important. We, who (?support) this view, demand that just and resolute measures be taken to establish law and order in the NKAO and restore normal life.

We hope that the USSR people's deputies will respond to our appeal.

Azerbaijan's Vezirov Receives Visiting General

NC1509094589 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0340 GMT 15 Sep 89

[From the Republican Press Review]

[Text] Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, received General Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, who visited

Azerbaijan on 13 September. During the meeting, General Lizichev explained the restructuring situation in the Soviet Armed Forces and the vanguard role of the political workers of the Soviet Army and Navy in the restructuring process.

Vezirov noted that the republic's leaders have always focused attention on the further broadening and deepening of relations between the people and the command headquarters of the military units in Azerbaijan and on the strengthening of the training that is given to the young men in military patriotism and internationalism.

Vezirov and Ayaz Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, attended General Lizichev's meeting with the party aktivs of the Baku garrison on 14 September. The newspapers reported on the meeting on their front pages.

Reader Proposes Abolition of Republican Parties

PM0509150889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Sep 89 Second Edition p 1

[Letter from A. Nanayenko in Frunze under the rubric "We Discuss the Nationalities Question": "'Personally, I Think...'"]

[Text] The draft CPSU platform proclaims the impermissibility of breaking down the CPSU into nationalities, and at the same time speaks of strengthening the autonomy of republican parties and of the right to adopt (admittedly within the framework of the CPSU Program) political documents reflecting specific national needs and conditions. In present conditions this thesis contains contradictions that could do enormous harm.

Personally, I think: The strengthening of unity and internationalism in the CPSU could be carried out by implementing two principles: 1. The transformation of the CPSU into an integrated unionwide party, without division into national parties. 2. The consistent democratization of intraparty life.

The first principle could be implemented by turning the union republic communist parties into national sections [otdeleniya] of the CPSU. Only an internationalist seeking to build a communist society and acting to that end could be a member of the CPSU—the country's united party.

The second principle could be implemented through the democratic formation of party organs from top to bottom, strict collectiveness in decisionmaking, the compulsory representation of lower party organs in higher organs, and the holding of elections of party leaders at all levels by means of partywide referendums.

A. Nanayenko,

Frunze.

Tajik Party Head Notes Ethnic Issues, Unemployment

PM1509103189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with K.M. Makhkamov, USSR people's deputy and first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Ladin under the rubric "Facets of Interethnic Relations": "Holding Out Our Hands to One Another"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Ladin] Kakhar Makhkamovich, the CPSU draft platform "The Party's Nationalities Policy Under Contemporary Conditions" aroused a great public response within the country, including in your republic. In your opinion, in what way in do you see the draft as innovative?

[Makhkamov] In my view, the main thing is that it takes into consideration an objective analysis of many pressing contradictions in the sphere of interethnic relations along with the supreme complexity of the real situation. It also takes into consideration the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the results of the discussion of these problems at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies and substantiates the need for and the substance of the urgent radical transformations in the Soviet federation. The draft's most important distinguishing feature is the fact that it is targeted on practical actions and the solution of key questions in the development of ethnic relations. I am also convinced that the publication of this important document on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee plenum concentrates the efforts of the party, the soviets, and the entire people on solving problems of tremendous significance for the future of our common homeland—the USSR.

[Ladin] The document voices serious concern and even alarm at the fact that the nationalities question in the country has recently assumed exceptional acuteness. Events took place quite recently in Tajikstan which illustrate that distinctive knots of social tension have also arisen here. I am talking about the events in Isfarinskiy Rayon. They force us to ponder just what is happening on the ancient Tajik land, what is preventing the republic's working people from stepping up the pace of perestroyka by joint efforts?

[Makhkamov] I would like to stress straightaway that the roots of the disturbances that occurred in certain areas of our republic do not lie in interethnic dissension, as some people are in a hurry to imagine. Everything is happening for quite different reasons. But it is a fact that these causes do worsen interethnic relations under certain conditions. The inhabitants of the Tajik "Pravda" Collective Farm [kolkhoz] and the Kirghiz "Aksay" State Farm [sovkhoz] clashed on the boundary between these two farms in Isfarinskiy Rayon. Their dispute revolved around land and water belonging to neighboring farms in Tajikstan and Kirghizia. Suppose both conflicting sides had been represented by people of the same nationality. Wouldn't the same thing have happened? I am sure that even today ethnic hues may not always color quarrels over water and plots of land.

[Ladin] Are we not oversimplifying the problem by reducing everything to a market squabble over the price of strawberries—as people tried to explain the events in Fergana—or to disputes over a plot of land?

[Makhkamov] The great complex problem of the entire Central Asian region lies behind the incident I mentioned. Rising unemployment among the able-bodied population, especially young people, the shortage of a broad range of foodstuffs and housing, restricted opportunities for obtaining plots of land, and the water shortage, which is very noticeable in the hot summer months, are making themselves felt with increasing acuteness in our republic every year. Tajikstan has the country's highest level of natural population increase. It is considerably higher than the all-union average. What is the result of this? Some 1 in 3 able-bodied inhabitants in the countryside are not in regular employment. This means that people who are permanently unemployed on kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and at other enterprises are forced to obtain a means of existence from their income from personal plots of land. But, as I have already said, it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide everyone who so wishes with plots of land since there is virtually no spare land in densely populated areas.

The shortage of jobs is also perceptible in the cities. Matriculants from secondary schools, technical colleges, and higher educational establishments are increasingly frequently encountering the question: Where are we to find work? Hence the uncertainty, hence the discontent and the reflections as to who is to blame for the prevailing complex situation. It is precisely the departmental, bureaucratic, and standardized approach to the republic's needs, as mentioned in the CPSU draft platform, that is to blame. It has indeed taken its toll on everything—from the disposition of productive forces to problems of language, education, and culture. Unfortunately, "advisers" who take advantage of the current complex situation to deliberately incite the population to interethnic conflicts are very quick to appear. The trouble is that party and soviet organs at local level along with Lenin Communist Youth League leaders and activists often only remember their mistakes after slight friction and disputes have already assumed unwanted momentum. This is very disquieting. We are experiencing a complex phase of perestroyka. We still have to overcome considerable difficulties together.

The results we are all dreaming about will indisputably be forthcoming. But they will not come out of the blue. The speed of the changes depends on how persistently and effectively we work and how assiduously and skillfully we manage our entire economy. Acceleration cannot be achieved by other means—for instance, by ultimatums to the government or strikes. That can only seriously retard the process of renewing and improving our entire economy. Short-lived local conflicts in Isfarinskiy Rayon, along with the hooligan outbreaks in Kanibadamskiy Rayon, Leninabad Oblast, have equally distracted the republic's leadership from the important work which has been launched in our Central Asia region since the beginning of this year to resolve the problem of employment for the able-bodied population. The events in Fergana literally dislodged our neighbors from Uzbekistan from the path of perestroyka. As a result joint interrepublic projects "have run into delays."

We are wasting time, and the deadline for the fulfillment of the planned programs is becoming more remote.

[Ladin] Today we are faced with the acute question of the need for radical transformations in the Soviet federation. As is well known, the main idea on which our federation is based is expressed by the following formula: There can be no strong republics without a strong union and no strong union without strong republics. I would like to hear what steps are being taken by the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] to strengthen economic integration and develop the all-union market and economic exchanges between republics?

[Makhkamov] Our republic is located on territory comprising less than 1 percent of the overall territory of the Soviet Union. While its population amounts to only 1.71 percent of the country's population. Nevertheless the significance of the output manufactured within the republic is considerable. We cultivate 10.71 percent of the USSR's overall production of raw cotton and 9.19 percent of the raw silk, and we manufacture 9.05 percent of the carpets and carpet goods produced. We export output from our machine building, ferrous metallurgy, light and food industries to other republics and also supply them with electricity, cement, electrical engineering industry goods, cable output, and domestic appliances and machines.

In turn we obtain a great deal from the fraternal republics. We have developed our closest economic ties with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics. That is a correct line which consolidates society on an internationalist basis and on the all-union and general human values of perestroyka mentioned in the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics. It is in the interests of all peoples to develop and strengthen cooperation and the unity of our state.

However, by no means all the opportunities for cooperation have been brought to fruition. This was also mentioned at the spring meeting of the chairmen of the councils of ministers of the Central Asia republics and Kazakhstan. Concrete proposals regarding the development of interrepublic ties were subsequently discussed at a meeting in Alma-Ata of the leaders of planning organs. They elaborated proposals for our ministries and departments regarding the organization of exchanges of output, creating joint enterprises, placing orders using neighbors' production capacities, and holding joint wholesale trade fairs.

[Ladin] That can probably be regarded as important elements in the future cooperation between economically independent republics?

[Makhkamov] And as the very first steps in the quest for new forms of economic activity. But that is not the only thing. A regional system of interlinkage in all spheres of public and economic activity may provide a sharp boost in implementing the planned programs for improving the population's life. The latter is becoming more mobile. It is becoming possible to react rapidly to current situations without waiting for decisions from the center, as often happens now.

But relations between the union republics will only be fully renewed and fuller in content after they obtain full economic autonomy. Tajikstan is switching to self-management and self-financing as of 1991. Wide-ranging preparations for this important event lie ahead. A representative commission is currently working in the republic to draft the corresponding proposals. The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee wholly supports the idea of regional economic accountability for the future and is channeling its efforts into achieving concerted action on the part of the republic's State Planning Committee [Gosplan] and Ministry of Finance along with the State Agro-Industrial Committee, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, and other interested departments in solving the tasks facing us in the new conditions of economic autonomy.

[Ladin] All the same, what can radically influence the reduction in the number of the unemployed able-bodied population? This question also worries young people in the army, who will have to return to their home areas, including Tajikstan, after their army service. It is well known that agricultural workers from China are working in some areas of our country, in particular, in Kirghizia, Tajikstan's neighbor. There is at the same time a surplus work force in some areas of the country. However, there are no obstacles, for instance, to Tajik farmers setting up their farms on deserted land and abandoned villages and farms in Russia and on disused land in Kazakhstan and Siberia. Mutually beneficial interrepublic agreements are probably possible on this score?

[Makhkamov] One important measure to create the requisite jobs will be the development of an orchard and vineyard complex in the republic and potato farming in mountain regions. An additional 250,000 people—mainly rural inhabitants—will be provided with work under the projected program by the year 2000. The state funds allocated for this are being assimilated.

New jobs should also be provided by the intrarepublic program for the development of medium and small cities and the construction of new enterprises and subsidiaries of major industrial enterprises in the countryside and in areas with the greatest accumulation of available manpower resources. The republic's Gosplan is elaborating a concept to afford most-favored status to those ministries and departments that want to site ecologically clean production units on the republic's territory oriented toward the processing of raw cotton and silk, vegetables, and fruit.

Talking about the experience of moving people from their native villages to new areas, it is worth pointing out that it only produces positive results when the requisite conditions are created for people: well-equipped housing, medical services, children's establishments, and the opportunity to work the land fully equipped and in a contemporary fashion. Their customary living environment along with the preservation of the traditional life style and customs are also important for people....

There is a shortage of land in our republic, but in some areas there is an abundance of it. We have conscientious people who could cultivate orchards and vineyards on land leased by the republic and produce feed crops for the development of livestock raising.

Thus, for instance, Kalinin Oblast has leased 30,000 hectares of fertile land to Tajikstan. Our republic will cultivate feed crops and vegetables here which will then be delivered to Tajik cities and villages.

There are also other matters of equal importance for the republic. It is paradoxical but we do have a situation whereby, on the one hand, we have a large number of unemployed while, on the other, we have a shortage of thousands of construction workers. This is despite the fact that a considerable proportion of Tajikstan's young people serve in military construction units and generally return to their home areas. But they do not become construction workers at home. Obviously they are drawn toward the land and the work to which they have been accustomed since childhood. We are thus glad of qualified specialists—construction workers. Whatever nationality they may be.

[Ladin] I would like to broach a question which was also reflected in the new draft party platform. The USSR Armed Forces are formed on a multiethnic basis. Proceeding on this premise, all citizens, irrespective of nationality, must perform their military service in accordance with all-union laws. But the following problem arises here. Not all draftees have identical opportunities for rapidly adapting to new conditions and successfully mastering the whole gamut of knowledge and skills included in the program for training a military specialist. The linguistic barrier and poor general educational and physical training are the main stumbling blocks characteristic of draftees from the Central Asian republics, including Tajikstan. From the results of last year's draft, for instance, no draftee from Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast was sent to the Rocket Forces, the Navy, the Airborne Forces, or to Air Force subunits.

[Makhkamov] A great deal has been done of late to change the situation for the better. Coordinating councils providing military-patriotic and international education for young people have been set up and are functioning under the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, and oblast, city, and rayon party committees. Important decisions were adopted at a meeting of the republic's party aktiv which examined measures to radically restructure young people's military-patriotic education and their preparation for service in the Armed Forces. These decisions are being implemented consistently. For instance, with regard to the language problem. A Tajik SSR Council of Ministers ruling has set up an experimental laboratory to develop spoken Tajik and Russian. Experimentalist-teacher G. Shmelev's manual has been published to help Russian-language teachers working with younbg people of predraft and draft age. Training of young draftees with a poor knowledge of the Russian language and inadequate physical fitness is being conducted successfully at special monthly meetings prior to the draft.

Up to 500 young men from Tajikstan, of whom more than 300 are indigenous nationals, have entered military-educational establishments in recent years. We hope that the USSR Defense Ministry will deem it possible to open a Suvorov Military School in Dushanbe. The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's government are prepared to offer all manner of assistance.

One must however acknowledge that there are indeed a considerable number of shortcomings in the work to prepare young people for army service in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. A session of the republic Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has examined this question and has taken resolute steps.

Many painful problems have been raised during the republic-wide discussion of the draft CPSU platform on nationalities policy. By actively involving the republic's party organizations, soviets, and public organizations in this discussion we are endeavoring to ensure that the in-depth and committed discussion now under way provides a good ideological boost to preparations for the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Akhromeyev on Military Doctrine, Forces Reduction

LD1509105889 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] In the nineties the Soviet Union intends to scrupulously comply with the military defense doctrine and have minimum armed forces. That has been stated by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev an advisor of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In an interview for the press he expressed firm belief that the threat of war between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Treaty countries does not exist. Our goal, said the marshal, is to see that the nineties become the years when political means prevail in ensuring the security of countries with different social systems. Sergey Akhromeyev recalled that the Soviet Union has recently announced a 30 billion ruble cut in its military budget for the years from 1987 through 1990. He also said the country will seek a radical reduction of the ground and air forces of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries at the talks in Vienna.

KGB Deputy Chairman on Visits to Closed Cities

PM1409154989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[Reply to reader's letter by F. Bobkov, deputy chairman of the KGB, under the rubric "At Your Request": "Send an Invitation"; first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "I have a friend who lives in the GDR. We have been corresponding for over 15 years and I have been to visit her. I consider it my duty to invite my friend and her husband and daughter to visit me in Gorkiy. But our city is still 'closed' to friends, even if they are from other socialist countries.
"[Signed] L. Obidina, Gorkiy."

F. Bobkov, deputy chairman of the KGB, answers the reader's question at the request of the editorial office:

So the Gorkiy Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration Visas and Registration Department has informed me, L. Obidina did not submit an official application to invite her friend from the GDR.

By way of information, we report that under the Helsinki Final Act, member states can establish regions closed to foreign visitors for security reasons, in accordance with internal legislation.

The list of cities and regions in the USSR closed to foreign visitors was confirmed by a USSR Council of Ministers resolution. The list is now being reexamined with a view to shortening it. At the same time, the fact of a particular region in the country being closed does not mean that it is impossible for a foreigner to visit relatives and friends living there. If L. Obidina applies to the militia organs where she lives in accordance with the existing procedure, there will be no objections from the KGB organs as regards her inviting her friend's family from the GDR.

Official Predicts No Immediate Results From Reform

LD1509092189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1740 GMT on 14 September broadcasts a 10-minute interview with V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social problems, by N.S. Yakovchuk, deputy chief editor of EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA.

Yakovchuk says the interview pertains to the issue of unemployment, something which has always existed but which was not referred to as such. He notes that unemployment will become more of a problem as enterprises switch to financial autonomy and will realize the need to increase efficiency. He says that policies for dealing with unemployment cannot be finalized until the USSR Supreme Soviet has approved the plan.

In response to a question on the recent wave of strikers' demands, Shcherbakov says that there must be a new interpretation of the concept of social justice, elaborating that, "It is not clear what the chief goal is, from the point of view of social justice. What do we want from today's perestroyka, for there to be no poor people? For there to be no rich people?" Concerning the Donbass strikers' demands that all cooperatives to be shut and that the mines' managerial staff should take a cut in wages, Shcherbakov notes, "For some reason, everyone—I think it is a general delusion—thinks perestroyka, especially in the transitional period, should of necessity bring about a rise in the standard of living. Both at the Congress of People's Deputies and at the Supreme Soviet session the criterion of perestroyka was considered to be one and the same: There is no meat; people are not living any better."

Detailing the immediate future of perestroyka, Shcherbakov says, "During perestroyka's transitional period in particular, the population's standard of living as a whole may even fall. There are, of course, ways to tackle this problem. We think they should be tackled by drawing up special consumer baskets for each stratum of the population, for each group of the population. We are currently working out such baskets." Shcherbakov notes further that the market deficits make any such measures problematic and the final solution must be to provide social welfare guarantees for certain strata of the population to protect them from such market factors.

In returning the interview to the issue of strikes, Shcherbakov comments that the whole system of party, trade union, economic, and legal training has been continuing in the same fashion as it was 10 or 20 years ago, insofar as people have not been taught from where their money comes. They continue to believe their earnings depend not on their own labor locally, but on what the government will give them. He says that an economic mechanism must be developed to ensure the individual has both the incentive to work harder and is able to perceive the result of that hard work. Shcherbakov says that "the most dreadful thing is not that the reform itself may not yield very great results, but that such a reform can very easily be turned back" when it is implemented only at the level of managers and directors. He concludes by saying that once economic reform has penetrated deep in the consciousness of each individual worker, it cannot be turned back.

New Restrictions on Consumer Goods Exports Cited

PM1509084789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "What Can Be Exported? At the USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for State Customs Control"]

[Text] In connection with the existing shortage of goods on the domestic market the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the resolution "On Measures To Regulate Consumer Goods Exports From the USSR" 30 August 1989. The document streamlines previous normative acts relating to exports of goods by foreign citizens who are in the USSR as tourists or on personal business or are transiting Soviet territory.

It is laid down that these citizens cannot export articles made of precious metals or precious stones, domestic electrical equipment and electronics, construction materials and tools, car spares, knitting machines, vacuum cleaners, all kinds of fabrics, children's clothing and footwear, real leather clothing, carpets, fur goods, linen and knitwear, crockery and tableware, bed and table linen, medicines, sanitation and hygiene products, perfumes and cosmetics, foreign goods, coffee, cocoa, tea, caviar, and salmon roe.

The aforesaid consumer goods and foodstuffs cannot be dispatched by international mail from the USSR by Soviet or foreign citizens.

The total value of other goods acquired in the USSR should not exceed R100 in retail prices operating in our country. The total value of goods mailed from the USSR should not exceed R30 per package.

Citizens permanently resident abroad who are working in the USSR (including at embassies, trade missions, and international organizations) or studying at educational establishments can take out of the country not more than one item each of domestic electrical equipment and electronics, refrigerators and freezers, sewing, knitting, and washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and cameras for their families in the course of 1 year. These persons are not allowed to take out cocoa, coffee, tea, caviar, or salmon roe.

There are no restrictions on consumer goods acquired in the USSR at specialized stores and organizations trading in foreign currency under the established procedure.

The regulation measures stipulated by the USSR Council of Ministers resolution come into force as of 15 September 1989. They are temporary and will be applied as part of the current "Regulations Governing the Import and Export To and From the USSR of Goods, Currency, and Valuables by Citizens."

Customs institutions are entitled until 1 October this year to apply the previous provisions on cross-border movements of goods to foreign citizens entering the USSR before 15 September this year.

Drug Statistics 'Still Alarming' Despite Decline

*PM1409143389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 6*

[Report by V. Zaykin: "Drug Addiction on the Decline"]

[Text] The militia's fight against drug addiction was the theme of the latest briefing on 5 September at the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry.

Internal affairs organs' heightened activity to stop the production and sale of drugs and also to prevent their use appears to be starting to produce results. There have been small but promising advances. There has been some increase in the detection of crimes associated with the sale of drugs. There has been a reduction in the quantity of drugs in illegal circulation, as evidenced by the increase in "black market" prices of the most popular types—on average 100-200 percent. In the first half of 1989 13,000 people stopped using drugs, as a result of educational measures and voluntary or compulsory treatment.

But the statistics are still alarming.

At present there are 121,700 registered users of drugs for nonmedical reasons. Some 60,000 of them are seriously ill. Some 1,240 people have been forcibly hospitalized after declining voluntary treatment.

The temptation to get involved in the drugs business is growing with each passing year. One can get rich too quickly. Only 8-10 years ago, it was noted at the briefing, the underworld price of a kilogram of opium fluctuated between R5,000 and R6,000. Now it is nearly... R100,000.

So a considerable number of the internal affairs organs' measures are geared to destroying illegal hemp and poppy crops, and also wild plants containing narcotics. For example, 1,442 illegal crops were found and destroyed and 2,700 hectares of wild plants were eliminated in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan this year. Thus, in this region alone, the militia has prevented drugs worth R1.3 million from coming onto the "black market." Similar measures, combined with an extensive press campaign, are being taken in Amur Oblast and especially in Turkmenia, where centuries-old traditions are having to be destroyed in the fight against drug addiction.

The wave of offenses committed by officials and people in charge of materials in the public health system shows no signs of abating. This year the police have uncovered 1,130 cases of malfeasance, resulting in the illegal sale of preparations containing narcotics. Thefts of ampoules of morphine and promedole and also omnopon powder, which criminals use as raw material for the manufacture of drugs, are particularly frequent.

The fight against crime has uncovered a number of negative trends. It has been established that the number of users of powerful medical and psychotropic drugs is increasing. More than 70 percent of the people in this category are inhabitants of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, particularly of those areas where there is no raw material base for the manufacture of drugs. The destructive craze is becoming more and more widespread among young people. Underground laboratories with connections in other regions have been discovered in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kirov.

The representatives of the international affairs organs stated that the fight against drug addiction could be much more effective if there were a statewide program, involving interested ministries and departments in the militia's work.

Vorkuta Coal Miners' Demands Examined

*PM1509084189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 3*

[Report by own correspondent V. Filipov: "A Passion for Ultimatums. Why Did the Managers of the 'Vorkutaugol' Association Set Up a Strike Committee?"]

[Text] Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]—At the Komi ASSR Council of Ministers, where Moscow writer Aleksey Ivanov and I called in on the road to Vorkuta, we were greeted with considerable irony: It's a bit late, they said, to be hurrying to see the Arctic miners. They stopped striking 26 July. Their demands have been met, the coal is flowing again, and there is no sign of friction with the departments... So what are you going to write about?

If that is the case, then the departments have carried out a radical perestroyka of their work since the "miners' lesson." Now isn't that a theme for an article! That is why we landed on the 67th parallel, in the city whose name means "Bear's Den" in Nenets.

...V. Dudko, chairman of Vorkuta City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom], was obviously not in the mood for reporters: He had been on the telephone all morning—the "Khalmer-Yu" mine had stopped dispatching coal. It looks like the passenger train linking Vorkuta with the settlement of Khalmer-Yu, 70 kilometers away in the direction of the Kara Sea, is about to break down.

In the measures relating to the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the miners' demands it says that this train is to be supplied with three new cars. The Ministry of Railways supplied the cars, but they were made in the fifties.

A. Oreshkin, general director of the "Vorkutaugol" Association, was just as unsuccessful as the gorispolkom chairman in his efforts to ensure the proper implementation of the government resolution:

"Minister Konarev told me that he has no new cars at the moment, but there may be some by the end of the year. Moreover, he did not even know that the point referring to the Ministry of Railways was in the resolution! I asked Komi Party Oblast Committee [obkom] First Secretary Yu. Spiridonov, through the CPSU Central Committee, for example, to influence the ministers who are supposed to implement the measures of this government resolution.

A warm train is absolutely vital for an Arctic route. But it is equally important to consider why even now the miners are literally having to wrench from the ministries that which is theirs by right. So the strikes which have stunned the people have not even stirred the department's foundations?

Indeed, everything is still as before: the "lower ranks" of the economy make reports and put in requests, while the "higher echelons" punish or pardon. But if the miners press their main demand—the right to independently sell part of the coal at contract prices and decide for themselves the form of ownership of the means of production—it will mean an end to sergeant major-type attitudes in the economy.

Despite the strength of the miners' resolve to fight for their rights, let us be objective: An enterprise cannot be made truly independent .by order from on high or through ultimatums. It takes comprehensive technical and economic preparations which can only be made by experts who are familiar with local production features. In other words, the fate of the miners' chief demand is now also in the hands of the economic managers and specialists of the "Vorkutaugol" Association.

What do the production commanders see as their task? On 4 August, in the republic paper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA, they published an appeal which was then conveyed to the USSR Supreme Soviet with the help of People's Deputy V. Lushnikov. But one seeks in vain in the document for even a word about the consolidation of specialists with the workers, without which the perestroyka of economic relations, hastened on by the strike, will get bogged down again. The appeal is full of grievances against the press, radio, and television, which are allegedly blaming the technical intelligentsia for most of the people's problems; against the workers, who, at the "center's" bidding, are expressing a lack of confidence in their economic chief; and, finally, against M. Gorbachev, whose utterances local leaders regard as an attempt to blame them for the slow progress of perestroyka...

"The appeal was unanimously adopted at conferences of economic managers and specialists of all coal industry enterprises in Vorkuta and Inta," A. Oreshkin announced. "We have the right to demand trust. Take a close look at the Council of Ministers resolution—all it contains is problems that are being tackled by Moscow. Does this not mean that here, in the Arctic, we were not sitting twiddling our thumbs prior to the strike!"

Concerning unanimity Anatoliy Vladimirovich is evasive. Specialists at the "Vorgashorskaya" Mine, many of whom, like mine director O. Bobrov, were elected by the collective, refused point-blank to back the appeal. They have other problems: preparing the mine for full economic independence before 1 January, as decided by the workers' trade union conference. In fact it, the field's biggest enterprise, would do well to leave the "Vorkutaugol" Association, when the need for it, for the association, becomes very problematical.

I would gladly be proved wrong, but I see no other reason for the managers' public action than a desire to keep their lucrative jobs. At the "Vorgashorskaya" Mine, for example, the strike committee identified around 100 managerial posts which, given economic accountability, there would be no point having: "grade 1 production management engineer," "management inspector," "senior labor discipline inspector," "shift accident prevention chief"... The at first glance innocent appeal by the managers (pluralism of opinions, for all that) could be a stumbling block for all mines marching to independence.

Dividing up the business according to position held, demarcating functions, settling grievances and then settling scores with enemies... How familiar this sounds in terms of our recent history. Do you think I am being dramatic? The technical engineering personnel at the "Oktyabrskaya" Mine set up their own strike committee to spite the workers, and they intend to put forward their own package of demands. This is a response of local significance, so to speak. But here is the first reaction to the appeal from outside: The leaders and specialists of the "Sakhalinugol" Production Association sent a letter to Vorkuta, expressing "total and complete" support for their Arctic colleagues' attitude toward the workers and the government. Is it only on Sakhalin Island that this managerial apparatus appeal is rallying people of like mind?

General director A. Oreshkin was also being evasive when he talked about the "purely Moscow" cause of the strike. For example, of the 23 demands put forward by the "Khalmer-Yu" miners in July only 8 related to the government's jurisdiction. The local leadership, including the mine director, had quite enough authority to tackle the others.

The Vorkuta leaders' inertia has long since ceased to be an economic issue. It is a political issue. But the professional politicians on the party city committee [gorkom] remain silent, as if it were a taboo issue. There are regular bureau sessions and various questions are discussed—right down to late payment of membership dues. But there is no open party discussion of the events which shook the city. Are they waiting, as usual, for an authoritative opinion from the party oblast committee [obkom]? But it has also been busy "preparing the strike issue for the bureau"...

In an interview for the paper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA (19 August) Vorkuta Party Gorkom First Secretary V. Serdyukov did, in fact, express a personal opinion on the impotence of certain anonymous leaders who got "drowned" in the mighty waves of the strike. But the "top man's" ambiguous position merely intensified mine party organizations' critical attitude toward the gorkom apparatus. At their conference the workers are expressing distrust of the current official political leaders of Vorkuta. That must be why V. Serdyukov, in conversation with us on 22 August, rejected the piece: He said that the journalists had taken liberties with his ideas and had published the interview without his permission. (I will refrain from describing the feelings I had a few days later when I was at the KRASNAYA ZNAMYA editorial office leafing through the original interview, with the corrections in V. Serdyukov's hand, and I heard my colleagues say that Valeriy Pavlovich had personally delivered the manuscript to Syktyvkar, where he had handed it to the paper via party obkom press sector chief R. Bikhert).

When those who are called the "servants of the people" are confused, the people themselves get down to work. In the tiny dressmaking classroom in the miners' Palace of Culture, which became the home of the city workers (strike) committee, the two telephones were ringing virtually nonstop. People were calling after despairing of obtaining the help or at least the sympathy of state institutions.

The strike committee cannot, of course, provide an apartment (while thousands of Vorkuta people who mine the coking coal that is invaluable to industry are still suffering in the converted barracks of Stalin's former camps), repair a dilapidated roof, or stop all bad practices in trade. But what the strike committee can do for people is to promptly investigate the facts and name the guilty officials in the pages of the city newspaper ZAPLOYARYE. Many of the things that have been done under the counter for many years have now been dragged out into the open by the miners. That is why they have the trust and supoport of the Vorkuta people. Many members of mines' strike committees have already been elected to party and trade union committees and labor collectives' councils.

But the city's leaders are unhappy about the miners' political independence. The journalists of ZAPOLYARYE have been castigated more than once at the party gorkom for publishing city strike committee materials. The committee itself has been outlawed: The city soviet executive committee refused to register it, citing Komi ASSR Justice Minister G. Rukavishnikov's view that there can be no power in the country other than the soviets.

"They are doing their darnedest to disband us," was strike committee chairman and miner at the "Yun-Yaga" Mine V. Gobrusev's view of the situation. "But, despite the fact that we are not recognized by the city authorities, we will work until we have carried out the task entrusted to us by the miners: We will ensure the fulfillment of all the demands laid down in the Council of Ministers resolution. We can see that even now certain forces in the capital's departments and in Vorkuta are endeavoring to prevent this. It is obvious why: So that the miners, angered by the stalling of the perestroyka process, will vent their wrath on M. Gorbachev and N. Ryzhkov. It will not happen—we will not let it!"

Novosibirsk Law Agency Officials Reprimanded

PM1509074389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Sep 89 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee"]

[Text] The results of checks on the work of the Communist leaders of Novosibirsk Oblast law-enforcement organs in carrying out the CPSU Central Committee resolutions on resolutely stepping up the fight against crime and strengthening socialist law and order have been examined at a session of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. Leaders of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs from Novosibirsk Oblast, the city of Novosibirsk, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and representatives of the press were invited to the session.

There has recently been a sharp rise in crime in the oblast, particularly among second-offenders and juveniles. Crimes have become more daring and dangerous, and are increasingly committed by organized groups. More than half of all violations of the law and the bulk of serious crime is committed in Novosibirsk City.

Despite the deteriorating situation, Communists A.A. Kashutin and G.G. Shugarov, chiefs of the oblast and city internal affairs administrations respectively, failed to organize a resolute rebuff for the dangerous manifestations of crime. The activities of the criminal investigation services and the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation have been weakened, there has been no campaign against organized crime, and there have been numerous cases of crimes being covered up but few cases of crimes being uncovered. The work of the party committee at the oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom] internal affairs administration (Secretary Comrade A.V. Nikolayenko) has been extremely unsatisfactory. Demandingness toward cadres has been reduced and the professional standard of militia staffers is poor. Oblast Prosecutor Comrade V.P. Vlasov, a Communist, has not been properly supervising the activities of internal affairs organs, strengthening legality, or protecting citizens' rights.

Comrade I.I. Indinok, chairman of Novosibirsk City Soviet Executive Committee, and Comrade V.S. Kasaurov, deputy chairman of the oblispolkom, have been complacent and slow in reacting, failed to use every opportunity to organize the fight against crime, and did not mobilize the public and labor collectives. The oblast party committee [obkom] (Secretary Comrade A.I. Zhuchkov), while adopting a number of correct decisions on the questions of the work of Communists at law-enforcement organs, failed to carry out the necessary organizational work or to ensure proper monitoring of the fulfillment of such work.

The CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee has issued strict party reprimands to the Communist leaders of the oblast and city law-enforcement organs for the serious shortcomings in their work. The statements by the leaders of the obkom, oblispolkom, and law-enforcement organs that they will implement resolute measures to improve the situation in the city and the oblast and to report the results to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee were placed on record.

New Sociopolitical Journal To Appear Jan 1990

LD1409225289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] From January 1990 a new sociopolitical magazine of the CPSU Central Committee DIALOG will come to replace the magazines POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE and AGITATOR. It will cover topical problems in the renewal of socialism, the activities of the party and the theory and practice of perestroyka in a popular, discussion, polemical form and it will take into consideration, as far as possible, the readers' needs and will answer their questions using the language of argument, comparison and proof. The new magazine has been called upon to work in a different manner, preserving and increasing all of the best things which were present in its predecessors. DIALOG is intended for a wide circle of readers.

KGB Investigators Charge Voronezh Armed Gang

PM1509094189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "In USSR KGB"]

[Text] The investigation into the criminal case of A.V. Zapevalov and others, seven people in all, has ended in the KGB administration for Voronezh Oblast. During the process of investigation a large quantity of rifled weapons was confiscated from them.

The preliminary investigation organs charged Zapevalov and his accomplices with organizing an armed gang which pursued the aim of attacking militiamen and servicemen to acquire weapons and also enterprises, institutions, and individual citizens with a view to robbery; they were also charged with murdering two women for selfish purposes and of preparing to hijack an aircraft and leave the country illegally.

The case has been passed on for examination by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Correction to 'Kryuchkov Cited on KGB Film'

LD1409113989

The following correction pertains to an item that appeared on page 73 in the 13 September Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the subhead 'Kryuchkov Cited on KGB Film, Role':

paragraph one, last sentence should read: ...in the USSR Foreign Ministry press center.... (changing "Internal" to "Foreign");

paragraph two, sentence two should read: ...and tragedies. It also handles government communications and guards the... (replacing "link" with "communications" and rewording);

paragraph four, sentence one should read ...of other countries. However, this belongs to the past. Now that certain kinds of crime have crossed the borders of one country, combating them successfully... (rewording and adding sentence).

Economic

Resolutions Needed To End Social Stratification

PM1409103789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 1

[E. Gonzalyez article under the rubric "Statistics and Our Commentary": "From Hand to Mouth"]

[Text] Everybody says that life is getting harder and harder based on the statistical data on average per capita incomes. Had this been the sole, or at least the main indicator of prosperity, there would obviously be no cause for alarm.

In 1980, 7.3 percent of the population had a total average income under R50 per month. Last year's percentage was 2.9. The trend toward declining proportions of low-income people in society is maintained, with income increasing up to the R125 bracket. It is hard to describe incomes above this level as low, and the percentages start rising slowly at the beginning, and steadily faster as you go up the scale. For example, incomes between R200 and R250 were enjoyed in 1980, 1985, and 1988 by 4.1 percent, 6.9 percent, and 10.1 percent of the population respectively. The figures for incomes above R250 were 1.3, 4.0, and 7.1 percent.

Generally speaking, the average annual growth rate of per capita incomes (labor remuneration, pensions, stipends, subsidies and benefits, earnings in kind from personal subsidiary farms, and so on) increased from 2.5 percent in the 11th 5-Year Plan period to 4.2 percent in the 12th. And while fighters for social justice fought their apparent enemy—the cooperative members—the ranks of highly paid working people "camouflaged" as ordinary consumers kept swelling in the rear. For the first time ever, the number of persons with a monthly income above R200 exceeded the number of low-income persons with incomes below R75.

Thus, whether we like it or not, stratification according to the level of average total per capita income is proceeding apace, and in all probability no other social problem is as widespread as this in all strata of society and in all regions of the country.

For example, according to estimates by the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the USSR State Committee for Statistics, last year we had 41 million persons (14.5 percent) with incomes below the poverty line (R78). But republican figures were 6.3 percent in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], 3.6 percent in Lithuania, 36.6 percent in Turkmenistan, 44.7 percent in Uzbekistan, and 58.6 percent in Tajikistan. Let me repeat: The number of low-income persons in all republics has been declining for years. But at different rates.

Recently there have been frequent debates about the contribution made by particular republics to the common wealth, and suspicions have emerged that some people take out of it more than they put in, that some live at the expense of others. Different suggestions for accounting methodologies have already been published, and a scientific foundation is being laid for this work which is new for us.

Really now, are we not succumbing to transient moods, which will make us feel ashamed later on? Is it altogether necessary to make estimates? Does a republic represent a single consumer who has to drink, eat, and be clothed as an equal among equals? This may be so theoretically but, in practical terms, how do you compare the living standards of one wage earner with two dependents (Central Asia and Azerbaijan) with those of two wage earning family members with one dependent (the Baltic republics, Belorussia, the RSFSR)? If comparisons are to be made, then let's compare families rather than republics. For example, a family with a per capita income below R75 spends more than one-half of its cash on food and puts almost nothing aside for a "rainy" day. Look at another family, with income in excess of R200, which spends less than one-third on food and puts over 13 percent into accumulations. Such families are to be found in all republics, but in proportions which are totally beyond comparison.

And who would take it on himself to determine which family is more prosperous and happier—the one with seven children, or the one with three savings accounts—one for dad, one for mom, and one for the sole family progeny? Each family consciously or intuitively chooses its own happiness. All we have to do is take that choice into account when organizing production and daily life.

Something which, incidentally, is hardly ever done. And this is precisely why the availability of housing in Tajikistan is 1.5 times lower than the average for the country and in the RSFSR, and 2 times lower than in Lithuania, Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, and Estonia. Just imagine the clamor if some republic is overlooked in the distribution of, say, motor cars for sale. But this is right, despite the fact that the average deposit in Armenia's savings banks is double that in Tajikistan. Housing anomalies are that much more undesirable—you can't join even a housing construction cooperative with minuscule accumulations and large families.

In October, following the introduction of pension supplements according to a USSR Supreme Soviet decision, the number of low-income persons will be reduced severalfold. But evidently not by all that much, since pensioners account for only one-fifth of the population with incomes below R75. The remainder are large or young families living mainly in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Obviously, social policy ought to somehow take this distribution into account. But statistical reports give no indication of how this is done in practice.

A store specializing in goods at socially reduced prices—this term is now used in our country—recently opened in Alma-Ata. In the first place, however, the store is geared mainly to pensioners and persons disabled through industrial injury or congenitally. Secondly, the first consignment of cheap goods was put together from stocks held by all the other stores, and nobody has the slightest idea where future supplies will come from—enterprises are doing nothing beyond giving assurances of their complete readiness, and produce nothing specially for such stores.

A general reflection suggests itself at this point. Why is it that changes for the better occur so slowly and so imperceptibly? It is true that we make only half-hearted decisions. It is also true that there are many mistakes in almost everything. But perhaps the paramount factor is this: All too often we end up with imitation of work rather than the real thing. This, in my opinion, is what happened to the venture with goods at socially reduced prices. It was obvious to economic managers from the very beginning that industry was not likely to produce such goods (or of acceptable quality in any case), while the trade network would limit itself to one or two stores (going into oxygen tents, as it were). Once again, an imitation solution to the problem.

As I see it, the same purpose was served by the attempt to control price rises by means of resolutions. The result is that, during the first quarter of this year, expenditure in the RSFSR increased by an average of 6 percent on food, and by 14 percent on the acquisition of industrial goods by workers and employees (the growth was significantly less for collective farm members). Naturally, market prices also shot up.

What is to be done, what is to be done? Numerous specific proposals were made at the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet session. This is why I shall limit myself to a general observation: The stratification of society according to income has already reached a level which makes it altogether impossible to ignore when pursuing social policies. Low-income families' expenditure on food is almost one-half that of the average family's expenditure. And their expenditure on the acquisition of nonfood goods is just one-third. Figures show that per capita food consumption has started declining in the RSFSR (this trend cannot be ruled out in other republics, either).

Of course, income differentiation makes it necessary to start thinking about price differentiation, about ensuring that every person regardless of income can consume the necessary minimum at firm and accessible prices, and anything over and above that at commercial prices. But subject to one mandatory condition: Funds earned as a result of this should be channeled only into the development of consumption. And nowhere else.

Actually, this is just one more of the multitude of possible suggestions prompted by impartial statistics.

Ruble Conversion Requires Four Major Stages

LD1509101989 Moscow TASS in English 0955 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Only by making the ruble freely convertible can the Soviet Union create an open economy, fully integrated into the world economy, a Soviet economist said here today.

Ivan Ivanov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers' State Foreign Economic Commission, was addressing the final meeting of a Soviet-Swedish roundtable meeting which discussed economic and social development in the two countries.

Ivanov singled out four major stages on the way toward a convertible ruble. He said the immediate task was to stabilise the financial situation in the country.

This would require elimination of the state budget deficit and the gradual removal of "redundant" money, now at the disposal of the population and enterprises, from domestic circulation.

Ivanov said the problem of "redundant" money canot be solved by merely increasing the production of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and called for the creation of a real estate market which would allow enterprises and individuals to invest part of their savings in real estate.

He said a reform of domestic prices is another important step toward a convertible ruble. Without such reform, "it would be impossible to analyse the ruble's purchasing power as compared with foreign currencies," he pointed out.

The third stage would be the achievement of the ruble's real domestic convertibility, the economist went on.

"Ruble holders should be given the possibility of buying anything they want on the domestic market," he said, adding that this could be promoted by a large-scale introdcution of wholesale trade which "should become a prevailing form of commercial turnover on the Soviet market."

Making the ruble freely convertible is impossible without a powerful and competitive export sector in Soviet industry, Ivanov said.

"The programme for the development of the Soviet export base is aimed at bringing the share of machinery, equipment and finished products of the chemical-and-timber complex in the general structure of Soviet exports to 60 per cent by the year 2000," he pointed out.

The economist expressed hope that the ruble could become convertible by 2000 if the Soviet economy successfully solves its tasks.

Council of Ministers Discusses Soap Shortage

LD1409205189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the USSR Council of Ministers.

The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers has examined the progress of fulfilling the target of developing production and providing soap and other detergents for the population. Despite the fact that today one quarter more detergents are being produced than a year ago, that procurement abroad has been significantly increased, and that provision of detergents is normalizing in some cities and oblasts, complaints from customers nevertheless continue to come in. This is a consequence, on one hand, of panic buying, and, on the other, of unsatisfactory distribution of goods among the regions of the country and among population points. The attention of the leaders of the USSR Ministry of Trade and of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives has been drawn to this fact. They have been instructed to put in order the trade in detergents.

The volume of production and of import procurements determined for this year exceeds last year's resources by more than 50 percent. There are quite sufficient resources to end rationing of these goods. The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers has also warned about the personal responsibility for production of detergents of Petrov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex; of Timoshin, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Food and Purchases; of Lemayev, USSR minister of the Chemical and petroleum refining industry; and of Olshanskiy, chairman of the State Agro-Chemical Association.

Special attention was paid to averting such a deficit in the future. Comrade Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chaired the meeting.

Agricultural

Nikitin Interviewed on Coordinating Farm Reform

PM1409115189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Vladilen Valentinovich Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) minister of agriculture and first deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom), by V. Gavrichkin: "The Right To Choose Must Be Left Solely to the Peasant: V.V. Nikitin, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Commission for Food and the Purchases, Answers IZVESTIYA's Questions"; date, place not specified—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Vladilen Valentinovich Nikitin is 53 years old. His whole life has been bound up with the countryside and agriculture. He graduated from the Omsk Agricultural Institute and is a mechanical engineer by profession. He worked in Tyumen Oblast as a farm and rayon agricultural administration engineer and director of a state farm [sovkhoz], created subsidiary farms for oil workers in Surgut, headed a rayon agricultural administration, was chairman of a rayon soviet executive committee, first secretary of a CPSU raykom committee, chief of an oblast agricultural administration, and chairman of an oblast soviet executive committee. In 1985 he became RSFSR minister of agriculture and afterwards first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Gosagroprom and a minister of the RSFSR.

[Gavrichkin] I would like to know, Vladilen Valentinovich, what your thoughts were when you first entered your present office as the man in charge?

[Nikitin] It wasn't so much what I thought, as it were, but that I physically sensed the tremendous weight of responsibility which I had accepted with the new job. But as for my thoughts... A lot of prior thinking had to be done and, believe me, these were difficult reflections. After all, the offer was a complete surprise. I must be honest: I had other plans. But at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Agrarian Questions and Food and the Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions I received firm support from the agrarian deputies. Such confidence, you will agree, is worth a lot today...

[Gavrichkin] Unfeigned, sincere support is indeed very important. Especially if you bear in mind that you inherited some extremely difficult problems. The point is not that the Gosagroprom discredited itself, as is usually thought. The existence of this superdepartment showed particularly clearly that commanding the agricultural complex and especially agricultural production from the center and duplicating command through the large management apparatus at succeeding levels is pointless. Recently the VESTNIK AGROPROMA published a plan of the structural subdivisions of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases. Doesn't it seem to you that the new management organ is very reminiscent of the now abolished Gosagroprom?

[Nikitin] Any management structure is in some way reminiscent of its predecessor. As for the apparatus of the commission itself, it isn't large—128 people. The commission has retained several specialized services of statewide importance connected with the implementation of policy in the sphere of the renewal of breeds, stock breeding, the regulation of supplies of foodstuffs to the union food stock, the preparation of cadres, the development of foreign economic ties, and other questions. For the discharge of its functions it is planned to create 9 main administrations and a number of other subdivisions with a total staff of 900 specialists. So there is no comparison with the former Gosagroprom. At this point I ought to stop listing for the time being the external differences—ultimately, they aren't the point.

Haven't we had enough reorganizations and forms of management in the countryside? And we linked all of them with hopes for a bright future, which is what we are hoping for today, too. So it is not a question of form but of whether or not we will be able to create a mechanism which encourages everyone to work for agriculture. Not by coercion, not under duress, and not as a result of entreaties or promises but from their own requirement, need, and interest. I am talking about an integrated system which includes machine building, transport, and all the public and social services. The entire national economy must work for agriculture so that not a single link is overlooked. Such a mechanism, such a system, as you will understand, does not depend on the agency "at the top."

The first demand on the new mechanism in my view, is that it should not hinder work on the land. Do not be surprised; this isn't easy to achieve. The process is in motion and now they are trying to turn us into "fixers" solving operational questions, traffic controllers dispatching freight cars, and troubleshooters for the agro-industrial complex. There have also been attempts to solve many problems at agriculture's expense.... The most important thing of all today is to not succumb, to stay calm, and to resist the pressure caused by the inertia of the old approaches and old thinking.

In short, whichever way you look, there are qualitatively new tasks all around. This means that the methods of resolving them must also be qualitatively new. The commission will have to do this in completely unfamiliar conditions. We were talking about a new management structure. Note this point: The commission doesn't have technological, traffic control, transport, or financial services and doesn't possess material resources. In other words, it has been shorn of those discredited functions which can be used either to do people favors or to do harm. But all the questions which I listed will have to be resolved somehow. But right away, through the economic mechanism and direct involvement in the area of economic interests.

[Gavrichkin] This is indeed a task of extraordinary complexity. The general conclusion now is surely clear: The type of economic systems created in the past, the type of economy as a whole, and the economic mechanism typical of them have completely outlived their usefulness and are historically a spent force. This is the point of the state commission which you are leading—it is one of the bricks in the integrated management edifice of the new type: Its design includes the idea of the clear demarcation of state and economic functions and economic mutual relations serve as the cement that binds.

[Nikitin] Yes. And we have an extremely urgent need to ensure that the changes that are being carried out are integrated. They must be implemented not only in the agro-industrial complex but across the whole national economic structure, too. In a coordinated way without lagging behind in individual areas.

But what do we see today? The mechanism of relations which is being formed in agricultural production is outpacing the corresponding changes that are occurring in the national economic complex. For example, the majority of agro-industrial complex enterprises and whole republics and regions have already switched to self-financing and are trying to live by their own means and... sometimes they do not have the opportunity to put their earnings to use and are unable spend these earnings either to expand or renew the means of production, or develop the social sphere. The system of material and technical support is completely unsatisfactory and the financial mechanism for regulating production has not been properly tuned. And essentially, given the present statewide shortage of resources the creation of a reliable material and technical support for the agro-industrial complex is the ultimate question. That is one of the commission's main tasks.

Or take price formation.... A bottle of milk is cheaper than a bottle of Pepsi Cola—isn't that utter nonsense! Nor is it any better with price parity for agricultural and industrial output: For example, to buy a "Don" combine harvester farmers have to sell 180-250 hectares of wheat.

Yes, I realize that raising purchase prices for agricultural produce affects retail prices or the budget and in today's conditions that will have grave social consequences. Yes, it is patently clear today that the new principles of price formation should be introduced gradually in step with the development of the wholesale trade in the means of production and the increasingly extensive use of contract, quota, and free prices and commercial trade. The path of eliminating the state monopoly in the formation of prices and democratizing price formation in conjunction with broad anti-inflationary measures are the correct policy in principle. But the preparations for its implementation must be thorough.

The existing system of price formation is a brake on development for agriculture now: In these conditions neither cost covering nor true economic accountability [khozraschet] are possible for any forms of economic activity. In this situation neither the collective farm [kolkhoz] nor the sovkhoz will prosper, neither the farmer nor the agricultural cooperative will survive. Look at what rural leaders and specialists are expending their energies on: Not on production, no, but on how to manage and make ends meet, how to live from day to day, and get hold of the things they need.

We have already managed to achieve something in this direction. The government has gone halfway and now all funded resources for the agro-industrial complex will be included in the state order of industrial enterprises. Hitherto a significant proportion of those resources was produced on the basis of contracts, but that only means that the contract is more valuable than money.... Not every farm can negotiate directly with plants and often, furthermore, this isn't "for free," farms have to give them something. But how can they when the state order absorbs all 100 percent of agricultural output.

In the plan of capital investments and resource provision for the agro-industrial complex in 1990 the level envisaged in the 5-year plan is retained. No one has been given greater priority than that this year. True, these aren't the volumes which we need and which we were counting on but this is the most that the country can give today.

[Gavrichkin] Vladilen Valentinovich, one can't help noticing that for some time now we have inescapably been discussing the new state commission's main functions. I recall that after your appointment to this high post had been ratified a deputy at a Supreme Soviet session tried to criticize the program that you had put forward. Everything in it, he said, is old and hackneyed—give us capital investments, give us resources, but virtually nothing about alternative approaches or a variety of forms of ownership and economic activity....

[Nikitin] Perhaps when formulating my position I wasn't sufficiently clear or thorough, which is excusable in a situation where deputies are being particularly exacting and there is a rigid time limit.

But as for the nub of the question, my view is perfectly clear. I am convinced that living and working conditions are inadequate for our peasants today. That being so, there is no need to lead them by the hand, instruct them every step of the way and show them how to live and work.

In this respect questions of ownership and forms of economic acitivity assume special significance. All forms, be it a kolkhoz or a sovkhoz, an association [assotsiatsiya] or a cooperative of cooperatives, an agricultural combine, an agricultural firm, or an amalgamation [obyedineniye], a joint venture, a consortium, a family livestock unit, contract, or various forms of lease relations—in short, any forms of relations of ownership and economic activity must now have equal rights to existence and coexistence. Everything is permissible but strictly on a voluntary basis. Therefore, it is senseless to debate whether all this should be done within the framework of kolkhozes and sovkhozes or outside it.

Complete freedom of choice and economic responsibility are the only correct principles. If people want to work in this form or that, on this basis or that, they shouldn't be prevented. If Russia's peasants need to create their own association—help them do that. If a peasant wants to leave the kolkhoz, obtain a plot of land, and manage it independently and if he wants to use hired or other services from public sector farming on a contract basis, then for heaven's sake negotiate with him sensibly, don't fleece him. After all, the interest and advantage here are mutual. We must recognize once and for all that a diversity of specific forms of socialist ownership is an objective process and we should not hinder the development of forms produced by life. The criteria here are efficiency and acquisition through labor.

But I would still mention two conditions here. The first is how to work, in what form—the right to choose must be left solely to the peasant, to the actual producer. Second: Our universal concern is to ensure the complete equality and comparability of economic activity conditions for the various social forms and rivalry between them or, if you prefer, competition will solve all the other questions afterwards. Incidentally, on that basis it is easiest to create a mechanism which enables really efficient use to be made of the as yet very limited material resources.

To unshackle people's initiative, first and foremost that of the peasant, a number of very important laws are being being prepared, as you know, including laws on the land and its use, lease relations, and ownership. The drafts already exist. There is work still to be done on them but the first versions already show plainly that these are interesting documents. A whole range of new concepts and many rights are being introduced, in particular the right to establish procedures governing the ownership and use of land and other property which is delegated to republics and directly to local soviets. This will undoubtedly provide broad scope to new forms of economic management and give people an interest in increasing production.

While recognizing the tremendous significance of such changes in the countryside I nevertheless remain a realist. At the Supreme Soviet session I asserted and repeat here that it is necessary to modernize the countryside's material and technical base more quickly and to radically improve the peasants' living and everyday conditions. The machinery and techniques that are being used are imperfect and without the necessary mechanisms and effort the problem of the food supply will not be resolved. And let us remember the roads and the neglected state of the social sphere in the countryside. I have not touched on the entire agricultural complex yet. After all, even if we achieve substantial growth now in the production of agricultural output, the extreme backwardness of the processing and storage base will still prevent us from properly filling the food stores.

[Gavrichkin] If I have understood correctly, you maintain that the success of work to solve the food problem is determined not just by the peasants or kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

[Nikitin] You know, the now-scrapped USSR Gosagroprom did have one great idea, that of integrating agricultural production with the sectors processing arable and livestock produce. It was, unfortunately, not possible to do this quickly. But the question remains relevant. And the integration process continues to develop: Various associations, agrarian combines, and agrarian firms are being set up on this qualitatively new basis in republics, oblasts, and rayons, and many such formations are already demonstrating high efficiency.

We must press on in this direction, for no peasant holding is conceivable without close ties with processing. All types of small collectives should be tightly integrated with processing, storage depots, transport, and trade. This is one of our state commission's major sectors of activity. Questions of specialization—which is also extremely necessary to improve our technology and create highly efficient waste-free production units—are also easily resolved through integration. I am certain that if we improve integration, the rest will follow.. You won't solve anything here by orders or administrative meddling. But it is our job and task to provide models and create the necessary conditions.

The only problem is that obsession with size has distorted the processing sectors' development. Long-distance transportation of agricultural produce leads to large direct losses and a deterioration in the quality of food products. Processing should be brought closer to the areas where raw materials are produced.

Yet the necessary equipment is lacking, and our own industry is developing extremely slowly. The process needs to be given a boost. I see our farms' access to the world market as just such an opportunity. By selling surplus wheat, pulse crops, and oil-bearing seeds kolkhozes and sovkhozes, including lease collectives and livestock units, are able to earn around 400-700 million foreign currency rubles. The task here is to set up and develop a powerful mechanism allowing our agricultural production to break through into the external market. This will afford direct access to the equipment, technologies, and modern scientific thinking that we want and enable us to set up joint ventures on mutually beneficial terms.

[Gavrichkin] Are there specific proposals regarding such enterprises?

[Nikitin] There are quite a few. While there was no foreign currency, people were reluctant to cooperate with us, but as soon as it became possible to make money, business people showed an interest. I recently met with a delegation from Hungary, told them about the opportunities, and had the following response: "Your decisions are music to our ears!...." There are quite a few people wanting to set up joint ventures to grow soybeans and produce sugar, tomato puree, and many other things. I hope that by making foreign equipment and technologies accessible to our farms we will thereby boost the development of our own machine building and agricultural science.

[Gavrichkin] You have delineated virtually all the basic functions and areas of activity of the State Commission for Food and Purchases. But your commission is an organ of state leadership. Where, then, is the demarcation line between state management and economic management and what form does it take.

[Nikitin] To generalize, our commission should ensure the elaboration of state policy in the sphere of socioeconomic, production, scientific, and technical development. And, of course, implement it through targeted programs, state orders, and capital investments.

Republics have broader functions, since all agro-industrial complex enterprises are now under their jurisdiction—regional economic accountability is inconceivable without this. It is important only that the former USSR Gosagroprom diktat should not be replaced by a system of republic administrative meddling. But I think that it is nowadays becoming more and more difficult to give orders to production workers. After all, they have switched to or are in the process of switching to full economic accountability and self-management and are being given the right to withdraw from existing associations and form various types of new economic formations on a voluntary, associative basis. The organs being set up to manage such formations are directly economic.

Note that this kind of managerial organ does not occuppy a superior position vis-a-vis its member enterprises, which rules out the possibility of administrative meddling. And it is also financed by contributions from the enterprises themselves. In other words, a qualitatively new structure of economic management is taking shape. Augmented by the appropriate economic mechanism, it will be sufficiently democratic, will be able to counter bureaucracy, and will not cramp the independence of the actual commodity producers. Ultimately this is, I think, the basic condition for successful work.

Nikonov at Party Debate on Agricultural Output

PM1509082789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Ensuring Food Supplies Is a Common Concern"]

[Text] Progress by the party, soviet, and economic organs of all oblast and republic centers and a number of major cities in carrying out party and government decisions designed to improve the population's food supply has been examined at the CPSU Central Committee with the participation of V.P. Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and leaders of central ministries and departments. First secretaries of party gorkoms [city committees] and chairmen of gorispolkoms [city soviet executive committees] and oblast, kray, and republic agro-industrial committees reported on practical measures being taken to boost the output of foodstuffs.

The state of production, processing, and storage of agricultural output was subject to detailed examination from an exacting party standpoint.

Analysis of the political and organizational work carried out by party committees showed that substantial positive changes are taking place wherever the industrial and scientific potential of cities is also directly involved along with rural workers in solving the agro-industrial complex' pressing problems.

Valuable experience has been accumulated in Kharkov, Belgorod, Minsk, Orel, Volgograd, Kaluga, Tselinograd, Voronezh, Brest, Vitebsk, Penza, Saratov, and a number of other cities. There, in addition to involving industrial potential in developing the agro-industrial complex, a whole system for integrating cities and the countryside in food production is taking shape.

In a number of places special zones for the commodity production of agricultural output are being formed around industrial centers, agrarian zones, as it were, comprising kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], lease cooperatives, peasant farms, storage depots, and processing enterprises and rayons. The funds and material and technical resources of industrial enterprises, in addition to other sources, are being invested in developing these complexes in suburban zones.

Work to set up agro-industrial formations—agrocombines and agrofirms—is continuing, which helps reduce losses of output and speed up production development rates. As a result the growth of gross output there is 6 percent higher, aggregate profitability of production is 8 percent higher, and labor productivity is 30 percent higher than the countrywide average.

In Voronezh, for example, the annual volume of work carried out for the countryside by city industry totals R82 million. Last year alone more than 1,000 homes, 400 hay storage facilities, and 100 grain threshing floors were constructed in the oblast's villages; more than 7 cheese-making shops were rapidly commissioned, and over 10 such shops are now at the installation stage.

Much has been done to expand the capacities of processing and food industry enterprises in Saratov and Penza Oblasts, and this had an immediate impact on improving the urban population's provision with foodstuffs.

The practice of direct long-term, mutually beneficial contractual relations between industrial enterprises and kolkhozes and sovkhozes, whereby on a co-production basis enterprises invest money and resources in developing farms, and the extra output produced by the fields and livestock units is supplied to the labor collectives, is spreading.

In many regions there is a marked improvement in developing horticulture and truck farming. Work to create new industrial enterprise subsidiary farms and expand existing ones is continuing.

However, it was noted that many party committees, soviets, and agro-industrial organs are slow to organize the implementation of the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum on the agrarian question, do not always facilitate the development of integration processes between city and countryside, and poorly monitor the assimilation of capital investment in the food and processing sectors and the agricultural output storage base. Ashkhabad, Baku, and Grodno are only just beginning to implement their comprehensive programs to improve food supplies.

Many cities are still poorly equipped with potato storage facilities, have few winter greenhouses, have feeble food enterprises' capacities, and they lack trading premises. Not enough specific measures to correct the situation are being carried out, and the freeloading approach still prevails. Greenhouse cultivation in Arkhangelsk, Barnaul, Gorkiy, Kaliningrad, Yaroslavl, and Kustanay is being expanded too slowly.

Some party gorkoms and gorispolkoms have been unable to ensure the requisite turnaround in the attitude of the leaders of industrial enterprises and construction organizations regarding the needs of the countryside. The plan for construction and installation work at food facilities is not being met. Powerful construction organizations are little involved in construction in the countryside. In Ust-Kamenogorsk, Temirtau, Sumy, and Rovno only 3-4 percent of planned construction and installation work for the agro-industrial complex is being carried out. Collectives of machine building enterprises are not fulfilling state orders and contracts regarding deliveries of many kinds of machines and equipment to the agro-industrial complex. The USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, Ministry of the Aviation Industry, and Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building have a large backlog in respect of deliveries to rural workers.

The CPSU Central Committee drew the attention of party committees and soviet organs to the unacceptability of adopting a passive stance on the pressing problem of food and of allowing a gap between planned measures and what is actually done. They were told to considerably step up organizational work in this priority area and to take additional measures to assimilate allocated resources and increase cities' contribution to improving the population's supply with food products.

The following took part in the examination of the questions: G.S. Ogryzkin and G.G. Seregin, deputy chiefs of the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Department; leaders of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases, ministries, and departments; and workers of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers.

Nikonov Visits Plant, Discusses Conversion

LD1409191889 Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 14 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—Ways of perfecting and organising the batch production of advanced equipment for family farms and leaseholders were discussed by Viktor Nikonov, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during today's visit to the Vladimir region, Central Russia.

At the Vladimir tractor plant, Nikonov drew special attention to the fact that practically all main shops of the plant worked at full capacity. The machine tools, which have been operated in the past 25-30 years, often broke down. At the same time, the spacious shops of a defense plant nearby, behind a high fence, stood idle. The advanced numerically-controlled machine tools do not operate at full capacity and are used extremely inefficiently.

Unfortunately, conversion is only making its first timid steps at the plant. The defense plant started production of only a small amount of spare parts for the T-30 tractor. There are neither funds nor material resources to modernise the old capacities. As a result the modern T-30 tractor and a fodder distributor, based on it, can be seen only at exhibitions.

Agricultural Developments for 10-14 Sep Reported

LD1509025389

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 10-14 September, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parenthesis at the end of each item.

10 September

Altay farmers have sent to elevators the first 1 million tonnes of grain from the new harvest. More than 80 percent of the wheat accepted is of strong, valuable grades. (0400)

11 September

No fileworthy items monitored.

12 September

In Krasnoyarsk Kray, the threshing of grain crops has finished on 1 million hectares, half the area to be harvested. Winter rye is already in the granaries, with every one of the 50,000 hectares yielding 30 quintals per hectare. In Irkutsk Oblast, the yield is over 19 quintals per hectare. Due to the wet weather, grain has been cut on just one quarter of the area. Only half of the harvested grain has been threshed there. (1500)

13 September

No fileworthy items monitored.

14 September

The sowing of winter crops has been completed in Kurgan Oblast. They occupy an area of 270,000 hectares, mainly rye. (1100)

Mass harvesting of rice has begun in Astrakhan Oblast. The area has been reduced by 10,000 hectares over the past 2 years because the land has been returned for use by fish farms in the Volga delta. The use of high-yielding rice varieties has meant that the resulting cut in the harvest will not be signifgicant. (1100)

The sowing of vegetables has begun in Turkmenistan. (1100)

Scientific

Biological Satellite 'Cosmos-2044' Launched 15 Sep

Flight To Last 14 Days

LD1509132589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1301 GMT 15 Sep 89

[A Biological Satellite Has Been Launched Into Space"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Sep (TASS)—Another artificial earth satellite, Cosmos-2044, was launched in the Soviet Union by the "Soyuz" rocket launcher today. On board are two monkeys and other biological objects, as well as scientific apparatus for studying the influence of weightlessness and cosmic radiation on the processes of vital activities.

Scientists from the Hungarian Peoples Republic, the GDR, Canada, the Polish People's Republic, Socialist Republic of Romania, the United States, France, the CSSR, and the European Space Agency are participating in the program for the 14-day spaceflight. The satellite has been placed in the following orbit: initial period of revolution, 89.3 minutes; apogee, 294 kilometres; perigee, 216 km; orbital inclination, 82.3 degrees.

The apparatus is functioning normally. After completion of all tests and fulfilment of the flight program, the biological objects and scientific apparatus will be brought back to earth for further study.

Details of 'Unique' Project Given

LD1509104189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0230 GMT 15 Sep 89

[From the "120 Minutes" program]

[Excerpt] Launching a new space apparatus is planned in the Soviet Union for today, literally in an hour or an hour and a half. This will be a biological satellite. The project is unique, and for this reason we have decided to tell you about it in a bit more detail. Just yesterday, at the space pavillion at the USSR exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy, visitors were able to see it. It is called 'Bion,' and there are about 20 countries taking part in its creation and in conducting experiments in space. Never before have there been so many combining their efforts in the conquest of space. The conquest of space is, again, an imprecise term. At issue is the study of man, seeking methods of treating our earthly ailments using space technology. For this reason, the passengers in the 'Bion' project will be earth inhabitants, fish and rats, on which various experiments will be conducted by scientists on earth. [video shows brief clip of the exhibition, satellite on display, fish tanks, rats, and monkeys] [passage omitted]

Six More 'Cosmos' Satellites Launched 14 Sep

LD1509080289 Moscow TASS in English 0750 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—The Soviet Union blasted off on Thursday the Satellites Cosmos-2038, Cosmos-2039, Cosmos-2040, Cosmos-2041, Cosmos-2042, Cosmos-2043. They were put into orbit by the Tsiklon booster-rocket.

The satellites carry scientific instrumentation to continue space explorations.

The six satellites circle the earth along orbits with the following initial parameters: Period of revolution—114 minutes, apogee—1,435 km, perigee—1,394 km, orbital inclination—82.6 degrees.

Apart from scientific instrumentation, the satellites have radio systems for precise measuring of orbital elements and radio systems to transmit data to the Earth on the operation of instruments and scientific equipment.

Equipment mounted on the satellites operates normally.

The coordination computing centre conducts processing of incoming information.

Cosmonauts Continue Tests on 'Mir' Complex

LD1509100389 Moscow TASS in English 0947 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—By TASS correspondent reporting from mission control centre:

The two Soviet cosmonauts, Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov, were reactivating and assembling research equipment on board the orbital space complex Mir (Peace) over the past two days.

They replaced individual elements in the on-board life-support system.

On September 13, using the propulsion unit of the spaceship Progress-M, the crew changed the orbit of their space lab.

The cosmonauts have completed preparations for using an installation, called Gallar, to produce high-quality semiconductor materials in conditions of microgravity.

The Mir crew is continuing astrophysical observations with the use of the internationally developed orbital observatory "Roentgen." Today, they conducted four sessions of observations of an x-ray pulsar in the Perseus constellation.

Viktorenko and Serebrov will take time off on Saturday and Sunday.

The cosmonauts are feeling fine. The flight is proceeding normally.

Optical Research Module for Mir Complex Tested

LD1509084989 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Text] In the Soviet Union, the testing has been completed of a new research module for the orbiting complex Mir on which two Soviet cosmonauts are continuing their flight. Specialist on space technology call it an optical module. Mainly television, film, and photo equipment will be installed on it. This will make it possible to study the natural resources of the country very effectively. The other laboratory which is being prepared for launching to the Mir complex is meant for large-scale ecological research. Together with the Soviet Union, a number of European countries will take part in equipping it.

Military

Galkin Interviewed on Military Doctrine

LD1309120289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1215 GMT 10 Sep 89

[Interview with Colonel General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Galkin, chief of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, on the occasion of Soviet Tank Troops Day, 10 September, by reporter Dmitriy Kurilenko; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Kurilenko] Comrade general, we know that the new Soviet military doctrine is strictly defensive in character. Tell me, what is the role within it of the tank troops?

[Galkin] Yes, Soviet military doctrine is a purely defensive doctrine, whereas the tank was originally created as an offensive weapon; and the tank units have been, and are, the main defense force of the ground troops, possessing mobility, great gun and missile power, and reliable protection. But it seems to me that all these qualities are consistent with defensive combat. And if we look at some of the factors of the tank itself as a combat unit, the first is the collective nature of tank weapons. This is not inconsistent with defensive combat—the contrary is true.

The second factor is the growing role of the time factor—you know, time in setting up defense or restoring it. And don't think any branch of the services will do that better than the tank units. I am talking, of course, of large-scale defense, whether in one theater of war or in several. And then the last factor is the factor of stability of defense. And I think there is simply no defense that is more stable than a tank defense deployed [eshelonirovannyy] in depth, interacting with motorized infantry. And speaking of the role of tanks in the old defense doctrine or in our new one, that is to say, in the old offensive or the new defensive doctrine, I think that it is equally great in both.

[Kurilenko] Until recently, tank recruits were mainly selected from people familiar with machinery—mechanics, combine operators, tractor drivers. On what principle are the present generation of recruits selected?

[Galkin] You know, Dmitriy, our principle for recruitment into the tank troops is basically unchanged. That is, we do give preference to young men who have some technical background. As you say, they have previously worked as tractor drivers, mechanics, or diesel men, or have secondary technical education. So here the only restriction would be state of health. Tank men have to be healthy boys with good endurance. And since that principle of recruitment into the tank troops was adopted many years ago, when the tank troops and the tanks themselves were technically of a much lower—incomparably lower—standard than now, we consider that that principle remains with us, the same principle. Tanks are powerful and at the same time technically complex, and in order to master the tank and operate it, of course you need a technical background.

Well, I want to tell you at this point that we also have a second stage, a second wind, as it were, in the training of tank men, when we train them actually in our units. And here we get boys who have come straight from school. Here we now have a completely new principle. The training has changed, it has become more complex. Regarding time, I'd say it has become more concentrated, because whereas previously a soldier would serve for 3 years, now he serves 2. Here we proceed on the basis of using a wide network of training simulators for the training of tank crews—electronic simulators and cinematic simulators. And before a crew gets into a live tank, it goes through this classroom system of instruction using simulators. It carries out all the tasks—all the tasks concerning firepower, all the driving exercises. Only after that does it get into a tank.

So we have also changed the principle of officer training, not only mechanics and drivers or tank gunner-commanders. Whereas formerly all our schools were secondary tank schools, now they are all higher schools. The command schools provide 3-year courses. We pay special attention to schools which train the engineering and technical personnel of the tank units. We have 5-year schools which provide comprehensive training for professional tank officers. I'd say that although our principle of recruiting is unchanged, the approach to those principles has, of course, become more complex and more demanding—higher—in the training of mechanics, commanders, gunners, and especially of officers.

[Kurilenko] I want to ask you this. For a long time the tank and armored troops enjoyed special popularity in our country—not so much popularity, as the love of the whole people. Films were made and songs composed about tank men. The lines: "the armor is strong and our tanks are fast" even came down to people of my generation, in the early'60's. Don't you think the lack of such regard for the present tank men and their combat machines indicates a certain decline in the prestige of this military profession in comparison with, say, the paratroops or the marines?

[Galkin] I understand. Well, I cannot complain here of any absence of regard for the tank men. We tank men constantly feel the attention, even the increased attention, and concern on the part of the Central Committee, the government, the Defense Ministry. And in everything that has to do with the tank units—from tank-building and the training of tank cadres to the perfecting of the smooth operation of the tank units in battle—I don't think you can compare the profession or the tank units generally, with the paratroop units or marine units. I have great respect for all branches of the forces, and a special affection for our paratroopers. But all the same, the tank units, combined units, and formations represent the solving of the main task, the achievement of the main goals in the main areas.

[Kurilenko] For a number of demographic and other reasons, the recruiting of elite troops into the military units has in recent years become an increasingly difficult task. Tell me, do you recruit into the tank troops men with a criminal record, and what, in general, is the incidence of law-breaking in those troops?

[Galkin] I understand, Dmitriy. Well, I can tell you that men with a criminal record are not sent to the tank troops. But we in the tank troops do have quite a few young men who have been in the custody of the law enforcement organs. But here I would like to say this: What you must realize is that in recent years quite a large percentage of young people have been coming into the ranks of the armed forces having been brought up among negative phenomena associated, after all, with great defects in moral education; and it is impossible to overcome this all at once, just like that. I will say that in this regard, in this area, a great deal of work is being done—thoughtful, enormous, responsible work by the entire corps of officers, by public organizations, and by the military justice system. The first questions to be posed concern educating people in legal matters in order to inculate a high sense of civic responsibility, humanity, respect for Soviet laws and for the rules of socialist community and a refusal to tolerate any infringements of them, and the strengthening of military discipline.

What should be said about discipline in the tank units at the present time? I say that it is at the requisite level, it corresponds to the high preparedness of the tank men, it is consonant with fulfilling the tasks which have been set. I want to say that the tank men are ready to carry out the orders of their homeland at any time.

[Kurilenko] As a result of the reduction of tanks, certain of their parts and components may be used in the national economy and after they have been dismantled. In what industries?

[Galkin] Yes, in this connection, in connection with the cuts affecting a certain number of tanks, this question has been studied and we have reported on it to the council of ministers. There is a decision of the Council of Ministers dated 12 July 1989. We have examined certain special vehicles which will be manufactured using tanks as the base. The documentation has been prepared for their manufacture—I can tell you what some of them are. Studies and projects have been examined, for example, for the building of such vehicles as an all-purpose tractor to tow oil and gas equipment and drilling equipment.

[Kurilenko] They have powerful engines, of course.

[Galkin] Yes, powerful engines. The all-purpose tractor will tow oil equipment from point to point. Then there's a firefighting pump manipulator vehicle for gas industry facilities and generally for all facilities connected with the manufacture and storage of highly inflammable substances. Then there's a multipurpose towing tractor with mounted equipment for the Ministry of Railways.

[Kurilenko] Has the question been raised of reducing deliveries of Soviet tanks to foreign countries?

[Galkin] Yes, Dmitriy, I can tell you that, well, military cooperation with foreign countries, including deliveries to them of Soviet military weapons, belongs to the sphere of the foreign-policy activities of the states. And on the basis of a decision by the Soviet Government—taking into account, of course, the security of our state, taking into account the long-term political, economic, and other reasons of state, and in connection with this new - the new political thinking in international affairs, in connection with the Soviet Government's policy of limiting and reducing arms forces—this question has been examined, and the Soviet Union is now advocating limiting arms deliveries, especially of offensive weapons, above all in zones of international tension, but on a basis of mutuality with the West. In other words, it should be mutual. Well, all this is fully applicable to the delivery of Soviet tanks to foreign countries.

[Kurilenko] And a last question, Comrade General: Do you think it possible that the tank and armored troops could be used to stop disorder and unrest within our country?

[Galkin] Yes, Dmitriy, that's a very difficult question. I was expecting you to ask it. Many people are asking this question at the present time. I consider—you know, let us look at the law code of the Soviet Union, our Constitution. And I would like to read Article 31 of Chapter 5, "Defense of the Socialist Homeland": The armed forces of the USSR have been created for the defense of the socialist gains and peaceful toil of the Soviet people and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of ths State.

But there is also another article of that same constitution. Here is Article 4, in Chapter 1: The Soviet State and All Its Organs—and the armed forces are organs of the state—all its organs operate on the basis of socialist legality and secure the protection, law and order, and interests of society and the rights and freedoms of the citizens. And it seems to me that I cannot say more than that article or put it any beter than it is stated in the USSR Constitution.

[Kurilenko] On 10 September, the country marks Tank Troops Day. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I am very happy to congratulate you.

[Galkin] Thank you very much. I, for my part, on this glorious holiday want to congratulate the veterans of the tank troops, our tank builders, the workers, engineers and designers, the tank officers, and all the personnel of the tank units on this great festival, Tank Troops Day.

Defense Minister Greets Military School Heads

PM1409074389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed feature containing report on Defense Minister D.T. Yazov's message to military academy staff and students, and interviews with military training chiefs: "Perestroyka Demands Knowledge—Thoughts on the Threshold of the New Academic Year"]

[Excerpts] Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, cordially greeted the staff of military academies, institutes, and schools, and military faculties at civilian institutes of higher education at the beginning of the new academic year. The main effort in the new academic year, the defense minister's message of greeting says, must be directed at deepening perestroyka in the education and training process, extending democratization, increasing the activity of staff in the tasks they are charged with, questing for what is new, and resolutely rejecting old-fashioned views and obsolete forms and methods of work.

On the eve of Knowledge Day, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked some readers to answer this question:

"What fundamentally new elements should appear in the organization of study and in the restructuring of education in the coming academic year, in your opinion? [passage omitted]

Major General Yu. Shirinskiy, chief of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School named for the 60th Anniversary of the Great October:

"Virtually the most serious problems are connected with the reduction of the Armed Forces. Among some of the students confusion and uncertainty about the future and doubts about the necessity for the very profession of military political worker have made their appearance. New forms of ideological and training work must be sought. Incessant instances of transfers of students from the school are worrying. Having studied for 2 or 3 years, some submit reports saying that they have become disillusioned with their choice of profession. What are the reasons for this? Of course, external influences and society's particular mood are partly the cause. But, undoubtedly, there are reasons within the school itself and in the work of its collective. How should the situation be changed and in what way exactly? There are no simple answers to these questions.

We are proposing to put to the forefront the training of students in political methods of leadership and the practice of assimilating general party precepts in the sphere of interethnic relations. With this aim in mind, programs of courses on social disciplines have been revised, and we will introduce a special new course on the above-mentioned problems. [passage omitted]

Officer Interviewed on Volga-Ural District Merger

PM1409095789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 89 Second Edition p 3

["Topical Interview" in Sverdlovsk with Major General I. Nozdrachev by correspondent S. Ryabov: "From the Urals to the Volga"; date not given]

[Excerpts] As already reported in the press, on 1 September this year the Red Banner Ural Military District was reorganized as the Volga-Ural Military District. In connection with the fact that the editors are receiving letters and telephone calls about this, our correspondent met with Major General I. Nozdrachev [not further identified] and asked him to comment on some of them.

[Ryabov] Ivan Fedorovich, the residents of Sverdlovsk and the oblast get the impression that they have now been left defenseless....

[Nozdrachev] I will say at once: The USSR Ministry of Defense took this step in accordance with our doctrine of disarmament. Incidentally, we are not pioneers in this instance: The Central Asian District has already been liquidated. And I also wish to draw my fellow countrymen's attention to the important point that it is not the military units and subunits in the Urals that are being reduced but the district's administrative and command apparatus.

The stationing of personnel, the total number of formations, and their material and technical base remain as before. [Passage omitted]

[Ryabov] By all accounts, you are now the only general still in the district staff building. But I also see something else: You are dressed in field uniform, and there is a travel order on the desk. A traveling bag in the corner....

[Nozdrachev] Yes, I am flying off in 2 hours time. Here, look at the order from Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov, our commander: "On 8 September in the District

Officers House in Kuybyshev City there will be a delegates meeting of the officer corps of the Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District...." Well, we will get acquainted with our colleagues and compare what turns out better for them and what for us. On this basis we will seek the optimum option for enhancing personnel combat readiness.

Although the reorganization has been brought about by good changes in the international arena, it is our profession and our sacred duty to be strong in the face of strength and to be able, in case of danger, to defend our people and our land against an aggressor.

Arkhipov on Defense Ministry Consumer Goods

PM1509093989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 89 First Edition p 1

[TASS report on interview with Army General V.M. Arkhipov, chief of USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, by unnamed TASS correspondent: "Gcods for the People"; date and place of interview not stated]

[Text] USSR Defense Ministry enterprises are presenting their products at the interrepublic wholesale consumer goods fair which opened 8 September at the Central Army Sports Club Athletics Complex.

What is their contribution to fulfilling the state program for providing quality goods for the population? How are they fulfilling the proposed plans? Army General V.M. Arkhipov, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services answers these questions, put to him by a TASS correspondent.

"First of all I would like to note that although the USSR Defense Ministry enterprises are not part of the country's military-industrial complex, their potential is considerable. They exist in all military districts and in the navy. Their basic task is to repair and restore hardware and weapons in the troops.

"After the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution 'On Measures To Increase Production and Accelerate the Saturation of the Market With Consumer Goods' was adopted in 1988, military enterprises' production of output for the population increased significantly. So we can say: We have not come to the fair empty-handed. Work is particularly well organized at the following plants: The Kronshtadt Ship Repair Plant, which produces upholstered furniture and summerhouses, the Zaporozhye Motor Vehicle Repair Plant, which produces trailers for cars, and the construction group of enterprises in Kaliningrad in Moscow Oblast, which supplies sawn lumber....

"This was made possible thanks to the efforts of labor collectives, whose initiative has grown in conditions of expanding economic autonomy and economic accountability. While R70.7 million of consumer goods were produced in 1988, R68 million have already been produced in the 1st 6 months of this year."

First Generation Nuclear Subs To Be Withdrawn

LD1309154789 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 13 Sep 89

[Text] The Soviet nuclear powered submarines of the first generation will be taken out of service ahead of schedule. A technical expert of the Northern Fleet has reported that this decision was adotped after analyzing the condition of submarines in the wake of a submarine accident near Medvezhiye Island on 26 June this year. A commission has found microcracks in a welded joint in the pipeline cooling the reactor.

Yazov Signs Former General Abashin's Obituary

PM1409110989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 89 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of Retired Colonel General N.B. Abashin]

[Excerpts] Retired Colonel General Nikolay Borisovich Abashin, an active participant in the Great Patriotic War and member of the CPSU since 1943, died after a prolonged illness at the age of 66. He departed life as a loyal son of the Soviet people who devoted his life to selfless service of the motherland and strengthening its defense capability. [Passage omitted]

[Signed] D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, M.D. Popkov, D.A. Grinkevich, V.V. Skokov, Yu.I. Paniratov, G.N. Gurin.